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GEOGRAPHICAL DATA IN INDIAN INSCRIPTIONS

By B. C. LAW

To reconstruct a systematic geography of ancient India based on the inscriptional evidence is a desideratum. Previous writers on this interesting subject have not made much use of this valuable evidence. In this paper an attempt has been made to deal with some south Indian towns, villages, rivers, mountains etc., mainly relying on the inscriptions hitherto published.

Kaḍaba.—It is in the Tumkur district of the Mysore State, where copper-plates of Prabhūtavarṣa (Śaka saṁvat 735) were discovered (*EI.*, IV, 332 ff.).

Kaḍaikkoṭṭūr.—It is the name of a village (Hultzsch, *SII.*, I, p. 105). Ariṣṭanemi ācārya belonged to it. It is mentioned in 391 of North Arcot district (vide Raṅgāchāri's list).

Kaḍāraṁ (or Kiḍāraṁ).—It is now the headquarters of the taluk of Ramnad Zamindari in the Madura district (*Ibid.*, II, p. 106). Kaḍāraṁ being the first port of call for ships from India to Further India and China, was the place best known to the people of the Tamil country and therefore Tamil inscriptions refer to the conquest of Kaḍāraṁ. The smaller Leyden copper-plates dated 1019 A.D. record an embassy from Kaḍāraṁ to the Coḷa court at Āyiraṭṭali (*EI.*, XXII, 267—71).

Kaḷavalināḍu.—The Tiruppuvanam plates of Jaṭāvarman Kulaśekhara I refer to it. This country was divided into two parts, north and south (*EI*.. XXV, Pt. III).

Kaḷavapūṃdi.—The Koduru grant of Ana-vota-reddi (Śaka 1280) refers to it, which may be identified with modern Kaluvapūḍi in the Gūḍivāḍa taluk of the Kistna District (*EI*., XXV, Pt. III).

Kaliṅga.—The Kaliṅga country lies between the Godāvarī and the Mahānadī rivers (Hultzsch, *SII*., I, pp. 63, 65, 95, etc.) The capital of Kaliṅga was Dantapuranagara (*EI*., XIV). Many other Kaliṅga capitals existed in the Ganjam district (*EI*., IV, 187) The Sonepur grant of Mahāśivaguptayajāti refers to Kaliṅga, Koṅgoda, Utkala and Kośala ruled by Lakṣmaṇasena of Gauḍa. Kaliṅga formed a geographical unit by itself, and had its own rulers from the earliest times. An eastern Gaṅga copper-plate grant from Sudava *E.I.*, XXVI, Pt. II, 66 ff.) also refers to Kaliṅganagara. According to this copper-plate Kāmarūpa is located in ancient Kaliṅga.

In the Aihole inscriptions of the seventh century A.D., Pulakesin II claims to have subdued the Kaliṅgas and took the fortress of Piṣṭapura (*EI*., VI, pp. 4 ff.). Harṣadeva or Śrīharṣa is described in a Nepalese inscription to have been the king of Kaliṅga, Oḍra, Gauḍa and other countries (*JRAS*., 1898, pp. 384-5; *IHQ*., 1927, p. 841). Another reference to Kaliṅga is found in the Bheraghat Inscription of Alhaṇadevī, the queen of Gayā-Karṇa of the Kalacuri dynasty, the grandson of the famous Lakṣmīkarṇa. It informs us that when Lakṣmīkarṇa gave full play to his heroism, Vaṅga trembled with Kaliṅga (*EI*., II, p. 11).

Most of the early Gaṅgas of Kaliṅga like Hastivarman (*EI*., XXIII, 65), Indravarman (*EI*., XXV, 195),

Devendravarman (*EI.*, XXVI, 63), who described themselves as lords of Kaliṅga, issued their grants from the victorious camp at Kaliṅganagara. (*EI.*, XXVI, 67). The plates of the early Gaṅgā kings of Kaliṅga, like Jayavarmadeva and Indravarman, refer to the victorious residence of Śvetaka (*EI.*, XXIII, 261; XXIV, 181; XXVI, 167), which has been identified with Chikaṭi in the Ganjam district. For a list of ancient districts of Kaliṅga country as mentioned in the different Kaliṅga inscriptions of various dates, vide *Indian Culture*, XIV, p. 137.

In the fifth century A.D. the well-known Komarti grant introduces us to a Śrī Mahārāja named Candravarman, who is described as Kaliṅgādhipati or the lord of Kaliṅga (Sewell, *Historical Inscriptions of Southern India*, p. 18). To this dynasty Umavarman and Viśākhavarman, who were the lords of Kaliṅga, probably belonged. To about the same date as that of the Komarti grant, may be ascribed the inscription of a certain Kaliṅgādhipati Vāśiṣṭhīputra Śaktivarman of the Māṭhara family who granted from Piṣṭapura (Pithapuram) the village of Rākaluva in the Kaliṅgaviṣaya (*EI.*, XII, pp. 1 ff.). A copper-plate grant of eastern Cālukya king Bhīma I, mentions a village in Elamañci-Kaliṅgadeśa, which formed part of a province called Devarāṣṭra. According to the Kharod Inscription of Ratnadeva III, the lord of Kaliṅga was the youngest son of Kokalla (*EI.*, XXI, p. 159). According to some, Kaliṅgarājā came to be regarded as the son and not merely a descendant of Kokalla. The Kharod Inscription further says that Kaliṅgarājā became the lord of Tummāṇ, which has been identified by some with Tumana in the Bilaspur district (*IA.*, LIII, pp. 267 ff.). According to the Amoda plates, Kaliṅgarājā churned the king of Utkala and contributed prosperity to the treasury of Gāṅgeyadeva (*EI.*, XIX, p.

75). According to a South India Inscription dated 1135 A.D., a Gaṅgā king of Kaliṅga was defeated by Durjaya Maṇḍa II (EI., VI, 276). The ruler of Kaliṅga along with those of Kāñcī, Kośala, Mālava, Lāṭa, Taṅka, etc., was defeated by Dantidurga, according to the Ellora Inscription, V, 23 and the Begumra plates of Indra III (EI., IX, 24 ff.).

Govinda III came to the bank of the Narmadā and conquered Kaliṅga and other countries including Mālava, Kośala, Vengī, Ḍāhala and Odraka (*EI*., XXIII, Pt. viii, p. 297).

Kalluru.—This ancient village is situated in the Repalle taluk of the Guṇṭur district (*IA*., XII, 248).

Kalapatti.—It is in Pālghāṭ, where a stone inscription was discovered (*EI*., XV, 145 ff.).

Kalubarigā.—It is the modern Gulbargā in the Nizam's territory (*EI*., XIII, 157).

Kalyāṇa.—This city was founded by the Coḍa king Kāmarāja, which became famous as Kāmapurī, 'the crest-jewel of the Āndhra country' (*EI*., XXVI, Pt. I).

Kamakapalli.—It is situated in the Girigaḍa village of the Karvannāḍga district (*EI*., XVI, 270)

Kanakavalli.—A village (*Ibid*., I, p. 78, 79) belonging to Paṅgalanāḍu, a division of Paḍuvur-Koṭṭam in Jayaṅkoṇḍa-Coḷamaṇḍalam.

Kaṇḍarādityaṁ—It is the name of a village (*Ibid*., I, p. 112) on the northern bank of the Kāverī in the Trichinopoly district. A chieftain of this name occurs in the inscriptions.

Kaṇḍeruvāḍi.—It is Kaṇḍeruvāṭiviṣaya district (*Ibid*., I, pp. 38, 44). An order was issued to its inhabitants by the Cālukya Bhīma II. (Vide 98 of Kistna district in Raṅgāchāri's list). Kaṇḍeruvāṭiviṣaya seems to have been subdivided into three or four small districts. It comprised apparently the whole of Guṇṭur taluk, the eastern

portion of Sattenapalli and the northern parts of Tenāli taluk. The central portion of Guṇṭur together with the south-eastern part of Sattenapalli taluk was called Uttara Kaṇḍeruvāṭi-viṣaya (*EI.*, XXIII, Pt. V).

Kanni.—It is the name of a river which flowed in ancient times near Cape Comorin (*Vailur Inscription of Kopperunjingadeva, EI.*, XXIII, Pt. V).

Kanteru.—The Kanteru plates of Sālaṅkāyana Vijayaskandāvarman refer to this village in the Guṇṭur taluk, Guṇṭur district (*EI.*, XXV, Pt. 1, January 1939).

Kanyā.—It is the same as Kanyākumārī, the Tamil name of Cape of Comorin (*Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 22 f. n.). It is also called Gangai-koṇḍacoḷapuram. Here an inscription of Kulottuṅga Coḷa I. has been discovered (*EI.*, XXVI, Pt. VI, April 1942, pp. 274 ff.).

Karaṇipākkaṁ.—It is also spelt as Kaḷanipākam. It is a village situated in Vellore taluk in north Arcot district, near Viriñcipuram (*Ibid.*, I. p. 136).

Karavandapuram.—This is the same as the village now known as Ukkirankottai in Kaḷakkuḍi-nāḍu in the Tinnevelly taluk. It was of great strategic importance in the time of the early Pāṇḍyas. Vestiges of a fort and a moat are even now visible, which give evidence to its former greatness. There are two Śiva temples called Arikeśarīśvaram and Rājasiṅgiśvaram, in the vicinity of the village named after the Pāṇḍya kings, Arikeśarī and Rājasiṁha (E.I., XXIII, pt. VII).

Karkuḍi.—This is the ancient name of Uyyakkoṇḍan Tirumalai in the Nandipanmamaṅgalam on the southern bank of the Kāverī (*Ibid.*, III, p 231). It is in Rājāśrayacaturvedimaṅgalaṁ in Pāndikulasamvaḷanāḍu (Vide Raṅgachāri's list, 1592).

Karṇāṭa country.—This country (*Ibid.*, I, pp. 69-70, 82, 130, 160, 164) figures prominently in Tamil classics. It has been described as a vast country (*dharāmaṇḍala*).

It is occupied by the Kanarese speaking people. The kings of Karṇāṭa were nominally dependant on the kings of Vijayanagara.

Karur or Karuvur.—It is a village of the Coimbatore district (*Ibid.*, p. 126, f. n. I). It is also called Vañji which was the old capital of the Cera Kingdom. Ptolemy calls it Karur the capital of the Prince of Kerala (Burnell, *South Indian Paleography*, 2nd ed., p. 33, note 2; *ZDMG*., Vol. XXXVII, p. 99; Hultzsch, *SII*., I, p. 106, f. n. 2). It is a town in the present Trichy district prominently mentioned in Tamil classics. According to Ptolemy, Karoura was the capital of Kerobothros, i.e., Karalaputra. Karūra means 'a black town' (McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, Ed. S. N. Majumdar, p. 182).

Karuvūr.—It is the name of a village in the Coimbatore district. It is also the name of a town in the same district (*Ibid.*, II, pp. 250, 260, 288, 305; Vol. III, p. 31).

Kālibhanā.—The Kālibhanā copper-plate inscriptions of king Mahābharagupta I Janamejaya (*IHQ*., XX No. 3) mention this village, lying about 9 miles to the north-east of Bolangir, the chief town of the Patna state in the Sambalpur district.

Kāḷidurga.—This is modern Calicut, a town (*Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 364—372). The Tamil form of this name is Kaḷḷikoṭṭai (Cf. *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. VIII, p. 283).

Kāliyūrkoṭṭam.—It is the name of a district (*Ibid.*, I. pp. 116, 117 and etc.). Its sub-division was Erikalnāḍu (vide 236 of North Arcot, Raṅgāchāri's list).

Kāmapurī.—This city was founded by the Coḍa king Annadeva in the Andhra country, which perhaps became the capital of his principality (*EI*., XXVI, Pt. I). It is also known as Kalyāṇa, the crest-jewel of the Andhradeśa.

Kāṁkarapartti.—It stands on the bank of the Gautamī (another name of Godāvarī). It is identical with

the modern village of Kākaraparru, on the west bank of the Godāvarī (*EI.*, XXVI, Pt. I). It is at present included in the Tanuku taluk of the west Godāvarī district.

Kāṇa-nāḍu.—It is stated to be a division of Pāṇḍimaṇḍalam. The southern part of the Tirumeyyam taluk which is the southernmost part of the Pudukottai State, had in it this ancient district of Kāṇa-nāḍu. It was contiguous to Keraḷasingavaḷanāḍu (*EI.*, XXV, Pt. II, April 1939).

Kāndaḷur.—It is the name of a village. It may be identified with Chidambaram (*Ibid.*, I, pp. 63—65, 95, 140). Rājarāja I, is said to have destroyed the ships here.

Kānapper.—It is the name of a village in the Pāṇḍya country (*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 149). It is famous for its temple.

Kāṭṭuppāḍi.—It is a village close to the Vellore station of the Madras Presidency (*S.I.I.*, p. 129, f. n. 3).

Kāṭṭuttumbūr.—It is the name of a village. It was in Paṅgalanāḍu, a division of Paḍuvūrkoṭṭam (*Ibid.*, I, pp. 78-79). It is really in the Vellore taluk of north Arcot district.

Kāvanūr.—It is the name of a village in the Guḍiyātam taluk of North Arcot District (*Ibid.*, I, p. 133). It is in the Saidapet taluk, Chingleput District.

Kāverī (or Kāvirī).—It is the name of a river which starting from Coorg passes through the districts of Coimbatore, Trichinopoly, and Tanjore, and falls into the Bay of Bengal. It is called " the beloved of the Pallavas," This means that a Pallava king ruled over the country along the banks of the Kāverī river (*SII.*, I, p. 29). In the South Indian Inscriptions this river is associated with the name of the Coḷas. Hara asked Guṇabhara: ' how could I standing in a temple on earth view the great power of the Coḷas or the river Kāverī? (Hultzsch, *SII.*, I, p. 34). The Cālukya king Pulakesin II

crossed this river with his victorious army to enter the Coḷa country when this river had her current obstructed by the causeway formed by his elephants. The glory of the Kaverı forms an inexhaustible theme of early Tamil poetry. According to the *Maṇimekhalai* I.9—12;23—4) this noble stream was released by the sage Agastya from his waterpot at the request of the king Kānta and for the exaltation of the "children of the sun." She was the special banner of the race of the Coḷas and she never disappointed them in the most protracted drought. The yearly freshes in the Kāverī formed the occasion of a carnival in which the whole nation took part from the king down to the meanest peasant. It is a famous river in South India, which rises in the Western Ghats and flows south-east through Mysore, and falls into the Bay of Bengal in the district of Tanjore in Madras Presidency. In ancient times, this river, noted for pearl-fishery, flowed down into the sea through the southern portion of the ancient kingdom of Coḷa. Uragapura, the ancient capital of Coḷa, was situated on the southern bank of this river. For further details, vide B. C. Law, *Rivers of India*, p. 51.

This river is mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (Kiṣkindhākāṇḍa, XLI, 21, 25; Cf. *Harivaṁśa*, XXVII, 1416—22; *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣmaparva, IX, 328; Vanaparva LXXXV, 8164—5, etc.). The Tīrthayatra sections of the Purāṇas and Epics mention this river as very holy. It is Khaberos of Ptolemy (McCrindle's *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 65), which is said to have its source in the Adeisathron range which may be identified with the southern portion of the Sahya.

Kāviripppumbaṭṭanaṁ.—It is the full Tamil name of Kāveripaṭṭanaṁ at the mouth of the Kāverl river (*Ibid.*, II, p. 287): It must be kāverippūpaṭṭinaṁ, an ancient sea-port capital of the Coḷas, washed away by the deluge according to Tamil classics.

Kerakera.—The Ādipura copper-plate of Narendrabhañjadeva refers to this village in Ghoshdapir in Ādipura pargana (*EI*., XXV, Pt. IV).

Keralasiṅga-vaḷanaḍu.—The Tiruppuvanam plates of Jaṭāvarman Kulaśekhara I refer to it, which covered a very large portion of the Tiruppattūr taluk of the Ramnad district, a part of the Pudukkottai State and seems to have extended into the Śivagaṅgā Zamindari (*EI*., XXV, Pt. II, April 1939).

Kiṇḍeppa.—This village was situated in the Tellavalliviṣaya (*E.I*., XXIII, Pt. II).

Koḍavalli.—It is to be identified with Koḍolī, about 7 miles to the east of Kolhapur (*E.I*., XXIII, Pt. I, January 1935).

Kolāulapura.—It has been identified by Rice with the modern Kolār in the east of Mysore (*EI*., XXVI, 167; Rice, *Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions*, p. 32).

Kollāpura.—It is modern Kolhāpur (*EI*., XXIII, Pt. I, January, 1935).

Komaṇḍa.—It is a village in the Nayāgarh State of Orissa where three copper-plates were unearthed (*EI*., XXIV, Pt. IV, p. 172—*Komaṇḍa copper-plates of Nettabhañja*).

Komartī.—This village is situated two miles southwest of Narasannapeta, the headquarters of a taluk in the Ganjam district, where three copper-plates of Candavarman of Kaliṅga were discovered (*EI*., IV, 142).

Konamaṇḍala.—It is a country in the Godāvarī delta with which the Haihayas were closely connected (*EI*., IV, 84, 320). The chiefs of Konamaṇḍala trace their descent from Haihaya, Kṛtavırya and Kartavīrya who belonged to the race of the Yadus.

Korukoṇḍa.—It is a hill fort in the Godavarī valley situated at a distance of about 9 miles to the north of Rajahmundry (*EI*., XXVI, Pt. I, January 1941).

F. 2

Kośala-nāḍu (Kośalai-nāḍu).—This is southern Kośala which, according to Cunningham, corresponds to the Upper Valley of the Mahānadī and its tributaries (*Ibid.*, I. p. 97; *Arch. Survey of India*, Vol. XVII, p. 68). According, to the Kuruspal Stone Inscription of Someśvaradeva, Mahākośala or Dakṣiṇa Kosalạ extended from the confines of Berar to Orissa and from Amarakanṭaka to Bastar (*EI.*, X, No. 4). In the Ratanpur Inscription of Jājalladeva we find that Kaliṅgarāja acquired the land of Dakṣiṇa Kośala and fixed his capital at Tummāṇa. According to the Bilhari Inscription Lakṣmaṇarāja is stated to have defeated the lord of Dakṣiṇa-Kośala (*EI.*, II, p. 305; I, p. 254). Dakṣiṇa-Kośala is generally taken to represent the modern division of Chattisgarh, while Tummāṇa has been identified with the modern village of Tumana in the Bilaspur district (EI., I, 39 ff., 45 ff.). According to the Jaina Jambuddīvapaṇṇatti, Kusāvatī was the capital of Dakṣiṇa-Kośala. It may have been precisely the city which is associated with the Vaitāḍhya range along which there were sixty Vidyādhara towns (*saṭṭiṃ vijjāhara-ṇagarāvāsā*, i, 12).

Koṭyāśrama.—It is the hermitage of Vaśiṣṭha, which has been identified with Kuting, 32 miles from Bāripādā (*EI.*, XXV, Pt. IV).

Kuḍiyāntaṇḍal.—This village is in the Chingleput district (*EI.*, XIV, 232).

Kudrahara.—It is the name of a district with its headquarters at Kudūra, which is the same as the modern Kuḍura in the Bandar taluk of the Kitsna district (*EI.*, XXV, Pt. I, January 1939).

Kumārapura.—In the Juraḍa grant of Nettabhañjadeva Kumārapura is identified with the village of the same name in the Berhampur taluk of the Ganjam district (*EI.*, XXIV., Pt. I, January 1937).

Kummaṭa.—It is situated in the Doravadinaḍu. It

may be identified with Kumāra-Rāmana Kummaṭa, situated at a distance of about 8 miles from Ānegoṇḍi (*EI.*, XXIII, Pt. V).

Kūniyūr.—This village is in the Ambāsamudram taluk of the Tinnevelly district, where copper-plates of the time of Venkaṭa II were discovered (*EI* , III, 236).

Kroṣṭukavarttanī-Viṣaya.—It is the name of a district mentioned in some of the early and later Gaṅgā records. This has been identified by Hultzsch with modern Chicacole (*EI.*, XXVI, pt. II, 66 ff.; XXV, V, January 1940).

Kṛṣṇāpura.—It is a deserted village at the western extremity of the ruins of Vijayanagara, where an inscription of Kṛṣṇaraya engraved on a rough stone-lablet dated śaka 1451 was discovered (*EI.*, I, 398). There is a village by this name situated six miles south-east of Tinnevelly, where copper-plates of Śadāśivarāya were discovered (*EI.*, IX, 328 ff.).

Lāmu.—It is situated two miles to the south of Tāḍikoṇḍa in the Guṇṭur district (*EI.*, XXIII, Pt. V).

Luputurā.—Lupaturā or Luputura is probably the same as Lipatuṅgā of the Patna plates of the 6th year (*EI.*, III, 344). Some have identified it with Lepta, six miles south-east of Bolangir in the Patna state while others are inclined to think that either Nuptara or Nuparsiṅga within the Sonepur state should be identical with Lupaturā (*EI.*, XXIII, Pt. VII).

Madhyama-Kalinga.—It was the name of the territory, which roughly corresponds to the modern district of Vizagapatam (*EI.*, VI., 227, 358; *Annual Report of the South Indian Epigraphy*, 1909, p. 106; *ibid.*, 1918 p. 132). According to some, it seems to be identical with Modocalingae of Megasthenes (IA., VI, 338).

Madura.—This city is situated on the river Vaigai. It is full of temples, and is undoubtedly a religious city.

The temple of Viṣṇu is within a mile from the railway station, and the inside of it is made up of black marble with a pathway for circumambulation. The biggest of all temples at Madura is that of Mīnākṣī, which is Lakṣmī. This temple covers a very large area, a portion of which is dedicated to Mınakṣī and other to Śiva. Madura was the capital of the Pāṇḍya kings. It was the capital of Jaṭāvarman who ascended the throne in the 13th century A.D. and conquered the Hoysala king Someśvara of Karṇāṭaka (*EI*., III, 8).

Maduramaṇḍalam.—It is the name of a country (*Ibid*., I, pp. 97, 99, 112). It is the ancient Pāṇḍya country, the capital of which was Madura. This is known as Modoura by Ptolemy. It is situated on the banks of the river Vaigai.

Madurodayavaḷanādu.—It is one of the districts of the Pāṇḍya country (*EI*., XXV, Pt. II, April, 1939).

Mahābalipuram.—This place is situated at a distance of about 35 miles to the south of Madras. According to a Vaiṣṇava saint, Śiva lived here with Viṣṇu, and hence we find shrines of both these deities situated close to each other. It is a place of pagodas. Besides, there are several caves, natural and artificial. In some of them we find very attractive cultural representation of Pauraṇic scenes. Mention may be made of the sculptures representing Mahiṣa-mardinī destroying the Rākṣasas, Arjuna's penance, Śrīkṛṣṇa supporting the hill to protect the cattle from the anger of the rain-god, etc.

Mahakantara.—According to some Sambalpur on the Mahanadı was probably its capital. It is identified with the eastern Gaṇḍavana, or with the southern Jhārakhaṇḍa.

Mahendrucala.—The Gautamī plates of Gaṅgā Indravarman mention it, which probably refers to the hills of this name in the Ganjam district (*EI*., XXIV, Pt.

IV, October, 1937). The Mahendra range of mountains extends from Ganjam as far south as the Pāṇḍya country to the whole of the eastern ghat range. The Mahendrādri or the Mahendra mountain was situated between the Gaṅgāsāgarasaṅgama and the Sapta-Godāvarī. A portion of the eastern ghats near Ganjam is still called the Mahendra hill. Pargiter thinks that the name should be limited to the hills between the Mahānadī, Godāvarī and Wen (Baṇa ?) Gaṅgā, and may perhaps comprise the portion of the eastern ghats north of the eastern ghats north of the Godāvarī (*Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*, p. 305 note).

The minor hills associated with the Mahendra mountain were the Śrīparvata, Puṣpagiri, Venkaṭadri, Aruṇācala and Ṛṣabha.

The whole range of hills extending from Orissa to the district of Madura was known as the Mahendraparvata. It included the eastern ghats. It joined the Malaya mountain. Paraśurāma retired to this mountain after being defeated by Rāmacandra. The eastern ghats must have been known to the geographers of ancient India as the Mahendragiri, as the highest peak of the eastern ghats is still called by that name. They run as detached hills more or less parallel to the eastern coast of India, which are known by different names in different parts of the country. (For details, vide B. C. Law, *Mountains of India*, Calcutta Geographical Society Publication, No. 5, p. 22).

Mahendravāḍi.—It is a village 3 miles east-south-east of the Sholinghur railway station on the line from Arkonam junction to Arcot, where an inscription of Guṇabhara written in archaic Pallava alphabet was discovered (*EI*., IV, 152).

Malabar.—It is the Kerala country (*SII*., II, pp 4, 241; vide also B. C. Law, *Tribes in Ancient India* pp. 193-94).

Malaikkūṛṛam.—This is a district which may be identified with the Malayakuṭa (Mo-lo-Kiu-ch'a) of Hiuen Tsang which he located in the delta of the Kāverī (*Ibid.*, III, p. 197).

Malaināḍu.—It is confined to Malayalam or Malabar. It comprises the territory of the Pāṇḍyas besides those of the Cera king. It is mentioned in the inscription of Rājendra Coḷa. (*Ibid.*, II, pp. 236, 242 etc.).

Malaiyūr.—It is situated on a fine hill with a fort (*Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 469).

Malayagiri.—It is the name of a hill (*Ibid.*, Vol. III, 422). A Pāṇḍya king leaving his own country sought refuge in this hill. Pargiter correctly identifies this range of hills with the portion of western ghats from the Nilgiris to the Cape Comorin. The hermitage of Agastya was situated on the Maḷayakuṭa which was also known as Śrīkhaṇḍādri or even as Candanādri (Cf. Dhoyī's *Pavanadūtam*). The southern extension of the western ghat below the Kāverī, now known as the Travancore hills, really forms the western side of the Malayagiri.

Malkhed.—The Salotgi Inscription of Kṛṣṇa III describes this imperial capital of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas as '*sthirībhuta-kaṭake*' i.e., the place where the military forces were located (*EI*., IV., 66; XIII, 176 ff).

Maḷḷai.—This is modern Mahābalipuram in the Chingleput district. (*Vailur Inscription of Kopperunjingadeva, EI*., XXIII, Pt. V).

Maṇalūr.—It is a village on the Tuṅgabhadrā (*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 230). There is a village named Manalūr in Pāṇḍyan territory (Vide Raṅgāchari's list, Tinnevelly, 515).

Maṇayirkoṭṭam.—It is the name of a district (*Ibid.*, I, p. 147).

Maṇimaṅgalaṁ.—It is a village at the eastern extremity of the Conjeeveram taluk of the Chingleput district, about six miles west of Vaṇḍalur, a station on the S. I. Rly. In Sanskrit verses the name of the village is Ratnāgrahāra (*Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 48, 49, 50). In the inscriptions Narasimhapuram (Chingleput) came to be known as Kiḍāraṃgoṇḍaśoḷapuraṃ (*Madras Epigraphical Reports*, 244 and 245 of 1910). A battle was fought here by Narasimhavarman, the Pallava king, in which Pulakesin was defeated (*Ibid.*, Vol. I, 144, 145; Vol II, p. 363).

Inscriptions of the reign of Rājarāja I refer to Maṇimaṅgalam as Lokamahādevī-Caturvedimaṅgalaṁ called after his queen Lokamahādevī, but the inscriptions recorded after his fifteenth year and in the reigns of his successors down to the reign of Kulottunga I call the village by the name of Rājacuḍāmaṇi-caturvedimaṅgalaṁ (*MER.*, 289 and 292 of 1897, and 7 of 1892; Cf. *SII.*, III, Nos. 28—30).

Mañjirā.—It is a tributary of the Godāvarī, which rises from the Bālāghat ranges, and flows south-east and north to join the Godāvarī. It is fed by three streams on the left and by five on the right. Its another variant is Vañjulā (*Vāyu Purāṇa*, XLV, 104).

Manneru.—It is a river in the Nellore district (*Ibid.*, II, p. 4).

Marudūr.—It is a village in the Kovilpatti taluk of the Tinnevelly district (*EI.*, XXIV, Pt. IV).

Maṭṭepād.—It is a village in the Ongole taluk of the Guṇṭur district, where the inscription engraved on five copper-plates of Dāmodaravarman was discovered (*EI.*, XVII, 327 ff.).

Māḍakkuḷaṃ.—It lies to the west of Madurā (*EI.*, XXIV, Pt. IV, p. 170).

Māmallapuraṃ.—This is a village which is generally called the seven pagodas situated on the sea coast, 32 miles south of Madras, famous for the Pallava remains (*Ibid.*, I, p. 1; Cf. Fergusson and Burgess, *Cave Temples*, pp. 105—159). It also served as the sea port of the Pallavas.

Māramaṅgalaṁ.—It is in the Tinnevelly district. Māraneri and Māramaṅgalaṁ were called in ancient times Māramaṅgalaṁ (*EI.*, XXI, Pt. III).

Mavinuru.—It is the name of a village which is perhaps identical with Māvinūru of the Konnūr Inscription (*EI.*, VI, 28). Kielhorn has identified it with the modern Mannoor, 8 miles east by south of Konnūr. The Venkaṭapur Inscription of Amoghavarṣa (Śaka 828) records the gift of a garden with one thousand creepers at Māvinuru to one Candrateza-Bhaṭṭāra (*EI.*, XXVI Pt. II, 59 ff.).

Māyiruḍingaṃ.—This is an island surrounded by the deep sea as a moat (*Ibid.*, II, p. 109).

Melpaṭṭi.—It is in the Guḍiyāttaṃ taluk of the North Arcot district (*EI.*, XXIII, Pt. IV, October, 1935).

Melpāḍi.—It is a village in north Arcot district, six miles north of Tiruvallam (*Ibid.*, II, 222, 249, etc.). It is situated on the western bank of the river Nīvā (*Ibid.*, III, p. 23). According to the Ambasamudram Inscription of Solanralaikoṇḍa Vīrapaṇḍya, it is in the Cittoor district (EI,, XXV, Pt. I, January 1939). The Karhad plates of Kṛṣṇa III were issued when the Raṣṭrakuṭa king Govinda III was encamped here, engaged in taking possession of all the properties of the defeated feudatories (*EI.*, IV, 278).

Melur.—It is a village, about 16 miles north-west of Madura (*EI.*, XXI, Pt. III).

Meru.—This is a mountain which consists of gold and is supposed to be situated to the north of Jambudvıpa.

The temple at Chidambaram seems to have been looked upon as the southern Meru as it contained a large amount of gold on the roof of its golden hall (*Ibid.*, I, p. 166; II, p. 235).

Miṇḍigal.—It is a village about 11 miles north-west of Chintamaṇi, the headquarters of the Chintamaṇi taluk of the Kolhar State in Mysore (*EI.*, V, 205 ff.).

Miyaru-naḍu.—It included the present Tiruvallam in the North Arcot district and the surrounding region (*EI.*, XXIII, Pt. 11).

Mudumaḍuvu.—The inscriptions of Vaidumba Maharaja Gaṇḍatrinetra mention it, which may be identified with Mudimaḍugu in the Anantapur district (*EI.*, XXIV, Pt. IV, October 1937).

Mugainaḍu.—It is a district, a division in the middle of Paṅgalanāḍu (*Ibid.*, I, pp. 97, 99, 101), forming part of Jayaṅkoṇḍa-Coḷamaṇḍalam.

Murappu-nāḍu.—It is a village in the Śrīvaikuntam taluk of the Tinnevelly district, 6 miles east of Palamcottah and is situated on the right bank of the river Tāmraparṇī (EI., XXIV, IV, p. 166; Sewell, *List of Antiquities*, I, p. 312).

Murasīman.—The Kālibhanā copper-plate Inscriptions of king Mahābhavagupta I Janamejaya mention it, identified with Mursing in the Jarasingha Zamindari in the Patna State, Orissa (*IHQ.*, XX, No. 3).

Musikanagara.—It is referred to in the Hāthigumpha Inscription of king Khāravela of Kaliṅga, who in the second year of his reign is said to have struck terror into the heart of the people of that place (*EI.*; XX, 79, 87 Barua, *Old Brāhmī Inscriptions.* p. 176; *JRAS.*, 1922, p. 83). The *Mahābhārata* (Bhışmaparva, Ch. 9 p. 366) places this country in south India, which has been identified with Konkan (*Viṣṇupurāṇa*, p. 474). Dr. Fleet says that Musika is a part of the Malabar coast between

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Quilon and Cape Comorin (*Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol I, pt. II, p. 281). For further details vide B. C. Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 384.

Mutgi.—It is a village in the Bagewaḍi taluk of the Bijapur district. It is situated some 6½ miles to the south-west of Bāgewāḍi town. Its ancient name is Murttage, where two inscriptions were found (*EI.*, XV, 25

Narasiṅgapalli.—This village is in the Chicacole taluk of the Ganjam district. where the plates of Hastivarman of Kaliṅga of the year 79 were discovered (*EI.*, XXIII, Pt. II).

Navatula or Navatulā.—The Triliṅga inscription of Devendravarman, son of Guṇārṇava, refers to this village situated in the Korasoḍaka-pañcalī-viṣaya, which has been identified with the hamlet of Nantala, situated about 6 miles to the south-west of Parlakimedi. The Korashaṇḍa plates of Vishākhavarman (*EI.*, XXI, pp. 23) and the Chicacole plates of Indravarman (*IA*, XIII, pp. 122 ff). mention Korasoḍaka-pañcālī, which may be identified with the modern Korashaṇḍa, a village six miles to the south of Parlakimedi in the Ganjam district (*IHQ.*, XX, No. 3).

Śrī-madhurāntaka-caturvedi-maṇḍalam.—This is an independent village in Kaḷatturkoṭṭam, a district of Jayaṅgoṇḍaśoḷamaṇḍalaṃ (*Ibid.*, III, p. 204).

Śrī-mallinātha-caturvedī-maṅgalam.—It is the name of a village in North Arcot district (*Ibid.*, I, pp. 77, 78 and 129), the people of which have been described as great.

Śrīraṅgaṃ.—It is the name of an island near Trichinopoly (*Ibid.*, III, p. 168; Cf. EI., 111, pp. 7 ff; *Raṅganātha Inscription of Sundara-Paṇḍya; Śrīraṅgam Plates of Mādhava Nāyaka* (*EI.*, XIII, 220 ff). Here stands the Raṅganātha temple. It was the place where Rāmānuja and Maṇavāḷa-mahāmuni dwelt for some time. The

Srīraṅgaṁ Inscription of Acyutarāya refers to the well-known place of pilgrimage in South India, especially sacred to the Vaiṣṇavas (EI., XXIV, Pt. VI, April 1938). The Śrīraṅgaṁ Inscription of Garuḍa-vāhana Bhaṭṭa dated the Śaka 1415 has the object of registering a gift of land made by Śrīnivāsa (*EI.*, XXIV, Pt. II., April 1937). This island contains the Śaiva temple of Jambukeśvara where an inscription of Valaka-Kāmaya (Śaka samvat 1403) was discovered (*EI.*, III, p. 72) This island is situated three miles to the north of the town of Trichinopoly between the two branches of the river Kāverī. The great temple stands in the centre of this island, which was built by the Nāyaka rulers of Pāṇḍya. It is a great place of pilgrimage as mentioned in the *Matsyapurāṇa*, *Padmapuraṇa* and *Srı-raṅgamahatmya*, forming a part of the *Brahmaṇḍapuraṇa*. The celebrated Vaiṣṇava reformer Rāmānuja lived and died here in the middle of the 11th century A.D. Ramacandra is said to have stayed here on his way to Laṅkā. The great temple which is a very old one, was renovated and improved by the Coḷa, Pāṇḍya and other kings of South India. The Srıraṅgam copper-plates of Harihara-Rāya, belong to the Srıraṅgaṁ nātha temple at Śrīraṅgam (*EI.*, XVI, 222 ff.).

GANGEŚA'S DEFINITION OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

By Tara Sankar Bhattacharya

Valid knowledge (Pramā), according to Gaṅgesa, is the perception of an object in a place where it is. Or it is the perception of the object in its locus in the character in which it exists there.[1] When the rope is perceived as a rope, we have valid knowledge of the rope. Here Mathurānātha points out that the real meaning of Gaṅgeśa is that when a thing is perceived to possess a certain character, the proper relation between that character and that thing is to be perceived. The jar bears the relation of inherence to its two-halves. Hence the knowledge of the jar as bearing the relation of conjunction to its halves is not a right knowledge. The author of *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* puts this in very clear terms : A possesses B in a relation R; Here A is a substantive having for its adjective B in the relation R; now A is to be perceived to possess B in the relation R, if the perception is to be valid.[2]

Apramā (wrong knowledge) is the reverse of valid knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object in a locus where it is not. In other words, when a thing A is absent in a locus B, the knowledge in B of something which has the character of A is a wrong knowledge.[3] To be more precise, when a definite subject perceives a specific object in a place which as such is characterised by the absence of this object, this subject has an illusory perception (bhrama). In the words of Mathurānātha, a specific

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[1] Yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhaḥ pramā. Tadvati tatprakāra-kānubhavo vā (*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, part I, p. 401).

[2] Yena sambandhena yadvattā, tena sambandhenatadvadviśeṣa-katvaṁ tena sambandhena tatprakārakatvaṁ vacyaṁ.

[3] Tadabhāvavati tatprakārakajñānaṁ vā apramā (*Tattvacintā-maṇi*, part I, p. 401).

substratum may be characterised essentially by the absence of a specific negatum; this negatum in its own character is absent there; now the perception of an object having the character of this negatum in that substratum, by a definite subject, is an illusion.[4] Correct knowledge is other than this illusion. It is the perception of a thing in its own character. When the jar is perceived as characterised by jar-hood, we have right knowledge of the jar; or when a thing possesses a certain quality, the perception of this thing so qualified is a correct perception.

It is to be remembered here that the question of right or wrong knowledge is a relevant one only with regard to determinate perception. Indeterminate perception is neither valid nor illusory, because it cannot be characterised and is not marked out by any definite relation.[5] It is mere sensing of the object. This sensing is devoid of name and classification (namajatyadi-rahitaṁ). When the object of perception is classified and named, we have determinate perception. In a valid determinate perception the contact of the sense-organ with the object produces a knowledge of the object in its true character.[6] It is a sensuous knowledge of the known in its essential nature at its proper place.

Objection may be raised that in the judgment, " The conch-shell appears as *this* silver," the knowledge of the " this " is valid and the knowledge of the "silver" is illusory in the same substratum (viz., the conch-shell)[7].

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[4] *Māthurī, Ibid.* p. 405.

[5] Prakāratādiśūnyaṁ hi sambandhānavagāhi tat (*Bhāṣāparicheda*).

[6] Indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannamavyabhicarı yathārthaṁ vajjñānam tat pratyakṣa-pramā (*Māthurī, Tattvacintamaṇi*, part I, p. 409).

[7] Suktāvidaṁ rajatamitijñānamekasmin viṣaye idantvasya pramā rajatasya ca bhramaḥ. *Ibid.*

The reply is that when a substratum is possessed of the "this", the percepti of the "this" there is a valid one. But the perception of silver in a locus where it is absent is an illusion. The conch-shell is not the locus of silver-hood and therefore not of "this silver." Hence there cannot be any question of a valid knowledge of the "this" which is an adjunct of silver as characterising a conch-shell.

It may be objeced to that our senses come into contact only with certain parts of a thing, say the parts of a jar and hence the knowledge of the whole jar by seeing a part of it is an illusion.

The reply is that the whole jar is not perceived in a locus where the jar is absent. Similarly, when the jar is present and is in contact with the sense, we have a knowledge of the whole jar, the whole being inherent in the part.

Again, the objection may be that when a thing, say A, is a spatially extended whole and another thing, say B, is in conjunction with some part of A, B is both present and absent in A (present in some part and absent in another); the result is that in the same substratum (A) we have both right and wrong knowledge, there being the knowledge of B in A where it is absent and also the knowledge of B in A where it is present.

This objection is unfounded. When B is in conjunction with A, it is foolish to say that it is both in conjunction with A·and not in conjunction with A. We do not perceive both conjunction (of B) and its absence in A at the same time. When the monkey is present on the tree, it is illogical to say that the monkey is both present and absent on the tree (Gangeśa here adopts the view of the author of the "*Nyāya-līlāvatī*" that conjunction is pervasive or vyāpaka). As a matter of fact, the judgment that the monkey is in conjunction with the top

of the tree and not with the bottom is a wrong judgment. When the monkey is present on the tree, the tree is in conjunction with the monkey, even as the cow and not a part of it is determined by the possession of the hump. Similarly, a jaṛ may turn red by chemical action and by further chemical action may turn black. In this case the judgment that the jar is red at some point of time and black at some other is a valid one. But the judgment that the jar is black now, i.e., at the moment when it turns red, is an erroneous one.

According to some thinkers, when a thing is perceived, its perception is valid (anubhavatvameva prāmāṇyaṁ). Even in illusory perception, the elements of the illusion are accepted as real.[8] The snake and the rope are the elements of the snake-rope illusion. Both the snake and the rope are real, but their unity is unreal. When tin is perceived as silver, tin and silver by themselves are not unreal. But the perception of silver in a locus where it is absent, i.e., in tin in which silver-hood does not inhere, is a wrong perception. As a matter of fact, the perception of silver in a place in which silver-hood inheres is a valid perception. But tin is not characterised by silver-hood. Hence when tin is seen as silver, we have an illusion.

Objection may be raised here that perception being valid in some cases and wrong in others, perceptual knowledge cannot be said to be valid in all cases.

This objection is well-founded. Perceptual knowledge is correct with regard to specific objects. Silver having its silver-hood inherent in it is perceived normally. This perception is valid. But tin is sometimes perceived wrongly as silver. Here the perception of the absence of silver in tin is a valid perception. In other words, the

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[8] **Bhrame'pyaṁśamādāyı pramā-vyavahārāt.** ***Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Part I, p. 413.**

perceptual judgment " Silver is not tin " is a correct judgment. When, however, we consider a valid generic judgment, e.g., "All things are knowable," the judgment "All things are not not-knowable" is valid.[9]

Thus valid knowledge is the perception of an object in the relation and character in which it exists in its locus and wrong knowledge is the perception of an object in a locus where it is not. Now as to the valid knowledge of an essence (dharma), the essence which is known co-exists with the character in which it is known; in other words, valid knowledge of an essence is the perception of an object which co-exists with this essence.[10] When I have valid knowledge of jar-hood, jar-hood and my object of knowledge co-exist, i.e., my object of knowledge is not different from jar-hood, i.e., what is known here is not not-jar-hood. But when the object of knowledge and the essence do not co-exist. we have wrong knowledge. If not-silver-hood is perceived as silver (e.g. when tin is perceived as silver), we have an illusory knowledge of silver-hood. Here the object of knowledge, viz., silver-hood inheres in silver and is not co-existent with not-silver-hood. We cannot, however, distinguish between right and wrong knowledge, i.e., right knowledge and wrong knowledge overlap, when the compound judgment " This is silver and silver is tin " is taken as a whole.

Valid knowledge may also be defined as the perception of a thing through a character which is not the negatum of the absolute non-existence qualifying the thing

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[9] Kevalānvayini viṣayatāśrayāvṛttiravṛttireva prasiddhaḥ, *Ibid* p. 416.

[10] Yatprakārikā yā viṣayatā tatprakārasamānādhikaraṇa-viṣayatāka, svaprakāra-samānādhikaranav-viṣayatākavā anubhavaḥ pramā *Ibid*. p. 417.

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(perceived)[11] When the (red) jar is perceived as red, red is not consciousness which is never present in the jar. This definition of valid knowledge may be expressed in the three different ways.

(a) Valid knowledge is the perception of a thing through a character which is not the character of the negatum absent in the thing.

(b) Valid knowledge is not the perception of (an apparent) character which (really) is the negatum of the absolute non-existence coexisting with this character.

(c) Valid knowledge is the perception of a character which is not the nature of the negatum of the absolute non-existence co-existing with this character.[12]

To explain (b) and (c) above, the snake perceived in the rope is absent in the rope. Here the absence of the real snake and the apparent snake co-exist. Valid knowledge is not the perception of this apparent snake in the rope Similarly, valid knowledge is the perception of the rope as the rope which is not the apparent snake which is really absent in the rope.

It follows from these that wrong knowledge is the perception of a character which is not co-existent with the essence of the thing perceived; or bhrama is the knowledge of a character whose locus is different from the locus of the essence of the thing perceived.[13] When we consider the wrong judgment " This tin is silver," the locus of tinhood is not silver and the locus of silver-hood is silver

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[11] Viseṣya-nisthatyantabhava-pratiyogiprakaraka-viṣayata-pratiyogı anubhavaḥ. *Ibid.* p. 419.

[12] *Tattvacintāmanı* part I, p. 419-420.

[13] Svavyadhikarana-prakaravacchinna-visayata-pratiyogijnanam va bhramaḥ. *Ibid.* p. 420-421.

and hence the perception of tin as silver is an illusion. But in the compound judgment, " These two viz., this jar and this cloth are," the objects of knowledge, though perceived together, are different. Here the cloth is not perceived as the jar or vice versa and consequently there is no illusion. As a matter of fact, the object of perception cannot be said to possess a character other than its own, such a character having no empirical validity. In other words, the object is revealed as it is to our knowledge (in correct perception).[14]

Objection may be raised that in the judgments "This subject has knowledge and this is the jar," there is doubt as to whether the subject possesses the knowledge of this jar and this doubt is not possible, if the object is revealed as it is to the subject.[15]

The reply to this objection is that of course there may be doubt as to whether *this* subject knows *this* jar or not, but this doubt does not prove that the object is not known as it is. One may doubt as to whether a particular subject knows a particular object; but when an object is known, it is known as it is. There can be the knowledge of a jar as it is and this knowledge is a property of the subject, i.e., the self. But there may be doubt as to whether *this* self has the knowledge of *this* jar.

If follows then that in correct perception, the object is known as it is. The relation between the object and knowledge is viṣayita (being objectified) This relation obtains between the object as such and its knowledge. No other relation intervenes between them. Indeed, as held by Udayana in "*Bauddhādhikāra*", knowledge is the knowledge of some object; knowledge by itself is unmeaning; hence the object of knowledge must be some character; this

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14 Jnana-viṣaya-svarupameva-visayatvam. *Ibid.* p. 4?3.

15 *Ibid.*

character may be external or internal as in introspection; but this character as it is is related to knowledge. In other words, when an object is known correctly, the object as such is related to knowledge. The relation between the object and its knowledge is a variety of self-relation (svarūpa-sambandha) called viṣayitā (being objectified). Here the relatum and the relation are the same. If a third factor is required to relate the object with knowledge, there is regressus ad infinitum. As a matter of fact, this is the case with all types of svarūpa-sambandha (self-relation). Negation qualifies its locus in self-relation. When the jar is absent on the ground, the relation between the ground and the non-existence of the jar is svarupa. The ground as qualified by the absence of the jar is the object of knowledge. In such an instance non-existence ipso facto characterises its locus. No third factor is necessary to relate the non-existence of the jar and the ground. Here the relatum viz., non-existence and the relation are the same. Similarly, inherence (samavāya) abides in self-relation in its locus. There is an infinite regress, if any more relation is required to relate samavāya (inherence) with its anuyogī (locus). It may be argued that the perceptual judgment "The ground is characterised by the absence of the jar" consists of two judgments, viz., "The jar is absent" and "The ground is," and so here the object of perception is a specific relation uniting the two. In other words, when the jar is absent on the ground, some relation is necessary to unite this non-existence and the ground and what is perceived is not simply the ground and the non-existence of the jar, but the ground and the non-existence of the jar as united by some relation which is other than these two. The reply to this contention is that the judgment "The ground is characterised by the absence of the jar," is possible by taking the non-existence of the jar as itself

qualifying the ground without the help of any third relating factor. Further to admit a third relation to relate non-existence and its locus is to be involved in the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum. Hence non-existence qualifies its substratum in self-relation. As a matter of fact, when we perceive that the jar is absent on the ground, the object of knowledge is the ground as characterised by the absence of the jar and not any additional factor relating the ground and the absence of the jar. Hence absence is both the relation and the relation in the knowledge of a substratum characterised by the absence of an entity.

THE PURDAH

By Miss Sakuntala Rao Sastri

The word *Purdah* is of Persian origin and means literally 'a curtain'. From this original sense it has acquired its secondary meaning viz., 'the seclusion of woman,' which may, however differ in degree according to the social status of a family. It is a common-spread belief that the seclusion of woman began with the advent of the Muhammadan rule. It is generally believed that previous to that period, women enjoyed full liberty and could move freely in society. Those who have studied the *Ṛg-Veda*[1] will at once refer to the popular festival of *'Samana'* in which both men and women took part, where poets thronged to acquire fame, women to win prizes at archery, horses to run races and women, young and old, to seek their partners in life. In the Epic period, we see the presence of the queen by the king's side at the celebration of any important sacrifice. In Ch. 89 of the Aśvamedha Parva of the *Mahabhārata*[2] when the horse-sacrifiial steed, after having roamed freely over the whole earth was slaughtered according to the ritual and the actual ceremony of the horse-sacrifice was being commenced, Draupadī sat near Yudhiṣṭhira for the performance of the rite. If we come to a still later period, that is, to the Classical Period, when the literary activity was at its height, we find practically the same thing. Canto 11 of the *Raghuvaṁśaṁ*[3] we find the king returning to his capital with his queen in an open chariot. Similarly,

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[1] *Ṛg-Veda*

[2] *Mahābharata*, Asvamedha Prava, ch. 89.

[3] *Raghuvaṁśaṁ*, Canto II.

in *Ratnāvalī*[4] there is a scene where the queen is present at the audience given by the king to the ambassadors who came from Ceylon. Instances can be multiplied to show where women came out freely to the gatherings frequented by men. This is, however, half the truth. It represents but one side of the shield, for, as long as the words 'Antaḥpura' and 'Avarōdha' are current in Sanskrit literature and are frequently used in Sanskrit compositions, we cannot avoid the conclusion that seclusion of women existed in Ancient India to some degree, though perhaps, it was not as rigid as in the Muhammadan period.

To go into the matter deeply and systematically we have first to note that there are no less than three words in the most celebrated of Sanskrit Lexicons, the *Amarakosa*,[5] to denote a harem. They are (i) Antaḥpuraṁ, (ii) Avarodha or Avarodhana, (iii) Śuddhāntaḥ. These three words are there to explain *Stryagāram Bhūbhujāṁ*, i.e 'the female appartments of the kings,' implying apparently that the harems could be kept up by kings alone. It will not be an uninteresting task to find out what sense exactly each one of these terms conveys and also to find out in what different places in Sanskrit literature they have been used and in what different connections.

We will take up the word Antaḥpuraṁ first. Bhānuji Dīkshit who wrote a commentary on the *Amarakoṣa* explains it by *Antarabhyantare puraṁ gṛham* meaning apparently 'the inner appartment'. The word is also explained by *Purasyāntaḥ sthitam* 'situated in the interior

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4 Ratnāvaṭi last scene.

5 *Amarakoṣha*—II. 11-12

अन्तःपुर अन्तरभ्यन्तरे पुरं गृहम्,

अवरुध्यन्ते अत्र ।

शुद्धा उपधा शुद्धा-रक्षका अन्ते—Bhānuji.

शुद्धा सुरक्षा अन्ता अत्र शुद्धान्त :—Kṣīraswāmī

of the town.' It will be seen that the word *Antaḥpuraṁ* has apparently two senses: one denoting the inner appartment of a palace set apart for women i.e. a harem; what the other meaning exactly is, will be considered later on. Now what is worthy of note is *antaḥpuraṁ* in the sense of 'a harem' which occurs not only in the Epics[6] but also in the literary composition of the later and classical period[7]. Thus not only Antaḥpura in the sense of 'harem,' is mentioned in connection with the palace of Virāṭa, king of the Matsya country in the *Mahābhārata* but also in connection with the royal palace of Ayodhyā the capital of the Ikṣvāku family. Antaḥpuraṁ in the sense again occurs in most of the literary works of the later period. Thus it occurs not only in Bhāsa's drama *Svapna-vāsavadattāṁ* but also in Kālidāsa's *Abhijñāna-śākuntalam* and *Raghuvaṁśam* and even in so late a work as *Kathāsarit-sāgara* of Kṣemendra. What is noteworthy about this word is that sometimes it is used in the plural. It thus occurs in plural twice, for instance, in *Śākuntalam*. Evidently in such a case, the word must mean not the harem so much as the inmates of the harem. The question here arises how far back this word is traceable. So far as we are able to ascertain it, the earliest work in which this word is mentioned is *Manusmṛti* where it occurs four times in Ch. 7 and there can be no doubt that the word is used there distinctly in the sense of a harem or a seraglio. In this connection it deserves to be noticed that the word *Antaḥpuraṁ* occurs in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* also, but obviously not in this sense.

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[6] *Mahābhārata* III. 53. 18.

[7] *R*. 2. 14. 28, 29; 3. 42, 55; 5. 79, 10.
Manu—VII. 221. and 216, 224. N. 1, 17. H.727.
Brahman—1, 12. *Pañcatantra*.
Kathasaritsāgara III., 50. N—17. 30.

Book I. Ch. 20 of the *Arthaśastra* itself opens with the directions for the construction of an Antaḥpura. The sentence runs thus:

वास्तुकप्रशस्ते देशे सप्राकारपरिखाद्वारमनेककक्ष्यापरिगतमन्तःपुरं कारयेत् ॥'

'On a site naturally best fitted for the purpose the king shall construct his harem consisting of many compartments, one within the other, enclosed by a parapet and a ditch and provided with a door.'

In this translation the word has been wrongly rendered as harem by Dr. Sama Sastry. A careful reading of the chapter will convince any body that the word is here used to denote a citadel or palace situated in the heart (*Antaḥ*) of the town (*Pura*). The harem formed only a part of this fortified palace and is denoted by the word *Avarodha* which occurs at the end of the prose section of the chapter. Directions are given showing where this harem must be constructed in that palace. The following sentence in that connection is worth quoting here :—

"पृष्ठतः कक्ष्याविभागे स्त्रीनिवेशो गर्भव्याधिवैद्यप्रख्यातसंस्थावृक्षोदकस्थानं च।"

'On one side, in the rear of the harem, there shall be made the residence of women's compartments provided with all kinds of medicines useful in midwifery and deseases, etc.

The word *Strīniveśa* found in this sentence is also worthy of note and denotes, 'the female establishment,' and we are distinctly told in this passage that this 'female establishment' was to be constructed in the rear part (*pṛṣṭhataḥ*) of the Palace. We are further told by Kauṭilya that the quarters of the princes and the princesses were to be constructed outside the female establishment (bahiḥ-Kanyā-Kumārapuram), but apparently inside the Antaḥpura or Palace. The other Sanskrit word for harem is *Avarodha*. It also occurs in the literary works

of the classical period.[8] It is therefore no wonder if it is met with in the *Raghuvaṁśam* and *Kumarsambhavam* of Kālidasa, the *Śisupulavadha* of Māgha and also in the *Kathasaritsagara* of Kṣemendra. It is true that the word has not been traced in Vātsyāyana's *Kumasūtra* or in anyone of the Epics; nevertheless there can be no doubt that the word was in vogue even before the beginning of the Christian Era, as is clearly proved by its occurrance in Rock Edict VI of Aśoka. The third word for the harem is Śuddhānta which is found in all works of Sanskrit literature ranging from Epics to the *Rājataraṅgiṇi*. We have thus briefly traced the history of the three words which denote a *harem* and we find that this practice of the seclusion of women was prevelent at least *as early as the Maurya period*, for the word *Avarodha*, as we have seen above occurs not only *in an inscription of Aśoka* but also in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya. But perhaps the earliest reference to the existence of *Purdah* in ancient India is that Sūtra of Paṇini which teaches us the fomration of the word *Asuryampasya*, which is explained by a commen·tator, the author of the *Kasika*, as "*Asuryampasya Rajadāraḥ*." " Those who do not see the sun (are) the wives of kings " which shows that in the time of Pāṇini, a most rigid type of seclusion was prevalent in the royal families somewhere. Pāṇini has been reasonably assigned to the fifth century B.C. The practice of Purdah must thus

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[8] *Raghu*. I. 32. IV. 68, 87; VI. 48, XVI. 58.
Kumarasambhavam VII. 73.
Kathasaritsagara XII. 55.
Mahabharata III. 23-25. *Kumārasambhavam* VI. 52.
Abhijnanasakuntalam VI. 71. 13. *Kathasaritsāgara* 106, 172.
Rajataraṅgiṇī III. 436, 450. V.380, VI. 138; VI. 74.
Raghuvaṁśam VI. 45, III—16. *Uttararamacaritam* II.
Vikramorvaśī 43.

have come into vogue before his time. It must not be thought that Pāṇini was teaching us the formation of a word which was not then in use at all; because in the first place such a thing is inconceivable in the case of any grammarian of repute and secondly, the word *Asūryampaśyā* is known to Sanskrit literature also. The term has thus been actually used with reference to the Princess figuring in the historical Drama of *Kaumudī Mahotsava* (II. 4). The author of the *Kāśikā* must surely have given this explanation of the word because it was current in his time and we may safely assert that " the queens of a king were so rigorously shut up in the harem in Pāṇini's time that they had no opportunity of seeing the sun even." *If Pāṇini lived and wrote in the 5th cen. B.C. we may reasonably assume that Purdah was practised in the royal household at least a century previously.*

As will be shown subsequently, the Purdah such as is found in the Epics, or in the later classical Sanskrit literature was not of such a rigorous character as is apparent from the word *Asūryampaśyā* which was current in the time of *Pāṇini*. Probably such a verulent type of Purdah was unknown to India, at any rate to the greater portion of India, as we shall see further in the sequel. Because ladies of the royal harem were allowed to come out of Purdah on special occasions. There is again nothing in any part of Indian literature which shows that the Purdah was of such a severe form that the ladies of the royal household could not see even the sun. Pāṇini is supposed to be a native of Sātātura which was in ancient Gāndhār and it is possible that Purdah of such a strict character was prevalent amongst some of the foreign tribes such as the Persians and so forth that were settled in and about the north-west frontier of India. In later times, it seems, the word lost its original literal sense and came to denote simply the wives of kings. Attention has been drawn to

the occurrence of the word in Act II of the drama, *Kaumudīmahotsava* where it is used with reference to the princess Kīrtimatī. But be it noted the Kīrtimatī was not strictly speaking *Asūryampaśyā* although she has been so styled in verse 4 of the same Act, for we know that she freely moves about in broad day-light, when e.g. she goes to pay her obesience to the goddess Caṇḍikā . near whose temple she meets and falls in love with prince Kalyāṇavarman who ultimately becomes the ruler of Magadha. Such a princess cannot strictly speaking be called *Asūryampaśyā* at all. Nevertheless the word originally must have conveyed the exact sense which follows from that compound word. There is every reason to suppose that in the time of Pāṇini at any rate women in some parts of India were so mercilessly shut up in the harem that it was not possible for them to see even the sun. But as we have remarked, this does not faithfully depict the type of Purdah that was prevalent in India as a whole, the India which we find reflected in the Epics and the Sanskrit literature of the classical period. We are, therefore, constrained to think that the word came into existence in the Sanskrit vocabulary on account of the seclusion that perhaps prevailed among the foreign tribes that were settled in the N.-W. Frontier of India, not far from which was situated the native place of Pāṇini.

Let us now proceed a little deeper into the subject. The earliest reference to the existence of Purdah is, as stated above, contained in Pāṇini which allows the formation of the word Asūryaṁpaśyā. This word is perhaps apt to give the impression that the harems in the time of Pāṇini were dungeons devoid of light and ventilation. It is, however, quite possible to imagine that the female compartments in a royal mansion were so constructed as to admit of good light and fresh air into their interior, but that the inmates were unable to see the sun at any part of

the day. As remarked above, the ladies of the royal household, if they were Asuryampasyāḥ strictly speaking, were unable to go out of the palace without being shut up in a *palanquin* as was the custom up till the modern age. Next to Pāṇini, in point of antiquity, is the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya and we have pointed out in the above, that although the word Antaḥpuraṁ is used there, it has been used not in the sense of a harem, but ' a fortified palace.' It has also been pointed out that *Purdah* was in force in the time of Kauṭilya as is shown by the use of the word *Avarodha* and *strīveśa*. Next in point of time, is the *Kamasutra* of Vātsyayana which is a great authority on the social life of the 4th cent. A.D. It is here that we find the word *Antaḥpura* used for the first time in the sense of ' a harem.' Thus in one place Vātsyāyana says, " The inmates of the harem (*antaḥpuraṁ*) should not be allowed to go out; nor any outsider to enter it except those of the approved character " (Benares Ed. 244. Sūtra 83).

It has to be noticed in this connection that Kauṭilya and Vātsyayana are of the same opinion about the persons who should guard a harem. Both agree that women's apartments should be strictly guarded. But the motive in the case of Kauṭilya is not so much the seclusion of women as the protection of king's person; for in the course of the same account, Kauṭilya enumerates several instances of queens who poisoned or abetted the murder of the king. Whereas Vatsyāyana's motive in guarding the harem is simply the protection of women from the unhallowed gaze of the public. It is however, worthy of note that what Vātsyāyana says about Antaḥpura clearly refers to the queens and women of the king. Hence the rules of seclusion are rigorously enforced only in the case of royal families.

The construction of the house of a Nāgarika has also been described by Vātsyāyana—of a Nāgarika who re-

presents the aristocrecy. Here, we are told that it was divided into two parts, the outer, where the master of the house attended to his business and received visitors and the inner, which was occupied by the ladies of the household. The word Antaḥpuraṁ has not been used in connection with such ladies, nor is there any evidence to show that they were relegated to any kind of seclusion of a verulent type. Elsewhere again Vātsyāyana[9] makes mention of unmarried maidens as well as married women going to gardens. He also mentions how a virgin on her way to a garden is sometimes snatched away from her friends and guardians for the purpose of marriage

The Jain *Kalpa-Sūtras* which belong to the third century A.D., present the secluded life of a woman in the following :—' Then the Kṣatriya Siddhārtha placed his wife Triśālā behind the curtain and taking flowers and fruits in her hands, addressed with utmost courtesy the interpreters of dreams.[10]

The word used for ' curtain ' in the above is *Yavanikā*. The same word is used by *Bhāsa in Swapna-Vāsavadattaṁ*; but it is to be seen what it exactly means in this connection. In the last scene of the above drama, Padmāvatī, Avantikā and the portress enter the stage. The nurse who was already there in the presence of the king recognizes her as the princess Vāsavadattā and expresses it to the king on which the king orders her to bring her from the harem of Padmāvatī. But Yaugandharāyaṇa claims her as his sister and to settle the dispute the king orders to draw off the ' Yavanikā.' Here all the persons were on the stage in the presence of the king and so it cannot be a ' curtain ' but a ' veil ' with which the whole body

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[9] P. 222. (Sūtra 27).

[10] (69) p. 245 of the Sacred books of the East Series, Vol. XXII.

of Avantika was covered. The cloth used for the purpose must have been one brought from the ' Yavana ' country or the Yavanas.

We again come to the works of Bhasa. His dramas throw a flood of light on the movements of women of the royal families, as most of his dramas deal with princes and princesses. We get a graphic description of a harem of his times through his writings. The word he uses for it is *Rājakula*. That was where the king resided. A vivid description of the Rājakula is given in his play called the *Avimāraka*. He describes it as being guarded by high walls. In the second Act, the nurse of the princess meets Avimāraka and discovering that he is in love with the princess, proposes his marriage with the princess and asks him to get into the apartment of the princess stealthily. She says:—

' This very day you must make your way into the princess's palace. The honourable Bhutikā, the minister-in-charge of the princess's quarters, has gone out with the ambassador of Benares with all honours from our king.'

Avimāraka, accordingly enters the ' Rajakula ' stealthily at night disguised as a burgler. He first passes through the streets and comes to the high walls of the *Rājakula*. With the help of the rope that he carried with him, he tops the high walls and alights near the stables where elephants of the royal household were kept. Then he passes through the quarters of the servants and then through a garden in which were an artificial river and a wooden hillock. Then he comes to the audience hall of the king. Behind it was situated the apartment of the princesses or *Kanyāpuraṁ*. We find here the *Kanyāpuraṁ* forming a part of *Antaḥpuraṁ*, and not outside it as is implied by the word वहि: in Kauṭilya's description of a harem. From what has been surveyed in the above, the apartments of the princes and princesses were outside the main *Antaḥ-*

pura and were separate from it. After a time, i.e., about Bhāsa's time, a part of the harem was reserved for princesses only. Still later, the custom of assigning separate quarters to the princesses was altogether abolished. Vātsyayana, though he gives all the particulars of an *Antaḥpura*, does not anywhere mention *Kanyapuraṁ*. Again we see that the *Kanyapuraṁ* of Bhasa was strictly guarded. The nurse proposes Avimāraka to enter the quarters only when she was sure that the minister-in-charge is absent. Another feature of the harem revealed through Bhāṣa's writings is the existence of the pluralities of *Antaḥpuraṁ*. In *Swapnavāsavadattaṁ*, Udayana, the king of the Vatsas, after his marriage with the princess of Magadha, meets a messenger from the king of Ujjayinī, his former father-in-law. Udayana, while inquiring about the welfare of his former mother-in-law addresses her as follows :—'षोडशान्तःपुरज्येष्ठा माता कुशलिनी ननु'

' Is my mother-in-law, the chief among the sixteen queens, well ? '

In the above, it is quite explicit that the harem of the king of Ujjayini consisted of sixteen Antaḥpuras, and the mother-in-law of Udayana was the chief among them and probably was at the head of the entire seraglio. We find elsewhere in the works of other poets, specially Kālidāsa, a reference to the plurality of Antaḥpuras.

Further we get a glimpse of the life of the young maidens of a royal family in these works. In Bhāsa, we come across two instances : one with reference to princess Vāsavadattā in the "Minister's Vow", and another in Avimāraka When Vāsavadattā went to worship at the shrine of the holy Yakṣiṇī she went with her nurse in an open *palanquin*. The jester says, " as a young girl, whom all might see in innocence, she was in an open palanquin " (Act III, p. 26). The second occurs in *Avimāraka* where the princess Kuñjarikā goes to the garden with her attend

ants. The garden was strictly guarded by sentinels so that no man could enter.

We also find that the old ladies of a royal household had to resort to strict seclusion even at their advanced age. In act III of *Pratimānāṭaka* we find the queens of Daśaratha, who were widows and were apparently very old, followed Sumantra with their veils on. They met their own son Bharata, but mistaking him to be a stranger, they spoke from behind their veils. But subsequently when they came to know that they were speaking to their own son only, they removed their veils and showed their faces.

From what has been surveyed in the above we find the strictest kind of seclusion prevalent in the households of kings.

The Jātakas, again, refer to the seclusion of women; for we find the word *Antaḥpura* mentioned here. But it is doubtful, if the degree of seclusion was as rigid as that of the royal families surveyed above. We do not come across the words *Śuddhāntaḥ* or *Avarodha* which designate the most rigid type of seclusion.

In Jātaka I. 224, we have a reference to the harem of a king. The pearl necklace of the queen was stolen away while the queen was bathing, and the inmates of the harem were perplexed to see how a man could enter the palace and take it, for the gates of the 'harem' were strongly guarded. The surprise of the people was subdued by the revelation that it was a monkey and not a man that stole away the necklace of the queen. 'A man has run off with the queen's pearl necklace . . . . There was a strong guard at the gate.'

Elsewhere in the *Khāntivādi Jātaka* (Vol. III) we find that a king called Kalabu comes to a park with the inmates of the harem. But the park is not mentioned as being guarded by sentinels as in Bhāsa. 'King Kalabu

being inflamed with strong drink came to a park in great pomp . . . . Then . . . . lay with his head on the lap of a favourite of the harem . . . . and he fell asleep.'

References to intrigues in the harem as mentioned in Kauṭilya are also to be found in many places

' Now one of the king's ministers dealt treacherously in the king's harem.' I. 129.

Elsewhere again, we find ' Now one of the king's court intrigued in the harem and the king learnt all about it.' II. 88, also II. 145.

The annals of Kāshmīr give us a new phase of the harem. Here we have instances where women of low caste were taken into the harem and were raised to the position of a queen. In VI. 74 king Yaśaṣkara takes a courtesan into his harem and raises her to the status of his chief queen. 'A courtesan Lallā by name, whom he had raised from love to the foremost place among the ladies of his seraglio, got him entirely under her control.'

In V. 379, we find that king Cakravarman was enamoured by the charms of two Domba girls and took them into his seraglio and raised them to the status of queens. ' The Domba girls won the heart of the king by their singing and acting which are described in conventional *kāvya* fashion. The enamoured king, encouraged by the sophisms of one of his favourites pays no regard to the low caste of the singers and takes Hamsī and Nāgalatā into his seraglio. He falls wholly into the snares of their arts of love.'

What has been surveyed so far refers to women who belonged to royal household and were subject to the strictest type of seclusion. But what type of seclusion was prevalent outside the realm of the palaces has now to be surveyed. We get a clue to this in Bhāsa's drama *Swapnavāsavadattaṁ* Women of the higher caste were excluded from the seclusion. It seems, as though they

had to observe it on certain occasions. In the last scene of the above drama, Vāsavadatta who was residing with princess Padmāvatī as the sister of a Brāhmaṇa, has been asked to come before the king. She comes there with a veil on. Padmavatī explains the situation thus to the king: 'her husband is away and she shuns the sight of other men,' showing thereby, that the absence of her husband is the only cause for her to be thus veiled.

The *Sāhitya-Darpaṇa* refers to the partial seclusion of women of respectable families. A woman of a respectable family could go out with an Avaguṇṭhana.

'If a woman of a respectable family is desirous of meeting her lover, she can do so fastening her ornaments tightly to her body so that they cannot make any sound, and after covering herself with an *Avaguṇṭhana*.' (Ch. III. 77).

The verse definitely states the degree of freedom allowed to a woman of a respectable family. The two verses following it, clearly state how women of lower status in society can walk in the streets. Besides this glaring example in a book of rhetoric pertaining to seclusion, there are descriptions in the works of Kālidāsa and other dramatists referring to partial seclusion. In the *Abhijnanaśākuntalaṁ* of Kālidāsa we have a vivid picture of this partial seclusion. In the fifth act the heroine comes to the court accompanied by two hermits. She comes with her Avaguṇṭhana on. The king expresses his admiration for her thus:—

> कास्विदवगुण्ठनवती नातिपरिस्फुटशरीरलावण्या ।
> मध्ये तपोधनानां किशलयमिव पाण्डुपत्राणाम् ॥

'Who could she be with a veil and with the gloss of her body not fully manifested, standing in the midst of anchorites like a tender sprout in the midst of scared leaves?

The word Avaguṇṭhana is generally translated as 'veil.'. A 'veil' means 'a cloth that covers the face.' In the present stanza we see that the word means more than that. The king says that 'the gloss of her body or the beauty of her form is not fully manifested.' This shows that the Avaguṇṭhana covered her whole body and also loosely wrapped hence the beauty of her figure is partly hidden from the view. So the Avaguṇṭhana was not merely a covering for the head and the face but also for the whole body. Again we find her coming to the court of the king in broad daylight from the hermitage. Elsewhere we find Avaguṇṭhana was used as a mark of respect also. In the *Mṛcchakaṭika* we find that as soon as Vasantasenā was married, she had to cover her head with Avaguṇṭhana as a mark of honour. In the last scene of the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, we meet with a similar incident.

The above refers to partial seclusion prevalent in ancient India and from what has been surveyed, it can safely be said that seclusion prevailed in the royal families as well as in the respectable ones, though it differed in degrees as to its rigidity. But there were occasions when even the queens of a royal household could give up their secluded life. In the *Pratimānāṭaka* of Bhāsa we find a clear reference to it. When Rāma leaves the place with Sītā, he finds his subjects eagerly waiting at the door of the palace to have a glimpse of the royal pair. On seeing this eager crowd around him Rama orders Sītā thus:—

"मैथिलि अपनीयतामवगुण्ठनम्"

'O lady of Mithilā, take off your veil.' Then turning to the people he says thus :—

"स्वैरं हि पश्यतु कलत्रमेतत् वाष्पाकुलाक्षैर्वदनैर्भवन्तः ।
निर्दोषदृश्या हि भवन्ति नार्यो यज्ञे विवाहे व्यसने वने च ॥"

'Gaze freely on this my spouse while your faces stream with tears. For women may be looked at without

offence at sacrifice or wedding, in calamity or in the forest.'

From what has been surveyed in the above, we come to the conclusion that seclusion was unknown to India in its earliest period. It was borrowed from foreign tribes who swept over the plains of India and became the rulers of it for sometime at least, about the sixth century B.C. For it is to be noted in this connection that the strictest type of seclusion is mentioned to be prevalent in the families of the kings only. It must have been a long-standing and time-honoured custom in ancient India to enable the author of *Kāśika* to mention it as such when he exemplifies the *sūtra of Pāṇini*. Later, too, we find it prevalent in the families of kings mainly, and extended to a certain extent to the aristocracy of the time. It seems as though it was observed in the later period as a mark of honour and dignity. From this it seems that seclusion in ancient India was adopted from foreign rulers by the native rulers of the land thus it came down from generation to generation and was confined first to the family of the rulers of the land and later extended to the aristocracy as a mark of dignity and respect.

MAGIC RITUAL IN SANSKRIT FICTION

By V. W. KARAMBELKAR

1. *Introduction* :—

Popular tales and fiction in Sanskrit contain a considerable material pertaining to magic. *The Daśakumāracarita*, the *Kathāsaritsāgara*, the *Kādambarī* and such other works contain passages which make direct or indirect references to the magical practices that were current in Mediaeval India and which still linger in distant corners of our vast country. Even the Jain and the Buddhist works do not fail to mention the ghastly magical performances which agree to a great extent with what we find in the Hindu fiction. From all these sources we find that terrible magic was practised both by men and women in Mediaeval India. Their magic consisted of *mantra* and practice. The *mantra*—material is not found mentioned in the works on fiction but many a time ritual is presented in full. These *mantras* and their ritual were traditional secret knowledge and were handed down by word of mouth from the preceptor to the disciple.

2. *The Kāpālikas*:—

Invariably, the atrocities of magical ritual are ascribed to the followers of a sect of Śaivism known as Kāpālikas, or Mahāvratins or Pāśupatas.[1] These Kāpālikas wore garlands of skulls smeared their bodies with the

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[1] R. G. Bhandarkar, '*Saivism, Vaisnavism* etc'; pp. 117 ff, 127 ff. M. Bloomfield, "*On False Ascetics and Nuns*"; JAOS. 44. 202 ff. Bloomfield in his above-mentioned article refers to a Copper-plate charter of Nāgavardhana, nephew of Pulakeśin II (610-639 A.D.) in which a grant is recorded of a village near Igatpuri in Nasik district for the worship of God Kapāleśvara for the maintainance of Mahāvratins residing in the temple.

ashes of the dead. lived in cemeteries and performed horrible magical ceremonies requiring human sacrifices for the acquisition of *Vidyā* or *Siddhi* or magical power.[2] The author Mādhava, in his *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* (XV. 1—28) brings his hero Śaṅkara in contact with Krakaca, the Kāpālika of Ujjain, who invokes Bhairava by drinking wine in a skull. There the full get up of a Kāpālika is given:—' His body is smeared with ashes from a funeral pyre, around his neck hangs a string of human skulls, his forehead is streaked with a black line, his hair is twisted into a matted braid, his loins are clothed with a tiger's skin, a hollow skull is in his left hand and in his right hand he carries a bell that rings incessantly.'

The most extreme type of Kāpālikas are called Mahāvratins or Mahāvratadharas according to the *Śivapurāṇa.* Mahāvrata is the great vow of eating food in human skull. According to the *Mālatīmādhava* of Bhavabhūti, ' Śrīśaila ' was the principal seat of Kāpālikas Sanskrit literature is full of reference to (Pā)- khaṇḍa Kāpālikas who perpetrated atrocities ex-proficio and for reasons like love. greed and gluttony singly or collectively.

The *Daśakumaracarita* (Chap 7: p. 199) describes a Kāpālika busy in his nocturnal activities:—' Mantragupta begins his adventure in a cemetery near the city of Kaliṅgas. There he overhears a couple of demoniac servitors complain that their wicked master, an evil and powerful wizard was just then disturbing their love passages with an order to fetch for him Kanakalekha, the

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[2] The group of *Vidyā*, *Yoga*, and *Mantra* is considered as one of the three superhuman qualities. The difference between *Vidyâ* and *Mantra* according to Jain canonical texts, is that the former is accomplished by certain magical practices and is presided over by certain female deity such as Prajñapti, etc; while the latter is accomplished just by reciting and is presided over by a male deity. *Yoga* is a charm or magical incantation or a magical power.

See, J. C. Jain. "*Life in Ancient India as Depicted in Jain Canons*". p. 227.

daughter of king Kardana. His body was ornamented with glittering pieces of skulls, he was smeared with ashes from funeral fires, he wore braids that looked like streaks of lightning; with his left hand he was sacrificing steadily into a fierce fire crackling sesame and mustard. In front of him stands one of the aforementioned servants with folded hands saying, "Issue your command; wherewith can I serve you?" He is told to fetch the princess and he does so instantaneously. Frightened and in tears, the princess Kanakalekhā kept crying, "Woe me. Woe father, Woe mother" as the Kāpālika held by her thick hair and prepared his sword to chop off her head, when Mantragupta snatched the sword from his hand and cut off his head.

Here we are not told, the magic power (siddhi) for which the Kapālika was performing the sacrifice in the cemetry and was offering the princess as a victim. Nor is the ritual fully developed.[3]

Similarly, the *Mālatīmādhava* of Bhavabhūti brings in a Kāpālika—Aghoraghaṇṭa and his female disciple Kapālakuṇḍalā who worshipped Cāmuṇḍā (Karālā) in the cemetery. Cāmuṇḍā is said to be the spouse of the great god Kapālin. To her the best among women was to be offered as victim for the acquisition of some magic power. Kapālakuṇḍalā says that she was asked by her preceptor to make full arrangements of worship including a jewel among women as victim for the ritual which promised some magic power. But Kapālakuṇḍala's words

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[3] From the account of Mantragupta in the *Dasakumara*, we are indirectly informed that the Kapalikas were respected to some extent for their knowledge of Vedas, Vedāṅgas, medicine and magic. The Jain works like Parśvanāthacarita, Kathāratna kara Mahārāṣṭrī Kathā, Kathākoṣa, Mallinathacarita, Malayasundarīkathoddhāra etc. and the Buddhist works like the Jātaka Kathā etc. (See Bloomfield's article) give us stories of Kāpālikas and their wickedness.

are ambiguous,[4] and Aghoraghaṇṭa too does not tell us anything of the mantra or its ritual.[5] Nor are we told anything in particular about Kapālakuṇḍalā—either as regards her magical powers or about the classes of female ascetics which practised black magic and the particular class to which she belonged.

3. *Śākinī, Yoginī and Ḍākinī* :—

Female ascetics who indulged in witchcraft ritual were of three categories—Śākinī, Yoginī and Ḍākinī. They differed from one another by their activities and *siddhis*. The story of Bhīmaparākrama (*Kathā SS*. 71. 264—270) illustrates the nature of the activities of a Śākinī. The *mantras* used by a Śākinī[6] required only barley seeds or some other corn which she sows at midnight in a secluded chamber of her own house. The seeds which grow immediately, are plucked, sifted, fried, pounded and placed in a pot of white copper (कांसपात्र). These are

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[4] "यत्र पर्यवसितमन्त्रसाधनस्यास्मद्गुरोरघोरघण्टस्याज्ञया सविशेषमद्य मया पूजासंभारः संनिधापनीयः। कथितं हि मे गुरुणा–'वत्से कपालकुण्डले भगवत्याः करालायाः यन्मया प्रागुपयाचितं स्त्रीरत्नमुपहर्तव्यम्. . . . —Act. V., after Verse 4.

[5] चामुण्डे भगवति मन्त्रसाधनादा–
वुद्दिष्टामुपनिहितां भजस्व पूजाम् ॥—V. 25.

[6] तत्रायुष्मानसंप्राप्य श्रान्तः कस्याश्चन स्त्रियः।
दत्तभोजनमूल्योऽहं वासाय प्राविशं गृहम् ॥
तत्र तद्दत्तशयनः क्षणं सुप्तः क्षणादहम्।
प्रवुद्ध यावत्पश्यामि कौतुकान्निभृतः स्थितः ॥
तावत्सा स्त्री गृहीत्वैव यवमुष्टिं गृहान्तरे।
समन्तादावपत्तत्र मन्त्रेण स्फुरिताधरा ॥
तैर्यवैस्तत्क्षणं जातैः फलितैः पक्वतां गतैः।
लूनैर्भृष्टैश्च पिष्टैश्च सक्तवो विहितास्तया ॥
तान्सक्तून्कांसपात्र्यां सा निधायाद्भिः समुक्षितान्।
पूर्वावस्थं गृहं कृत्वा स्नानाय निरगाद्द्रुतम् ॥
ततस्तां शाकिनीं मत्वा. . . . .

charmed grains and they have the power to turn a human being into a she-goat. The minister Bhīmaparākrama was later on transformed into a peacock by a butcher-woman by fastening a thread into his neck. This, of course, was a different method, other than that used by a Śakinī who deals with the charmed grains only.

In the *Daśakumāracarita* (Chap. 6, p. 190 ff), in the story of Nitambavatī we are told that a rake by name Kalahakaṇṭaka falls in love with Nitambavatī, the wife of an elderly gentleman of Ujjain. He obtains the position of a caretaker of the cemetery and from there sends an old Jain nun as love's messenger to Nitambavatī. He pretends to be a holy man; able to procure offspring for her; she must come that night to a grove and place her foot in his hand where-upon he would pronounce charms over it which would procure the desired result. Nitambavatī does so; the fake ascetic pulls an anklet from her foot, marks her thigh with his knife and runs off. The rogue then offers the anklet to her husband for sale. That creates suspicion about her in her husband's mind. Before the tribal assembly the rogue tells that he, *while he was on duty at the cemetery on the previous night saw a beautiful woman drag a corpse from a pyre*. He leapt upon her, accidentally scratched her with his knife on her thigh. In her haste she fled, dropping her anklet. Nitambavatī was then convicted of being a Śākinī.[7]

From this it appears that Śākinī gets her magic power by devouring human flesh of a corpse on pyre.

In the story of Bandhudattā (*Kathâ SS* **37. 110-111**) a female friend of hers gave her two charms which refer to the 'String-method' of a Yoginī.[8] Somadā and Bandha-

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[7] A similar story appears in the *Kathā-SS*. 75.160 ff. but there the beautiful maiden Padmāvatī is charged with being a Yoginī.

[8] द्वौ स्तो मन्त्रप्रयोगौ मे ययोरेकेन सूत्रके। कण्ठवद्धे स्त्र गित्येव मानुषो मर्कटो भवेत्।
द्वितीयेन च मुक्तेऽस्मिन्सूत्रके सैष मानुषः। पुनर्भवेत्कपित्वेऽपि नास्य प्रज्ञा विलुप्यते।

mocanika were Yoginıs (*Kathā-SS.* 37. 150—170), and it is expressly stated there that Somadā was a Yoginı.[9] These Yoginıs transformed men into bulls or monkeys or even transformed themselves into mares or cows by fastening charmed strings into necks. In the *Uttamacaritakathanaka*, a Jain work, we have a story of Anaṅgasena, a courtezan who fell madly in love with the prince Uttamacarita. Unable to obtain him in any other way, she manages to tie a magic thread round his leg. He is immediately turned into a parrot.[10] The courtezan was thus a Yoginı. The use of magic grains and the use of magic thread are the two special characteristic points which distinguish Śākinı and Yoginī from each other.

The *Vetālapañcaviṃsatikā* once casually mentions the habit and the object of worship of the Yoginīs. The Yoginīs are habituated to meet periodically in the cemetery and they offer collectively a human victim to their God Bhairava.[11]

Ḍākinī has a more terrible aspect. The method of initiation in the fold of Ḍākinīs is described in the story of the Queen Kuvalayāvalī (*Kathā-SS.* 20.48-51 and 105ff.) the wife of the king Ādityaprabha. Once the king suddenly returned from a hunting expedition to his capital. When he reached the inner courtyard, he found the doorkeepers in a state of confusion. As he entered the Queen's apartment he found her naked, her eyes closed, her hair

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[9] ब्राह्मणी सोमदा नाम चपला गुप्तयोगिनी।

[10] Quoted in Penzer's "*Ocean of Story*" Vol. VI, p. 60.

[11] सेाऽहं दैवादिह प्राप्तः स्मशानेऽत्र स्थितां निशि।
अपश्यं योगिनीचक्रं समागतमितस्ततः॥
तन्मध्ये चैकयानीय योगिन्या राजपुत्रकः।
उद्घारितहृदम्भोजो भैरवाय निवेदितः॥

No magic ritual, if it is to promise a substantial siddhi will ever be without human victim.

loosened, her lips muttering some words, her forehead shining with big spot of red lead and she herself standing in a big circle which contained such things as human blood, flesh, wine etc.[12] The queen was one from the group of the Ḍākinīs and was performing the ritual necessary for retaining her magical power known as '*Khecarī-siddhi*' (flying in air). Being questioned by the king she told him how she became a Ḍakinī by falling a victim to the temptation of this *Khecarı-siddhi*. While in her maidenhood she saw some of her friends flying in the sky. On being asked about the source of their power, they told her that the particular siddhi was obtainable by eating human flesh. The princess remained doubtful for a second for fear of eating human flesh but soon decided to have the one for the sake of the other. Immediately the initiating preceptor was brought and the princess was admitted into the secret associaton of the Ḍākinīs. The ritual for the acquisition of the *Khecarī-siddhi* is sufficiently available to us. It consists of a bath, worship of Vighneśvara, standing in a big magic circle[13] in naked state[14] and

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[12] देवीं देवार्चनव्यग्रां नाम्ना कुवलयावलीम् ।
दिगम्बरामूर्ध्वकेशीं निमीलितविलोचनाम् ॥
स्थूलसिन्दूरतिलकां जपप्रस्फुरिताधराम् ।
विचित्रवर्णकन्यस्तमहामण्डलमध्यगाम् ॥
असृक्सुरामहामांसकल्पितोग्रवलिक्रियाम् ।

[13] Magic circle is another important factor in all the practices of black magic. Bāṇabhaṭṭa's *Kādambarī* also makes a reference to the magic circle:

महानरेन्द्रलिखितमण्डलमध्यवर्तिनी विविधवलिदानानन्दितदिग्देवतानि बहुलचतुर्दशीनिशासु चतुष्पथे स्नपनमंगलानि भेजे ।

(Purvabhaga. p. 129; N. S. Edn. 1910). Also Gambler's Circle in *Mṛcchakaṭika* Act. II.

[14] Nudity is essential in many ceremonies of black magic. It may be for fear of pollution or because in magical rites clothes become taboo or the magic rite being abnormal, the performer is also required to be abnormal or complete nudity denotes total submission or nudity gives shock to the spirit or sexual organs are said to

worship of Bhairava in the circle. After the worship comes another bath, the Balis are offered containing Mahāmāṁsa (human flesh), blood and wine and finally the *mantras* are disclosed to the new recipient after she has eaten of the Mahāmāṁsa. No sooner the last item is over than the entire circle of the Ḍākinīs flies in the sky.[15]

Ḍākinīs and Yoginīs both can fly, both move in groups, both visit cemetery periodically and both have Bhairava as their great god of magic rites.[16]

4. *Propitiation of Vampire*[17] :—

The process of inviting and pleasing a Vetāla is uniform throughout, though that is done for various purposes. In the story of Śrīdarśana (*Kathā-SS*. 75.261) Vetāla is worshipped for curing Yakṣmā (consumption); in the story of the king Trivikramasena (*Kathā-SS*. 75.36-37) the mendicant Kṣāntiśīla wishes to please Vetāla to secure

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possess some peculiar powers in these matters. For any of these reasons or for all these, nudity of the performer is an important factor in magic rites. See, Penzer's "*Ocean of the Story*". Vol. II, p. 117.

[15] सा मां पादानतां स्नातां कृतविघ्नेश्वरार्चनाम् ।
विवस्त्रां मण्डले भीमां भैरवार्चामकारयत् ॥
अभिषिच्य च सा मह्यं तांस्तान्मन्त्रान्निजान्ददौ ।
भक्षणाय नृमांसं च देवार्चनवलीकृतम् ॥
आत्तमन्त्रगणा भुक्तमहामांसा च तत्क्षणम् ।
निरम्बरैवोत्पतिता ससखीकाहमम्बरम् ॥

[16] The story of Niścayadatta (*Kathā-SS*. 37.57-75) has an episode in which the hero finds himself in the company of four Mahāvratins. They were in a dense forest at night, when a Yakṣinī by name Śṛṅgotpādinī comes to them and devours the four companions of the hero. She does so by singing a *mantra* in accompaniment of her lute and dance. Her lute was made from human skull. When she thus sang, a horn appeared on the head of the man on whom she fixed her gaze. This Yakṣinī, of course, was neither a Ḍākinī, nor a Yoginī.

[17] See the note 'Vampire' in Penzer's "*Ocean of Story*" Vol. VI. p. 136-140.

overlordship of the Vidyādharas through him (see further *Kathā-SS*. 90. 21); while Vikramakesarī, one of the ministers of Mṛgāṅkadatta gets the mantra and ritual for the propitiation of a Vetāla to bring about reunioṅ with his master (*Kathā*-SS. 75. 16) But there the old man who knew the *mantra* with the required concomitant ritual, convinces Vikramakesarī that anything is obtainable through the favour of Vetāla (*Kathā-SS*. 75 19)

King Viṣamaśīla had one Vetāla by name Agniśikha as his servitor. He did all odd jobs at the behest of the king. The appearance of this Agniśikha was rather terrifying—' with his red eyes burning, his hair on the head standing and whole of his get up menacing'.[18]

The propitiation of such a Vetāla or Vampire is usually done with the help of a warrior, a hero of extraordinary courage. The ceremony of *Vetāla-sādhana* is, therefore, always called as ' *Vīrasādhya* '—possible only with the help of a hero. This ceremony is undertaken in a cemetery on the fourteenth day of the black half of the month, at night.[19] The performer sits under a Bunyan tree in the cemetery, with his body smeared with the ashes from a funeral pyre using the hair of a corpse as his sacred thread, with a turban made from the cloth that is used for covering the dead, on his head and having put on a black garment. He uses a branch of palm as a chaplet

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[18] "स चाहूतो ज्वलन्नेत्रः पांशुरूर्ध्वशिरोरुहः।" *Kathā-SS*. 121.24.

[19] In the famous Jain story of Ambada, such a ceremony is undertaken on the evening of the 8th day of the half month- *Charlotte Krause, Indische Erzähler Band*. 4. p. 24 quoted by Bloomfield in his article in *JAOS* 44.202 ff.

तत्त्वं कृष्णचतुर्दश्यामद्यैवास्यां निशागमे।
इह स्मशानमागच्छेरन्तिकं मम सिद्धये।—*Kathāsaritsāgara*, 73-278.
तर्हि कृष्णचतुर्दश्यामागामिन्यां निशागमे।
इतो महास्मशानान्तर्वटस्याधः स्थितस्य मे॥—*Kathāsaritsāgara*, 75.3.

in his turban.[20] He sends the hero to fetch the corpse which is temporarily inhabited by the Vetāla or himself he goes to bring it if he has sufficient courage. Such a corpse is to be found hanging down a Śiṁśipā tree situated to the southern direction of the cemetery. A circle[21] is already prepared to receive the guest, under the Bunyan tree. The circle is a special and spacious one drawn by the power of human bones; all of its angles facing different directions are occupied by jars full of human blood; the same blood is used to sprinkle the circle; candles of human fat[22] are kept burning inside. Oblations are offered in the fire which is already kindled there.[23] The corpse inhabited by Vetāla is bathed and garlanded and deposited in the circle, its face being turned up to the sky. Its mouth is opened by force and a sacrifice is performed in it

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20 'भस्मोद्धूलितगात्रश्च केशयज्ञोपवीतभृत् । प्रावृतप्रेतवसनः...... —*Kathāsaritsāgara*, 99.11.

भस्मानुलिप्तसर्वांगं धृतकेशोपवीतकम् ।
प्रेतवस्त्रकृतोष्णीषं संवीतासितवासकम् ॥ --*Ibid.* 73.283

प्रदोषे नीलवसनः तमालकृतशेखरः ।—*Ibid.* 75.42.

21 The magic circle appears to have twofold purpose—(a) as a protective area and (b) as a stronghold of the magician. It being a charmed circle the evil powers cannot break it through. It is also a stronghold from which the magician can conveniently and with advantage force the evil powers to obey him. "The circle also denotes finality and continuity. It commands every point of compass and can be regarded as the inner circle of the horizon itself. The circle is not only a safe place to be in while conjuring but often acts as a prizon from which escape is impossible." Penzer "*Ocean of Story*" Vol. II. p. 98; Also see "Magic Circle" in Hasting's *Ency. of Religion and Ethics* Vol. VIII. 321 ff.

22 "The Hand of Glory" in the '*Ocean of Story*'. Vol. III. p. 150-154.

23 स चाभिनन्द्य संपूज्य रक्तमाल्यानुलेपनः । नरास्थिचूर्णलिखितं कोणन्यस्तास्रकुम्भके । महातैलज्वलद्दीपं मण्डले विपुलान्तरे ।—*Kathāsarit*. 73.305-306.

असृग्लिप्ततले गौरेणास्थिचूर्णेन निर्मिते । मण्डले दिक्षु विन्यस्तपूर्णशोणितकुम्भके ।

महातैलप्रदीपाढ्ये हुतपार्श्वस्थवह्निनि । संभृतोचितसंभारे स्वेष्टदैवतपूजने ॥ —*Ibid*. 99.3-4

by offering oblations with the help of ladles and spoons made from human bones. The worship consists of *Arghya* in a bowl of skull, flowers of human teeth, sandal of blood, incense of eyes and food of human flesh. The ceremony is deemed successful if a flame rises from the widened mouth of the corpse. The ceremony is over when a handful of mustard seeds are found in the mouth of the dead body. They possess all possible magic powers that one can imagine.[24]

5. *To Secure a Ghost as a Servant*:—

The story of a Brāhmaṇa and a ghost (*Kathā-SS*. 28. 155ff) gives us the ritual by which the services of a ghost can be secured for curing a wound. There it is told that a Brāhmaṇa while cutting wood in forest sustained a wound caused by a splinter. The piece went deep in his flesh in the thigh and though it was removed yet the wound went more and more deep till it reached the bone. The Brāhmaṇa gave himself up to despair when he found that despite all his efforts the wound became almost incurable. At this juncture a friend of his advised him to secure the services of a ghost to cure his wound, which was about to become fatal. He gave him a *mantra* with the instructions about the necessary accompanying ritual.[25] Having

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[24] वेतालं तं तदोत्तानमात्तप्रेततनुं व्यधात् । वक्षःस्थलोपविष्टश्च तस्यास्यकुहरेऽथ सः । नरास्थिस्रुक्स्रुवकरो होमं कर्तुं प्रचक्रमे । क्षणाच्च तस्य वेतालस्यास्याज्ज्वालोद-भूत्ततः ।।—*Kathā-SS*. 73.306-307.

तस्मिन्मंत्रबलाहूतं प्रवेश्य नृकलेवरे । तं वेतालवरं भिक्षुः पूजयामास स क्रमात् ।। तस्मै ददौ कपालार्घ्यपात्रेणार्घ्यं सुनिर्मलैः। नरदन्तैः ततः पुष्पं सुगन्धि च विलेपनम् ।। दत्त्वा मानुषनेत्रैश्च धूपं मांसैर्बलिं तथा ।।—*Kathā-SS*. 99.12-13.

[25] इत्युक्त्वाख्यातमन्त्रोऽसौ उवाचास्य क्रियामिमाम् ।

उत्थाय पश्चिमे यामे मुक्तकेशो दिगम्बरः । अनाचान्तश्च मुष्टी द्वौ तण्डुलानां यथाक्षमम् ।।

द्वाभ्यामादाय हस्ताभ्यां जपन्गच्छेच्चतुष्पथम् । तत्र तण्डुलमुष्टी द्वौ स्थापयित्वा ततः सखे ।।

मौनेनैव त्वमागच्छेर्मावीक्षिष्ठाश्च पृष्ठतः । एवं कुरु सदा यावत् पिशाचो व्यक्ततां गतः—*Kathā-SS*. 53.28-155 ff.

got up in the last quarter of the night. the man should unite his hair and in naked condition fill his fists with rice grains. He should then, without rinsing his mouth, go to a cross-road[26] uttering the *mantra* and deposit the rice grains there and return in silence without looking back. In a few days the ghost will appear before him.

6. *Ritual for Curing Fever* (*Jvaracheṭaka*) :—

The story of Haṁsāvalī (*Kathā-SS* 71. 61 ff) gives us an important magic performance. Prince Kamalākara wishes to marry Haṁsāvalī who had secured a divine gift of curing a person who is suffering from fever by mere touch of her hand. At the time of wedding ceremony Kanakamañjarī, a wicked friend of Haṁsāvalī deceives her and takes her place and marries Kamalākara. Later on the prince begins to suffer from fever and Kanakamañjarī who pretended to be Haṁsāvalī was afraid of exposure. She, therefore, undertakes to perform Jvaracheṭaka—a magic performance which cures a person suffering from fever. The ceremony was told to her by some Yoginī (*Kathā-SS*. 71. 207). It required a human victim.

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[26] "Cross-roads in Magic" in '*The Ocean of Story*', Vol. III. p. 37-38.

ययौ शून्यैकलिंगं सा खड्गहस्ता शिवालयम्। तत्र खड्गहतच्छागशोणितस्नातरञ्जितम् ॥

तदंस्रकल्पितार्घं च तदन्त्रस्रग्विवेष्टितम्। आनर्च शिवलिंगं सा तद्धृत्पद्मेन मूर्धनि ॥

धूपं दत्त्वा तदक्षिभ्यां तच्छिरोऽस्मै बलिं ददौ। ततस्तदग्रवेद्यां च लिप्तायां रक्तचन्दनैः ॥

लिलेख गोरोचनया कमलं साष्टपल्लवम्। तत्कर्णिकायां सास्रेण पिष्टेन रचितं ज्वरम् ॥

भस्ममुष्टिप्रहरणं त्रिपादं त्रिमुखं व्यधात्। पल्लवेषु निवेश्यात्र परिवारं यथाविधि ॥

ज्वरस्य निजमन्त्रेण तस्याह्वानं व्यधत्त सा। ततः पूर्वोक्तवत्सास्य स्नानार्घ्याद्यौपहारिकम् ॥

चिकीर्षुर्मानुषाङ्गास्त्रैः . . . . . , —*Kathā-SS*. 71.61 ff.

The ritual is simple enough[27] The ceremony is begun at night in a lonely temple of Śiva. There, a goat is to be killed with sword and the image of Śiva to be bathed with its blood. All other items of worship of Śiva are also to be taken from the killed goat—its flesh as cover, its heart as flower, its eyes as incense, its head as Bali. Then the platform in front of the image of Śiva is to be sprinkled with red sandal; on it a lotus with eight petals is to be drawn with yellow pigment; in its centre the image of Fever is to be prepared with blood and flour. The image has three faces, three legs and has its fists filled with ashes (as weapon). Having thus prepared Fever with its concomitants, it is to be invited with a *mantra* and worshipped with human blood, bones, flesh etc. from the body of a person who is killed there and then.

7. *Change of Sex*[28] :—

The idea of changing one's sex is very old.[29] Though no specific ritual is available yet we find from references in works on Sanskrit fiction that change of sex was a magical act. To achieve such a change, a magic pill (Guṭikā) was usually used. Magical objects and spells were considered potent to accomplish a change of sex. As a rule the spell or charm is accompanied by the taking of the pill, which was presumably allowed to remain in the mouth as long as the change of sex is desired to continue. When the pill is removed the original sex is restored. This " pill method " was well known to Mūladeva and he used it to turn Manaḥswāmī, a comely merchant youth into a beautiful damsel (*Vetālapañcaviṁśatikā*, Story 15 in *Kathā-SS*. 89. 25-26). In another work three women used

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[27] W. N. Brown "*Change of Sex as a Hindu Story Motif*".

[28] W. N. Brown "Change of Sex as a Hindu Story Motif". *JAOS*. 47, p. 3ff.

[29] Indra changed his sex by *Māyā* (magic)-*Atharvaveda*. VII. 38.2; Keith—'*Religion and Philosophy of Veda*'. I. 125.

magic pills to satisfy each other.[30] In *Malayasundarīkathoddhāra* of Dharmacandra we have also a reference to the use of this same method.[31].

A charm may be employed with the aid of other magic objects to bring about a change of sex.[32] In the *Dharmakalpadruma*,[33] a magic vegetable produces change of sex. A magic plant transforms a girl into a man in the *Kathākoṣa*.[34]

Parakāyapraveśa—entering another's body[35]—is also a magic act. According to the *Kathā-SS*. this magic art of entering another's body is said to be based on Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems of philosophy. But no specific ritual of the act is available. An illustration of this act is mentioned in the 23rd story of the *Vetālapañcaviṁśati*.

8. *Invisibility*:—

Bhāsa's *Avimāraka* refers to a magic ring which made the hero invisible whenever he desired it. That there was some magic ointment to secure invisibility is illustrated in the story of Guṇaśarman (*Kathā-SS*. 49. 74, 81, 150). The thief Śarvilaka in the *Mṛcchakaṭika* used Yogarocana for the same purpose.

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[30] 'Pañcadaṇḍacchatraprabandha' ed. Weber. p. 77. (Bloomfield).

[31] Hertel, *Indische Marehen*, p. 211 f. (Bloomfield)

[32] Ambada uses a magic plant or fruit to change women into asses. Krause, *Indische Erzahler*. p. 60.

[33] 3.6.324 ff. (Bloomfield).

[34] *'Ocean of the Story'*. VII. 223.

[35] 'On the Entering of another's Body'. by. M. Bloomfield in *Proceedings of the American Philological Society*, 56, pp. 1-43.

[36] *Kathā-SS*. 48.78-79:—

राजन्नेकमना भूत्वा शृण्विदानीमनुत्तमम् ।
उपदेक्ष्यामि ते योगमन्यदेहप्रवेशदम् ॥
इत्युक्त्वाख्याय सांख्यं च योगं च सरहस्यकम् ।
युक्तिं देहान्तरावेशे तस्मादुपदिदेश सः ॥

Two *vidyās* or magic powers known as Anulomā and Pratilomā are mentioned in the story of Bhīmaparākrama (*Kathā-SS*. 74. 134). Of these, Anulomā secures invisibility of a person who recites its *mantra* and the Pratilomā restores him his invisibility.

The *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (14.3) prescribes the following ritual:—

"If invisibility is desired, having fasted for three nights one should on the day of the star Puṣya sprinkle with the milk of goats and sheep barley, planted in the soil placed in the skull of a man who has been killed by sword or has been impaled. Then having put on a garland of the barley which sprouts from this, he may walk invisible".[37]

"The skin of a snake filled with the ashes of a man bitten by a snake will cause beasts to be invisible."[38]

9. *To Put to Sleep*:—

"Having fasted for three nights one should on the dark 14th day of the month of the star Puṣya, purchase from a woman of an outcast tribe some finger nails. Then together with some beans, having kept them unmixed in a basket, one should bury them in a cemetery. Having dug them up on the second 14th day and having pounded them up with aloes, one should make little pills. Whenever one of the pills is thrown after chanting the *mantra*, all will sleep.[39]

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37 "त्रिरात्रोपोषितः पुष्ये शस्त्रहतस्य शूलप्रोतस्य वा पुंसः शिरः कपाले मृत्तिकायां यवानां वस्ताविक्षीरेण संचयेत्। ततो यवविरूढमालामाबध्य नष्टच्छायारूपश्चरति" (कौ॰ अर्थ॰. Ed. Jolly. Punjab. p. 256. Kauṭilya gives here many more remedies to become invisible.

38 "सर्पदष्टस्य भस्मना पूर्णा प्रचलाकभस्त्रा मृगाणामन्तर्धानम्।"

39 "त्रिरात्रोपोषितः कृष्णचतुर्दश्यां पुष्ययोगिन्यां श्वपाकीहस्ताद्विलखावलेखनं क्रीणीयात्। तन्माषैः सह कण्डोलिकायां कृत्वासंकीर्णं आदहने निखानयेत्। द्वितीयस्यां चतुर्दश्यामुद्धृत्य कुमार्या पेषयित्वा गुलिकाः कारयेत्। तत एकां गुलिकामभिमन्त्रयित्वा यत्रैतेन मन्त्रेण क्षिपति तत्सर्वं प्रस्वापयति।"—Arthaśāstra, 14.3., p. 257.

10. *For Fulfilment of One's Desire*:—

The 18th story of the *Vetālapañcaviṁśatikā* (*Kathā-SS*. 92.50-56) gives some details of a *vidyā* known as '*Iṣṭasaṁpādinī*'—that which fulfils the desires. According to the Mahāvratin, who was pleased with Candraswāmin and to whom he was about to impart the *vidyā*, the ritual for its success is to be undertaken in water. As soon as the performer begins to mutter the *mantras* in water, he forgets himself and feels that he is born again, is growing, has attained youth, is married, has children and is totally enmeshed in the charms of his new life. His preceptor reminds him, his real intention of securing success in the *Iṣṭasaṁpādinī* Vidyā. If he takes the hint and throws himself in fire in his imaginary life, he gains success in the magic performance otherwise his preceptor also loses his magic power.[40]

Thus we find in Sanskrit fiction a large number of magic performances, but a still larger number is not found fully described There are references to the uses of magic sword (*Story of Śrīdatta*), or magic ring (*Avimāraka*), or magic pill or magic pitcher (in *Śaktiyaśa Laṁbaka*) which are said to possess great power but the processes of their preparation are not given. The story of Śṛngabhuja and

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[40] असाध्या तव विधेयं साध्यतेऽन्तर्जले ह्यसौ। तत्र चैषा सृजत्याशु जपतः साधकस्य तत् ॥

मायाजालं विमोहाय येन सिद्धिं न सोऽश्नुते। स हि तत्र पुनर्जातं बालमात्मानमीक्षते।

ततो युवानमुदूढ़दारं जातात्मजं तथा। सुहृन्मेऽयमयं शत्रुरिति मिथ्या स मुह्यति।

न च स्मरति जन्मेदं न विद्यासाधने क्रियाम्। यस्तु त्रिरष्टिवर्षः सन्गुरुविद्या-प्रबोधितः ॥

जन्म स्मृत्वा विदित्वा तद्वीरो मायाविजृम्भितम्। तद्वशोऽप्यत्र कुरुते तथैवाग्नि-प्रवेशनम् ॥

परमार्थं जलोत्तीर्णः सिद्धविद्यः स पश्यति ॥ अन्यस्य न परं विद्या शिष्यसैषादि सिध्यति ॥

अस्थानार्पणतो यावद्गुरोरपि विनश्यति ॥ —*Kathā-SS*. 92.50-56.

Rūpaśikhā contains the description of various feats performed with the help of *mantra* and magic uses of earth. water, fire and thorns. Śarvilaka, the master theif, of *Mṛcchakaṭika* possessed a kind of seed which enabled him to detect treasures hidden under ground. Similarly, the story of Kārpaṭika (in *Viṣamaśila Lambaka*) mentions a magic ointment for feet which helps a man in walking for miles together without feeling fatigue. The *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya also gives a preparation of such an ointment.

THE PROBLEM OF INCONTINENCE IN THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

By Jaideva Singh

Socrates said, "Knowledge is virtue." This raises a problem " If knowledge is virtue " how is it, that in spite of our knowledge, we are led to a vicious act?"

" I know the right and approve it too,
I know the wrong, and yet the wrong pursue."

How does such a phenomenon occur? This problem is known as that of Incontinence in Ethics. It has been raised also in the *Bhagavadgītā*. It is the aim of this paper to study Śrī Kṛṣṇa's solution of the problem.

In chapter III, verse 36, Arjuna puts a pointed question to Śrī Kṛṣṇa,

अथ केन प्रयुक्तोऽयं पापं चरति पूरुषः।
अनिच्छन्नपि वार्ष्णेय बलादिव नियोजितः॥

By what is a man led to vice, O Kṛṣṇa, even reluctantly yoked to it, as it were, by force?

What is Śrī Kṛṣṇa's reply?

काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः।
महाशनो महापाप्मा विद्धयेनमिह वैरिणम्॥[1]
धूमेनाव्रियते वह्निर्यथाऽऽदर्शो मलेन च।
यथोल्बेनावृतो गर्भस्तथा तेनेदमावृतम्॥[2]
आवृतं ज्ञानमेतेन ज्ञानिनो नित्यवैरिणा।
कामरूपेण कौन्तेय दुष्पूरेणानलेन च॥[3]
इन्द्रियाणि मनो बुद्धिरस्याधिष्ठानमुच्यते।
एतैर्विमोहयत्येष ज्ञानमावृत्य देहिनम्॥[4]

Man is led to vice by egoistic desire or wrath born of *rajas*, all-consuming, all polluting; know that it is kāma or krodha that stands in the way of his higher

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[1] III, 37. [2] III, 38.
[3] III, 39. [4] III, 40.

life. As a flame is enveloped by smoke, as a mirror by dust, as an embryo is wrapped by the amnion, so is *Jñāna* (wisdom) enveloped by passion. Yes, enveloped is wisdom by passion which is a constant menace to man's further evolution and which is insatiable as fire. The senses, the lower mind and intellect are said to be its seat; by means of these, enveloping wisdom, it infatuates the dweller in the body.

In this answer, Śrī Kṛṣṇa makes out two important points which deserve our special attention: (1) Man has egoistic desire, emotion, passion which is impulsive, and is hard to resist. (2 It is on account of his clamant, clamorous desire-nature that he is unable to see light and utilize true knowledge.

Instead of indulging in mere subtle, metaphysical speculations, Śrī Kṛṣṇa handles the problem in a perfectly concrete, practical, realistic fashion. His solution of the problem may be conveniently considered under the following heads:

(a) The psycho-physical constitution of man and the reason why man falls a victim to incontinence.

(b) The concept of true knowledge and whether man has this knowledge.

(c) How to attain to true knowledge?

(d) Can man be incontinent after attaining to true knowledge ?

(a) The secret of incontinence lies in the psycho-physical constitution of man. The *Gītā* puts the psycho-physical constitution of man in a nut-shell in the following verse:—

इन्द्रियाणि पराण्याहुरिन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनः।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्यो बुद्धेः परतस्तु सः।[5]

[5] III, 42

The senses are higher than the objects; the *manas* is higher than the senses; the Buddhi is higher than the *manas*, and what is higher even than the Buddhi is the Supreme.

This gives at once man's constitution and its hierarchy Man has the sense-nature, *manas*, Buddhi and the Ātman, and each one of the latter is higher than the preceding.

Śaṅkarānandī Ṭīkā gives the rationalé of the superiority of the one over the other in the following words:—

"प्रकाशकत्वान्तरत्वसूक्ष्मत्वप्रवर्तकत्वव्यापकत्वकारणत्वादिधर्मैः पराण्युत्कृष्टतराण्याहुर्वदन्ति।"

One is called higher than the other, because it reveals the other, is inner, subtler, and more pervasive than the other, and because it sets the other to activity.

Indriyas together with manas refer to the lower desire-nature of man, and Buddhi together with Ātman refers to the higher nature of man, to his synoptic insight. So long as the lower nature is not fully integrated to the higher, there is always a danger of moral lapse. So long as the clamorous, lower nature is not tamed, it is always apt to run wild, and seek its own gratification. When man is swayed by passion, no amount of reasoning avails. Shakespeare put this situation very beautifully in the mouth of Portia in the following words in the *Merchant of Venice* :—

" If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches and poor men's cottage princes' palaces. It is a good divine that follows his own instructions. I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching. The brain may devise laws for the blood; but a hot temper leaps o'er a cold decree. Such a hare is madness the youth, to skip o'er the meshes of good counsel,

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[6] **(Gujarati Press Edition, p. 297)**

the cripple." As a matter of fact, cool reasoning is not possible at that moment. Kāma-egoistic desire achieves its object through the agency of the lower nature.

इन्द्रियाणि मनो बुद्धिरस्याधिष्ठानमुच्यते।
एतैर्विमोहयत्येष ज्ञानमावृत्य देहिनम् ॥[7]

Kāma takes hold of the senses, *manas*, and the assenting intellect (Buddhi has here been used in the sense of assenting intellect) and throws a pall over a man's *jñāna*, weaves a spell round him and misleads him into doing wrong.

In his '*Critical History of Greek Philosophy*,' W. T. Stace, makes the following pertinent remarks on the Socratic dictum " Knowledge is virtue."

"Aristotle, in commenting upon this whole doctrine, observed that Socrates had ignored or forgotten the irrational parts of the soul. Socrates imagined that every body's actions are governed solely by reason, and that, therefore, if only they reasoned aright, they must do right. He forgot that the majority of men's actions are governed by passions and emotions, " the irrational parts of the soul." Aristotle's criticism of Socrates is unanswerable."[8]

इन्द्रियाणां हि चरतां यन्मनोऽनुविधीयते।
तदस्य हरति प्रज्ञां वायुर्नावमिवाम्भसि ॥[9]

If the mind is applied to any of the roving senses it hurries it away, even as the gale hurries away the boat upon the waters. So when we are under the sway of passion, we cannot rightly think. It is Rāga or kāma that makes short work of our principles or resolutions and it is on account of this that we become incontinent. In this

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[7] III, 40

[8] p. 147.

[9] II, 67.

connection, the following questions force themselves upon our attention :—

1. What is the nature of Rāga or Kāma?
2. How does it work?
3. How does it grow?

Indeed Arjuna very pertinently puts these questions to Śrī Kṛṣṇa which are found only in the Kashmirian recension of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

भवत्येष कथं कृष्ण कथं चैव विवर्धते।
किमात्मकः किमाचारः तन्ममाचक्ष्व पृच्छतः ॥[10]

The answers to these questions may be gathered from a few verses of the Kashmirian recension and a few that are common in all the recensions of the *Gītā*.

एष सूक्ष्मः परः शत्रुः देहिनामिन्द्रियैः सह।
सुखतन्त्र इवासीनो मोहयन्पार्थं तिष्ठति ॥[11]
कामक्रोधमयो घोरः स्तम्भहर्षसमुद्भवः।
अहंकारोऽभिमानात्मा दुस्तरः पापकर्मभिः ॥[12]
हर्षमस्य निवर्त्यैष शोकमस्य ददाति च।
भयं चास्य करोत्येष मोहयंस्तु मुहुर्मुहुः ॥[13]
काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः।
महाशनो महापाप्मा विद्ध्येनमिह वैरिणम् ॥[14]
आवृतं ज्ञानमेतेन ज्ञानिनो नित्यवैरिणा।
कामरूपेण कौन्तेय दुष्पूरेणानलेन च ॥[15]
इन्द्रियाणि मनोबुद्धिरस्याधिष्ठानमुच्यते।
एतैर्विमोहयत्येष ज्ञानमावृत्य देहिनम् ॥[16]
ध्यायतो विषयान्पुंसः संगस्तेषूपजायते।
संगात्संजायते कामः कामात्क्रोधोऽभिजायते ॥[17]

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[10] III. 38. Madras Sanskrit Series
[11] III, 39 Kashmirian recension.
[12] III, 40 Kashmirian recensiou.
[13] III, 41 Kashmirian recension.
[14] III, 37.
[15] III, 39.
[16] III. 40.
[17] II, 62.

क्रोधाद्भवति संमोहः संमोहात्स्मृतिविभ्रमः ।
स्मृतिभ्रंशाद् बुद्धिनाशो बुद्धिनाशात्प्रणश्यति ॥[18]
संकल्पप्रभवान्कामांस्त्यक्त्वा सर्वानशेषतः ।
मनसैवेन्द्रियग्रामं विनियम्य समंततः ॥[19]

(a) The nature of kāma or Raga.

(i) It is subtle, mental (सूक्ष्मः)

(ii) It is associated with our sensibility (इन्द्रियैः सह)

(iii) It is pleasure-seeking (सुखतंत्र इवासीनः)

(iv) It exists by deluding a man into taking his body and the senses as the self—

अहंकारोऽभिमानात्मा देहाद्यात्मप्रत्ययलक्षणं विपर्ययज्ञानमारोपयन् स्थितिमनुभवतीति; अनात्मन्यात्मप्रतिपत्तिनिबन्धनमात्मा स्वभावो यस्य तादृशः ।[20]

(v) It is an aspect of the conative. dynamic side of our nature (रजोगुणसमुद्भवः)

(vi) It is born of ideation, imagination, creative thought—form with a resolve to possess the object of imagination (संकल्पप्रभवः)

(vii) It is based on a sense of want and gives rise to another want after gratification (दुष्पूरः अनलः)

Kāma has, thus, a cognitive, an emotive and conative element. The cognitive element consists in a sense of want, in the imagination or representation of an object, with an intent to possess it (संकल्प) and the conciousness of a self which will be gratified by the attainment of the object (अहंकारोऽभिमानात्मा) .

" Desire implies a consciousness which can distinguish between its actual and a possible future state, and is aware of the means by which this future state can be brought into existence. It involves a permanent self, regards itself both as a present and future self, and acts with reference

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[18] II, 63.
[19] VI, ·4.
[20] p. 19. 117, Sarvatobhadra-tīkā, Madras Sanskrit series.

to their connection. I involves, in short, a self which can project or objectify itself." [21]

The emotive element consists in sense of pain born of want, and pleasure in the idea of anticipated gratification. Though the idea of the attainment of the object of desire is not an idea *of* pleasure, yet there is pleasure *in* the idea of its attainment. Pleasure follows the fulfilment of desire.

The conative element of desire is a very important one. In spite of the intellectual and emotional elements, there would be no desire if there be not an active tendency ready to emerge at their call. While the cognitive element (संकल्प) of Kāma is the origin, the emotive-conative element constitutes the *strength* of desire.

(b) How does it work?

How does kama work? It uses the psycho-physical apparatus of the sense, *manas* and the assenting intellect, and thus achieves its object. (इन्द्रियाणि मनोबुद्धिरस्याधिष्ठानमुच्यते)[22] As we mentally dwell on an object, we form an attachment, an affective or emotive association in the terminology of Psycho-analysis, which leads to the active working of kāma. Any obstruction in the way of kāma leads to krodha (anger) Krodha is only a negative aspect of kāma, a part of our desire-nature. This 'pull and push' of kāma and krodha shatters our inner perception of truth, causing a loss of 'memories' by which alone we may hope to rise to the higher life. Shri Krishna Premji rightly points out in his '*Yoga of* the *Bhagavadgītā* that the word 'memory' has been used here in the 'platonic sense' of what the soul knew and knows on its own level, not mere memories of life-experience down here.[23]

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[21] Psychology by Dewey, p. 363

[22] III. 40.

[23] *Gītā*, II, 62. and 63

(c) How does it grow?

Curiously enough it does not come to an end by gratification, but grows all the more. It is दुष्पूर, it can hardly be satisfied; it is अनल, it knows no end; the more it is gratified, the more does it grow like a flame.

न जातु कामः कामानामुपभोगेन शाम्यति।
हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मेव भूय एवाभिवर्धते॥

Desire never comes to an end by gratification. It grows all the more, the more it is gratified even as the flame grows all the more, the more sacrifical oblation is poured into it. Every gratified desire leaves behind its mental impressions; its engram-complexes in the words of T. Percy Nunn. These engram-complexes lead to the repitition of desire. In this way, it becomes habitual and can hardly be eradicated. Śaṅkarānanda, commenting on the word kāma occuring in verse II, 55 of the *Gītā*, shows remarkable psychological insight:

विषयेषु कामोदयो विषयस्वभावो वा किंवा पुरुषस्वभावो वा। नाद्यः। दृष्टे तृणपर्णादौ भोक्तुं पुंसः कामानुदयात्। न द्वितीयः। कान्तासन्निधौ बालस्य कामादर्शनात्। तर्हि कथं कामोदय इति चेदुच्यते 'काम, जानामि ते मूलं संकल्पात्किल जायसे' इति स्मरणात्कामः संकल्पमूलः। संकल्पो वासनामूलकः। नहि वासनया विना वस्तुनि समीचीनत्वबुद्धिरुदेति। समीचीनत्वबुद्धिं विना कामोऽपि न घटते। ततः कामोत्पत्तेः कारणं विषयेषु भोग्यत्ववासनैव। वासना नाम भोग्यजन्यसंस्कारः। भोग्यत्ववासनाबलादेव विषयेषु कामः प्रवृत्तिश्च जन्तूनाम्।

He says that desire cannot be due to something inherent in the nature of the object or in the nature of man. It is due to 'representation' which is again due to traces of mental impressions or engram-complexes of the enjoyment of previous presentations. Without Vāsanā or engram-complex, a sense of the fitness of an object for enjoyment cannot arise, and without this sense of value, desire cannot come into being. Therefore, the cause of desire is the Vāsanā of the enjoyability of objects, and Vāsanā is the

mental impression left behind by objects which are valued as enjoyable. Śaṅkarānanda beautifully brings out the role of (i) Saṅkalpa or ideation; (ii) Vāsanā or the mental impression left behind by the enjoyment of an object, etc., and (iii) a sense of values समीचीनत्वबुद्धि in the formation of desire.

Vāsanā is responsible for the repetition and growth of desire, but the sense of valuation is very largely responsible for the formation of desire itself and this *sense of valuation depends on our idea of self.*

We have seen that kāma or egoistic desire is due to the lower nature of man. We have analysed kāma and seen that along with other things, it is due to our defective sense of value which considers only that object to be valuable which gratifies the bio-psychical individual. When Socrates said that knowledge is virtue, he did not take into account our lower nature which is impetuous and clamant. We may intellectually conceive an ideal of conduct, but whenever we fail to carry it out into practice, the failure is always due to the terrific force of kāma which belongs to our lower nature. We saw at the very outset that moral incontinence is due to the craving of the flesh, the clamour of our lower nature which is not fully integrated to the higher. But what is this compelling terrific force of kāma due to?

It is due to the emotive-conative dynamism which is on one side of the desire. Rāga is an emotive desire. After a number of repetitions of the enjoyment of our objects of desire, an emotive-conative disposition is formed and it is this emotive-conative dynamism that sets the neuro-muscular machinery into motion, and we are compelled to do an act against our better judgement.

'भोग्यत्ववासनाबलादेव विषयेषु कामः प्रवृत्तिश्च जन्तूनाम्'

McDoughall says very rightly, " No mere idea has a motive power that can for a moment withstand the force

of strong desire, except only the pathologically fixed idea of action, and the quasi-pathological ideas of action introduced to the mind by hypnotic suggestion." [24]

The mere intellectual judgement is cold; it does not draw our blood. The emotional dynamics of kāma is on the side of the lower self and it clamours for gratification. Modern Psychology has shown clearly that our mind usually rationalizes our desires. When we are moved by kāma, we easily find reasons for its gratification. This delusive nature of kama has been referred to again and again in the *Gıta*.

(सुखतन्त्र इवासीनो मोहयन्पार्थ तिष्ठति,[25] मोहयंस्तु मुहुर्मुहुः[26], संमोहात्स्मृतिविभ्रमः[27] एतैर्विमोहयत्येष ज्ञानमावृत्य देहिनम् ।[28]

And so in a conflict between the intellectual ideal and kāma, it is kāma that has the upper hand, and that is why there is moral incontinence. This is the reply of Śrī Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna's query as to why man commits a vice even against his better judgement.

काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः ।
महाशनो महापाप्मा विद्धयेनमिह वैरिणम् ।[29]

Virtue is a state of volition, not merely of intellect. And if we would be virtuous, we have to effect a change in our very 'Will.' A haunting, creative desire for the higher life must take possession of our soul. We have to break through the hard shell of the self, if we would emerge into light and fresh air.

We started the consideration of the problem of moral incontinence under four heads, viz., (a) The psycho-

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[24] Social Psychology, p. 247)
[25] III, 39. (Kashmirian recension),
[26] *Ibid* ;
[27] II. 63,
[28] III, 40 etc.
[29] III, 37,

physical constitution of man, and the reason why man falls a victim to incontinence. (b) The concept of true knowledge and whether man has this knowledge. (c) How to attain knowledge? (d) Can man be incontinent after attaining to true knowledge?

We have discussed the problem under (a) and seen that (i) Kāma is rooted in Saṅkalpa and Vāsanā and (ii) that since the emotive-conative dynamics is generally with the side of our lower nature which is the seat of desire and is desire-promoted, we fall a victim to incontinence. Not only is reason powerless before the blast of a desire, but we even rationalize our desires.

इन्द्रियाणि मनो बुद्धिरस्याधिष्ठानमुच्यते।
एतैर्विमोहयत्येष ज्ञानमावृत्य देहिनम् ॥[30]

Let us now consider the second point (b) viz., the concept of true knowledge and whether man has this knowledge.

When in spite of his better judgement, man is overpowered by kāma, has he really true knowledge, jñāna, or a mere intellectual formulation? Is man so helpless, is he perpetually doomed to be the galley-slave of kāma in spite of what he may conceive to be a better ideal for his life or has he a mode of knowledge, jñāna, which if once attained, and assimilated, cannot be over-powered by Kāma? If jñāna (gnosis, wisdom, true knowledge) can save him, what is it?

The *Gītā* says that in the far reaches of his being, man has this jñāna, which burns luminously on its own level but which is obscured by kāma, and,therefore, inoperative. It is not, 'head-learning' but 'soul wisdom'; it is not the result of logic-chopping, but a synoptic vision, the characteristic of Buddhi or Prajna which

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[30] III, 40.

is not merely analytic apprehension but *synthetic comprehension*

धूमेनाव्रियते वह्निर्यथाऽऽदर्शो मलेन च।
यथोल्बेनावृतो गर्भस्तथा तेनेदमावृतम्॥[31]
आवृतं ज्ञानमेतेन ज्ञानिनो नित्यवैरिणा।
कामरूपेण कौन्तेय दुष्पूरेणानलेन च॥[32]

Commenting on the word *jñāna* in this context Śaṅkarānanda says in his *ṭīkā* :

एतेन कामेन ज्ञानं सर्वत्र ब्रह्मगाहिका बुद्धिरावृतम्।

Jñāna is that mode of the Buddhi which enables one to see the Supreme Reality. This jñāna is obscured by kāma just as fire is obscured by smoke, mirror by dirt, and the embryo by the amnion. Smoke, dirt and the amnion are all removable, and then the light shines in all its glory, the mirror can reflect truly, and the embryo assert its own life. So too, kāma, the obscuring veil is removable, and then jñāna will shine in its inherent splendour. This jñāna is the birth-right of every man, but he has to work up to it. As Browning puts it beautifully in his *Pracelsus* :—

"Truth lies within ourselves; it takes no rise
From outward things, whate'er you mav believe.
There is an inmost centre in us all
Where Truth abides in fulness; and to know
Rather consists in opening out a way
Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,
Than in effecting entry for a light
Supposed to be without."

It is beyond individual desire or ego-focussed consciousness. It is an integral awareness, a wholeness of vision, an insight into the meaning of life. The jñāna is

[31] III, 38
[32] III, 39

veiled by ajñāna, the ego-focused conciousness; that is why people are deluded.

अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः[33]

Jñāna is not merely logical reasoning, discursive thought. It is knowledge which neither custom can corrupt nor age stale.

(c) *How to attain to true knowledge.*

Jñāna is in every man, but it is veiled. It is, however, open to man to recapture it by a concious transmutation of his conciousness. Śrī Kṛṣṇa lays down in detail the technique of mounting up to Buddhi or Prajñā where we have jñāna in its fullness. This Vijñāna, Prajñā or Buddhi has also been designated as jñanātman in *Kaṭhopaniṣad.*[34] The teacher first gives the disciple an intellectual *analysis* of the eternal verities (the Sāṅkhyana wisdom), and then asks him to build it up *synthetically* (yoga) in the living tissue of his life. Philosophy (Sāṅkhya) alone is not enough for the perception of truth, but spiritual discipline, a *praxis*, an integration (yoga) of the entire personality to the Highest, to the truth within is necessary in order to make it a living reality.

The teacher, therefore, advises Buddhiyoga, the detachment of the *manas* from the senses, and its union with Buddhi. In order to attain this union with Buddhi or Prajñā, the disciple should first of all withdraw the senses from their objects and surrender them to the higher mind.

यदा संहरते चायं कूर्मोऽङ्गानीव सर्वशः।
इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थेभ्यस्तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ।।[35]

This correspond to the Pratyāhāra of Patañjali. One should practise sense-control (dama).

तानि सर्वाणि संयम्य युक्तमासीत मत्परः।
वशे हि यस्येन्द्रियाणि तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ।।[36]

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[33] V, 15
[34] I, iii. 13
[35] II, 58
[36] II, 61.

One should give up the lower desires.

प्रजहाति यदा कामान्सर्वान्पार्थ मनोगतान्।
आत्मन्येवात्मना तुष्टः स्थितप्रज्ञस्तदोच्यते ॥[37]

The lower desires pull and tug the mind in various directions, and it is impossible with distracted mind to have union with Buddhi.

By avoiding Rāga and Dveṣa. Kāma and Krodha, one acquires sublimation, mental calm (śama, prasāda) and it is only then that he will be established in Buddhi.

रागद्वेषवियुक्तैस्तु विषयानिन्द्रियैश्चरन्।
आत्मवश्यैर्विधेयात्मा प्रसादमधिगच्छति ॥[38]
प्रसादे सर्वदुःखाना हानिरस्योपजायते।
प्रसन्नचेतसो ह्याशु बुद्धिः पर्यवतिष्ठते ।।[39]

One should develop a balanced, impersonal attitude in life सिद्धयसिद्धयोः समं भूत्वा). Buddhi is super-personal, universal. So long our separative, individualistic, egoistic attitude asserts itself at every moment, so long it is not possible to rise to the level of Buddhi. The lower separative mind of sensibility is individualistic, particularistic. It is clamorous, and desires its private personal gratification. An impersonal attitude in life has, therefore, to be constantly practised by the aspirant to prepare himself as a worthy instrument for the super-personal Buddhi.

विहाय कामान्यः सर्वान्पुमांश्चरति निःस्पृहः।
निर्ममो निरहंकारः स शान्तिमधिगच्छति ॥[40]

One should practise contemplation, collectedness, then will his mind become fit to receive and reflect the luminous knowledge of Buddhi.

नास्ति बुद्धिरयुक्तस्य "अयुक्तस्यासमाहितचेतसः पुरुषस्य बुद्धिः सर्वत्र ब्रह्मदर्शनलक्षणा चित्तप्रसादैकलभ्या प्रत्यग्दृष्टिर्नास्ति"[41]

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[37] II, 55.
[38] II. 64.
[39] II, 65.
[40] II. 71.
[41] II, 66 (Śaṅkarānanda)

In brief, one can reach the higher level of one's life by practising *Vairāgya*, desirelessness and *abhyāsa*, constant practice of opening oneself and surrendering oneself to the Highest.

अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च गृह्यते।[42]
अभ्यासयोगयुक्तेन चेतसा नान्यगामिना।
परमं पुरुषं दिव्यं याति पार्थानुचिन्तयन् ॥[43]

Ultimately, the moral conflict is resolved permanently only by a perception of the Supreme by means of Prajna. After describing the hierarchy of our psychical being. Sri Kṛṣṇa says finally—

एवं बुद्धेः परं बुद्ध्वा संस्तभ्यात्मानमात्मना।
जहि शत्रुं महाबाहो कामरूपं दुरासदम् ॥[44]

Thus knowing the Supreme Reality to be higher even than Buddhi, restraining the lowerself by the Ātman, slay thou, O Mighty-armed, the enemy in the form of desire, difficult to be overcome.

विषया विनिवर्तन्ते निराहारस्य देहिनः।
रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यस्य परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते ॥[45]

Merely withdrawal of the senses from their objects will not do. The relish or gusts for them still remains. This can totally disappear only when one has a vision of the Supreme.

Karma-yoga and Bhakti-yoga which have been so much emphasized in the *Gītā* are also meant to loosen the strangle-hold of kāma, to free the individual from the ego-bound conciousness so that he may become a worthy channel for the flow of Divine life. Every work of the disciple must become dedicated, consecrated, and he must surrender himself completely to the Highest within him.

The teacher sums up in the following verse practically all the technique that he has taught for controlling the

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[42] VI, 34. [43] VIII, 8.
[44] III, 43. [45] II, 59

desire-bound egoistic life and rising to a level where he may have that perfect vision which ensures for ever against a fall into the lower life.

चेतसा सर्वकर्माणि मयि संन्यस्य मत्परः।
बुद्धियोगमुपाश्रित्य मच्चित्तः सततं भव॥[46]

" Renouncing mentally all work in Me, intent on Me, resorting to union with Buddhi, have thy thought ever focussed on Me."

" And the process of yoga-development of the soul seems essentially to consist in regulating, restraining, controlling, selectively and attentively turning in one direction (by Saṁ-yama) and inhibiting all other directions (by nirodha) the activity (Vṛtti) of the Citta-manas-aṇu, after minimising its egoistic restlessness (by vairāgya), and prasāda) as possible, by the various means mentioned in the yoga-works. In this way, the individual mind or *ahaṅkāra-manas* deliberately orients itself towards and makes itself the channel, the vessel, the receiver, the missionary of the Universal Mind, Mahat-Buddhi, and replaces intelligence by intuition." [47]

All vice, all sin is at once self-love and self-betrayal. It is due to a desire to gratify the private particularistic, clamant self, the ego-focussed consciousness, and it is thus a betrayal of the real Self which is Universal. It is only by an orientation towards this Self, by an integration with the Highest within him, by a process of psycho-synthesis, that a man shall see the light that never fades, and thus free himself for ever from octopus-like hold of his desire-nature.[47]

"उद्धरेदात्मनाऽऽत्मानं नात्मानमवसादयेत्।" [48]

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[46] III, 57

[47] Science of Peace by Dr. Bhagwan Das, 2nd edition, p. 217.

[48] VI, 5.

McDougall rightly maintains that in normal life the self-regarding sentiment, the system of emotional and conative dispositions that is organised about the idea of the self, plays a very important part. And he goes on to say, " He (the man without the self-regarding sentiment) might become the very paragon of prudence, but hardly of virtue. Such a man might have acquired and might retain admirable moral sentiments, he might even have formed an ideal of conduct and character, and might entertain for this ideal a sentiment that led him to desire its realization both for himself and others. But, if he had lost his self-respect, if his self-regarding sentiment had decayed, his conduct might be that of a villain in spite of his accurate self-knowledge and his moral sentiments. On each occasion on which a desire, springing from a moral sentiment, came into conflict with one of the coarser and stronger desires, it would be worsted; for there would be no support for it forthcoming from the sentiment of self-respect."[49] Surely, the system of emotional and conative dispositions should be organised in connexion with the self in any real moral endeavour, and the system of yoga, the process of integration is meant to achieve this, but which self is it round which the system of emotional and conative dispositions has to be built? If it is the egoistic self, then again there is the danger of a moral lapse. It is not merely self-regarding sentiment that will save us, but the Self-regarding sentiment which will ensure luminous knowledge through Buddhi and will save us from incontinence. The emotive-conative disposition that worked for the gratification of the lower self has to be broken, tilled, cultivated and transformed by spiritual *praxis* and *askesis* so that it may work in harmony with the higher Self. Its dynamics must

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[49] *Social Psychology*, pp. 248-249.

be put at the command of the Highest within us, if we will be free from moral incontinence.

Whenever we trip morally, we are seeking satisfaction of a pseudo-self which is only not-Self. Ultimately all moral lapse is due to avidyā, confusion of Self with not-Self, and in this sense, it may be said " Ignorance is vice. Knowledge is virtue." This *avidyā* is, however, a positive condition of our being. It cannot be wished away by a mere intellectual fiat, nor can Vidyā be attained by merely putting on the wishing cap or by mere logomachy. Avidya can be deconditioned and Vidyā attained only by spiritual discipline which includes both the analytic and the synthetic processes, both Sāṅkhya and Yoga in the words of the *Bhagavadgita*.

So it is only by a life of self-discipline, prayer and contemplation that man rises to Prajñā, to a level of his being where he may have true knowledge. One has to die to the lower self, if one would live the higher life. It is only on the stepping stones of our dead selves that we can rise to higher things. But it is a death which is also a birth. In the words of *Kaṭhopaniṣad* "योगः प्रभवाप्ययौ"[50] —yoga is atonce a death and a birth. The crucifixion of the lower is necessary for the resurrection of the higher.

According to the *Gītā*, it is not that we have knowledge and still we may morally trip, not that we may know the right, but may still do the wrong but that because we morally trip, therefore, we do not have knowledge, because we love to dwell in the darkness of wanton, separatist self, that the light is denied to us. The moral life of self-discipline is a precondition of the luminous knowledge of truth. Dr. Bhagwan Das puts it very beautifully in his '*Science of the Emotions*.'

" The hard in heart cannot see God; that is to say the

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[50] III iii, 41

ethical condition of vairāgya, wherein the hard 'heart-knot' of intense personal feeling, 'I and thou,' 'mine and thine' separatist individualism, is loosened—this is indispensable to, is only the other aspect of, the intellectual condition of illumination, "the vision of God, the All-self," the jñāna of truth, and also of the *practical* active self-sacrifice and renunciation," [51]

This does not, of course, mean that the lower life is to be annihilated; it only means that the lower is to be transmuted and organised in the life of the higher, so that the lower becomes a channel and a missionary of the higher life.

> "To man, propose this test—
> Thy body at its best,
> How far can that project thy soul on its lone way ?" [52]

The bio-psychical man is not yet full man. He is only the veil and promise of the full spiritual man.

It may be said that the main problem has been by-passed. The problem is 'how does a man do the wrong when he knows the right,' and the answer given is that a man cannot truly know unless he is, at first, morally pure. And how can a man be morally pure unless he knows right ? Doing the right without knowing it is like putting the cart before the horse; it involves a flagrant fallacy of *hysteron proteron*.

In order to answer this question, we shall have to examine the concept of knowledge itself. There are five senses in which the word 'knowledge' is generally used.

(1) A mere suggestion which comes and goes.
(2) An established opinion whose rationale we are unaware of.

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[51] 3rd Edition pp. 520-21.
[52] Browning.

(3) A logically reasoned knowledge, an analytic discrimination.
(4) An illumination, a synoptic insight, an integral synthetic wisdom which transmutes the ego-focussed consciousness.
(5) Foundational consciousness where knowledge and being are one.

The fifth is the very nature of the Ātman. The first cannot be called knowledge at all. The second is at best implicit knowledge. Practically all of us begin the moral life from this point. The tradition of society, the teaching of scriptures, the moral conscience of the nation—to these mankind owes its first moral education. We are unaware of their rationalé. Reason is only implicit in them.

The third phase of knowledge consists in logically unravelling the reason involved in the moral tradition of society, and the teaching of scriptures. It is reasoning out to oneself as to what is right and what is wrong. We begin analysing and examining the premisses of our moral life, and discriminate between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. This is what is usually known as philosophical knowledge. Some few start their moral life from this rational stand-point.

The question as to how we can do the right unless we first know it is answered in the above two paragraphs. We have a knowledge of one of the above two kinds when we begin our moral life. They play a very important part in life and all of us have to begin our life in one of the above two ways. But these are not jñāna (ज्ञान) as yet. The second is only a *mata* (मत), *Upadeśa* (उपदेश), *deśanā* (देशना) anuśāsana (अनुशासन). smṛti, tradition or śāstra (शास्त्र). The third is viveka (विवेक). But man is not all reason. He has in him also the desire-nature, passions and emotions which strain at the leash and break loose when they

can. In the words of Portia " A hot temper leaps o'er a cold decree. Such a hare is madness the youth, to skin o'ver the meshes of good counsel, the cripple." It is this desire-nature that is responsible for the phenomenon of moral incontinence. In the words of the *Gītā*, "काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः What is worse, when we are dominated by passion, we even rationalize our desire and put reason off its guard. A tearing, raging, boisterous passion cannot be charmed away by the hocus-pocus of a mere syllogism.

The *Gītā* takes up the question at this point where the Science of ethics leaves it. It says:—

आवृतं ज्ञानमेतेन ज्ञानिनो नित्यवैरिणा।[53]
कामरूपेण कौन्तेय दुष्पूरेणानलेन च[54]
अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः।[55]

Jñāna is veiled by this desire-nature, this ignorance of man. Jñāna is Bodhi, Buddhi, Prajñā. It cannot be achieved by mere reasoning, by mere analytic discursive thought. It is spiritual awakening. One has to win one'e way to it, and when one becomes *sthita-prajña* (स्थितप्रज्ञ), when one lives *sub-specie eternitatis*, then there is no question of a fall for him. In order to win one's way to it, the *Gītā* recommends the method of *vairāgya* and *abhyāsa*. One has first of all to *turn away* from the sense-life, and towards the Highest within us. Moral purity is the *sine qua non* of spiritual awakening. It leads to *prasāda*, *śama*, mental calm and this mental calm is necessary for *jñāna* "सत्त्वात्संजायते ज्ञानम्"[56], "प्रसन्न चेतसो ह्याशु बुद्धिः पर्यवतिष्ठते।"[57]

Patañjali, the Buddha, in fact every teacher recommends moral purity as the first step towards the attain-

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[53] II, 39.
[54] III, 39.
[55] IV, 15.
[56] Gita, XIV, 17
[57] II, 65

ment of Prajñā. The brute within us has first to be tamed. But this is only the first step. Simultaneously with *vairāgya,* have to continue *abhyasa*, a life of consecrated activity (कर्मयोग), prayer and devotion (भक्तियोग) and contemplation (ध्यानयोग). Then we shall achieve Prajñā. We have to begin with *vairāgya*, but the more we turn towards the higher life, the more is the lower purified. Sri Aurobindo Ghose says very rightly "It is true that the more the lower nature is purified, the easier is the descent of the higher Nature, but it is also and more true that the more the higher Nature descends, the more the lower is purified."[58] While the mind is one organic whole, there are, certainly *levels* of consciousness. We can mount up the ladder of our being only by letting go our foothold of the lower rung. The conflict of the moral life is really solved only by rising to the spiritual plane.

(d) Can man be incontinent after attaining to true knowledge? This question has already been partly answered. Once a man has attained this jñāna, he can no longer fall, for this jñāna has not been simply obtained by reasoning but by living, by spiritual discipline, by an orientation towards, integration with, prayer and self-surrender to the Highest within us. We are organically related to it now, and with the attainment of this jñāna it is no more possible for us to go astray than it is possible for us not to see with our eyes.

सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्तद्बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ।
वेत्ति यत्र न चैवाऽयं स्थितश्चलति तत्त्वतः ॥[59]

"That in which man finds the supreme bliss which is to be grasped only by Buddhi and is beyond the sphere of the senses, wherein established, he cannot be dislodged from the Truth." It is the truth of the super-mind. Śrī

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[59] VI, 21.

[58] Lights Yoga p. 12.

Aurobindo Ghose has expressed the same in the following way:—

" The Prakṛti itself is divided into the lower and higher—the lower is the Prakrti of the Ignorance, the Prakṛti of mind, life and matter, separated in consciousness from the divine, the higher is the divine Prakṛti of Saccidananda with its manifesting power of super-mind, always aware of the divine and free from Ignorance and its consequence." [60] This *jñāna* is not simply an intellectual attainment, but it transforms and transmutes our lower mind; it is *metanoia*, which as the late Dr. Anandcoomarswamy insisted, is literally and truly transmutation of consciousness.

"न हि ज्ञानेन सदृशं पवित्रमिह विद्यते"[61]

There is no purifier like *jñāna*.

यथैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन।
ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा।।[62]

" As the burning fire reduces fuel to ashes, O Arjun, so does the fire of wisdom reduce all desire-prompted actions to ashes."

The mind of such a being is fully controlled and reflects the light of the supreme; he is free from the trammels of desire. He is now *yukta*, a fully harmonised, a fully integrated personality.

यदा विनियतं चित्तमात्मन्येवावतिष्ठते।
निःस्पृहः सर्वकामेभ्यो युक्त इत्युच्यते तदा।।[63]

He may now well exclaim in the words of Browning :—

" Life's struggle having so far reached its term.
Thence shall I pass, approved
A man, for ay removed
From the developed brute, a God though in the germ."

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[60] *Lights on yoga* pp. 40-41.
[61] IV, 38. [62] IV, 3 . [63] VI, 18.

TIME AND MYSTICISM

By K. C. Varadachari

Time is indeed one of the most important categories which had varying fortunes in the history of Philosophy. It is well-known that time walks at divers paces with divers persons. There is such a distinction as subjective time and objective time or subjective duration and objective times, or standard times which vary from place to place. But the Indian conception of time is that Time can be defined generally as having triple stages or successive moments such as the past, present and the future. It is irreversible though events may be cyclical. Time extends both sides up to infinity. And the secret of Time is its present tense according to some well-known thinkers not because of the other two being irrelevant but because the present has the consequence of the past within it and has the potency of the future within it. If we know the ' Now ' then we know ' all ' about the Time. But some thinkers hold that this approach to the problem of Time as successive triple moments connected closely with the concept of Negation (*abhāva*) is unsatisfactory as also the theory that time is but the divisions of the day or month or year into arbitrary 24 parts or 60 ghaṭikās and 60 minutes and seconds etc., till we come to the infinitesimal indivisible span of time (*truṭi*). This is spatialised Time say some thinkers.

Astronomical times are different from the temporal times and differ according to some arbitrarily chosen measuring rod, very valuable for close social work. Thus some hold that this kind of time is binding because it is socially regulated and adopted by all by convention and being a social contrivance and convenience an illusion or unreal

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in the real sense of the term. Relatively it is infecting the concept of Time and therefore time itself is relative.

The whole problem of Time must be viewed not indeed in this manner but in terms of the larger standpoint of the ' ingression ' of the eternal in the temporal which is characterised by different grades of times or durations or measures (chandāṁsi). The subjective conception of Time as the process of becoming and not the arbitrary social (spatialised) time, is valuable. The speed of time is calculated by the vigour which attends upon the upward process. In matter the speed is reduced to a dull uniformity of repetition without any attendant variations, (*Tamas*). The speed of life is at a new tempo indeed very much different from the speed of matter the most attenuated or wavicle-form. Kāla thus is different in the level of the mind—which has become a classical metaphor of the highest speed—manojava. Higher levels of consciousness have higher speeds so that the succession is ultimately reduced so far as the lower level is concerned to simultaneity. Contraction of time or slowness occurs. Equally this entails the contraction of space or distinction between the intervals between two points. Thus the problem of time turns out to be the problem of space also, and the solution of the problem of Time is the solution of the problem of space. Ultimately this turns out to be the problem of energy, of consciousness or intelligence. The differing paces of movement are available in our own organism and there is multiplicity of motions each with its own unique pace and form which are harmonised by the interrelated laws (*ṛtas*) of the Highest Spirit, the Unmanifest Eternal directing and ordering the harmonious concord of the several planes.

Time thus is a mystery of the manifestation of the diversity extending from the most slow and spread out to the most speedy and concentrated movements. Their co-

existence needs explanation from the mystical stand-point. To say that time is but the activity of Māyā or the supreme delusive power of Spirit which simultaneously displays illusions to the individual and confuses him by interpenetrative confusion between fancies and fantasies, as the *Yoga-Vāśiṣṭha* explains, is to miss the truth which does not so much refer to consequences but only to the nature of this confusive possibility. The Mind is said to be the cause of all illusion—*mana eva manuṣyaṇam karaṇam bandha-mokṣayoḥ*—. The meaning is that some times we pass into higher or lower speeds of time and therefore of space and levels of experience which are real but because of the non-adaptation they are delusively pleasurable and yet of temporary (not momentary) nature. Mind brings in speeds of instability just as desire brings in complications of imagination and wish-fulfilment. There is a great amount of speculation as to what should be the nature of Time prior to creation or even knowledge or, for the matter of that as to what is the nature of Space prior to matter being created. If we are asked to hold the view that matter is a creation, a new and original creation by God or Spirit, then there can be the notion of a timeless eternity and a spaceless Vastness. The concept of ākāśa as the plenum within which we have the occurance of events or things (atoms or wavicles), defines the directions; and this verily is relative to the individual atoms or groups of atoms or events or things or individuals. If time is conceived in terms of motion or changes, then too we are wedded to relativity. But then the philosophical assumption of a timeless and spaceless or dateless existence as a rational need is unprovable. But if we could conceive of the other possibility that this is the state where everything is in quiescence of Peace, and it is precisely this state that in some parts of its being plunges into movement whilst retaining its own Peace in other parts (as the Sāṅ-

a fourth of the whole being involved an each state in modi-
khyans conceive of the evolution of their categories—only
fication), it is possible to explain the double experience of Time and the Timeless, Space and Spacelessness, Being and Becomingness, Transcendence and immanence. The unceasing continuity of time or event neither refers to the same individual nor to all or the whole, nor the other alternative of unperturbed stillness of everything or each thing—a position that might involve us in assumptions of illusion of process and progress. Time and Space then are integral to our experience and if we mean to transcend Time and Space it means something that is other than their abolition. It is this meaning that is granted by the mystical consciousness of unceasing devotion to the highest values of Truth and Eternal Being or the Divine Personality—the Ultimate Summum Bonum or the Good which is followed under all conditions and at all stages of individual growth. This devotion is the pursuit of the Divine with an one—pointedness and absorption of devotion born out of the knowledge of absolute selfness of the Divine out of whom flows all values and all reality. Space and Time are limitations to the ignorant and the pursuer of the little things of the body and pleasure. The transcendence over space and time means just the setting aside of all limitations as interferences to the worship of the Divine, attainment of the Divine. The transcendent love (*parā-bhakti*) knows no limitation, and recognizes none, not only of space and time and circumstance but of birth or caste or class, status or livelihood, life or death. The philosophical transcendence is a mirage considered in the context of the transcendence that is attained by the mystic. Time and Space become however significant, and not the abstract abode of events or the evolution-co-ordinates as Professor Alexander held.

Once then we have found that so far as mystical cons-

ciousness is concerned its set of values do not reject space or Time or the Ākāśa which is the plenum (Matter in one of its primal forms—bhūtas, which plays a very important role in the yoga psychology as the abode and indeed itself *nāda*—sound in all its fourfold forms of *parā. paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*)—but utilises these conditions and processes for the manifestation of the Divine Excellences (*līlā*) (or possibilities).

The unreality of these is not the condition for this liberty of spiritual askesis. spiritual discovery of values. spiritual realisation and evolution; on the other hand, we are made aware of the implicit sets of processes that every state of devotion. knowledge. and action. implies.

Thus when it is said that the primary secret of spiritual life consists in the will to practice dependence on the Highest alone and none other, and not what many think a will to defy every condition including the deity—one of the greatest truths of eternal life has been uttered.

Time, said Sri Aurobindo, is one of the factors in the ascent of spiritual life: (Synthesis of Yoga) This is because the pace and the time of fulfilment or ripeness for the opening of the inner life are not governed by the individual's consciousness at all but by the Grace of the Divine. This is the view of all those who have been treading the path and though the elapse of time may be slow according to the individual's reckoning.

Recently I reviewed a journal entitled "*The Wind and the Rain*" in which there was an article entitled "The Indian Time-Table," by Mr. Willy Haas.* I shall mention the general thesis of that author. The Indian Timetable is not like the European Time-table which is again different from the American Time-table. He holds that

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* Prof. Haas considers that Time can be classified into Historical. unhistorical and ahistorical.

the European Time-table or the conception of History is one continuous stream of life, which has gathered all the rich heredity and culture of the past and is proceeding towards the future. Thus the present is a consequence of the past, a child of the past, conserving the traditions and heredity of the same, The American New World Time is a free movement unconditioned by the ancient history of Europe and its cultural and racial movements, starting a new epoch, save to the extent that the early settlers had carried with them and what the new settlers are carrying with them into that country. But the general movement is to preserve the moral righteousness of the past of their late country, from which they had fled as refugees so to speak rather than the traditions of the other kind, which repelled them. A new pace for civilization was rendered possible by denying the outer heredity and conditions for the sake of an eternal principle of individual freedom and free society. A new conception of progress—a revolutionary speed was rendered possible by this abandonment of the past scenes and figures. Perhaps the American Time is the actualisation of the Bergson's conception of Time as duration impelled from behind by the triple aspirations of liberty, individuality and religion. This is mystical and ahistorical as compared with the European Time which is purely historical. The severance with the historical time of Europe, from its tradition and heredity was the higher purpose of mystical time. The withdrawal however was never complete and there is a return of the American to Europe for whatever reason it is not necessary to enquire just now.

The Indian Time-table is different from the historical European Time, though it has an historical Time of its own—the meta-biological theory of Avatars. It has also presumably an ahistorical Time—though this ahistorical Time is more Vedantic, Absolutistic. It has in addition

an unhistorical Time revealed in its primitive beliefs in transmigration. After all India is a conglomerate or amalgam of cultures of all strata of evolution from the most primitive to the modern educated savant, in the Western sense of the term. Time accordingly walks at different paces. The different paces of Time however are not widely separated or demarcated but there is an inexorable tendency to mix and mingle with each other making life unpredictable. Time is not relativised but interfused, and confusion is the result. Accordingly the future of India is unpredictable.

I have just stated briefly in my own words his general Thesis. But it is necessary to enquire further. He says that the Indian Time-Table is equivalent to the unhistorical theory of transmigration, pseudo historical Avatara doctrine, and the mystic ahistorical Time.

Transmigration is the view which holds that life after death has a tendency to take up forms of life which may be of any order, human, animal or even plant. The law of Karma inexorably controls the kind of body that we are to take. If our deeds are human we take up a human body, otherwise we are attracted to and attain to other types of bodies. The movement of the soul from one type of body to another involves, or course, the belief in the existence of souls, life after death, and belief in the principle that disposes our future according to deserts. The belief in transmigration is common to all primitive races. India also believes in it, perhaps the difference is that the primitive believes without any reasons whereas the Hindu has a principle or hypothesis which explains the belief. But Prof. Haas considers that this belief is not held but persisted in and that surely is a recessive dynamism. Totemic worship and taboo and superstition have been proved by Sigmund Freud to be phenomena of the subliminal and the unconscious and the irrational elements

which, evolutionarily considered, have occured earlier To retain belief in them and to act according to those beliefs is a regressive (if not pathological) phenomenon.

But have the moderners been able to shake off this regressive movement? The superstition in the transmigration has been sacrificed at the cost of letting loose the whole pandora's box of furies. Men need not take another body to be brutes; they have become brutes.

It was according to an ancient Saw that Gotama, the Buddha, made a profound remark that men become what they worship or love. Worshipping and eating derive their meaning from the root √ bhuñj in Sanskrit. And on another occasion he made the remark that those who eat meat will become the abodes of the animals whose meat they eat. The ancient superstition of transmigration and the fear of transmigrating into lower forms of life prevented them from descending down the grade of life. This worthy restraint has been given up. There is a supreme wisdom concealed in the doctrine of transmigration when taken along with the doctrine of karma. Love of life and seeking to lift life to higher levels of being are implicit in this doctrine. The individual soul does not change its individuality as Prof. Haas thinks but only its sheaths or personality in the course of its transmigration. It is undoubtedly a point to insist that the individual has not the memory of his past life and therefore the doctrine of transmigration—both forwards or backwards—is refuted. But then are we certain that there is no biological memory, instinctive memory in the animals and ourselves. The Indian Yogī holds that it is possible to know the past lives fully and know the whole history of the spirit. Perhaps it is incredible to us. But so many things are incredible—have always been.

The second important element of the Indian Time table considered by Prof. Haas is the theory of reincarna-

tion. The soul incarnates constantly till it is finally released. Incarnation is the corrolary to samsāra. Freedom from reincarnation or *punarāvṛtti* is one of the aims if not the only aim of our life. Jñāna alone can lead to the transcendence over samsāra or crossing over samsāra or death. When this is the case and the Hindus believe in this possibility, it is surprising to hear from Prof. Haas that it is an element that explains the regressive movement of Indian Time. But what he is attacking is not this but the Reincarnation of God or Avatāra doctrine. Every Hindu knows that the avatāra is a descent of God rather than an ascent of man. The ten avatāras of God in popular reckoning, are Matsya, Kūrma, Varāha, Narasimha, Vāmana, Paraśu Rāma, Kodanda Rāma, Halāyudha Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and Kalki. There has been the inclusion of Buddha laterly. Some ingenious writers immediately equated this with the biological evolution or ascent of Man made popular in the 19th century and after. This metabiological view is unacceptable, for, though it can be conceded that the descent of God or the Highest spirit in any form will raise the form to a higher level of Consciousness yet it will not be right to say that it is the evolution of the Deity that we are witnessing. In the Purāṇas the purpose and meaning of the Avatāra is for the restoration of Dharma in and to the plane—an act of Grace.

It is His beneficent willingness to take any kind of Form—which is in that order the perfect expression of His Sovereignty and Puissance, Virility and Transcendence, Beauty and Light—for the protection of His creatures. Nor is the view that some avatāras exist at the same time as others capable of being refuted, for it is this supreme possibility that is seen in the Divine. The Divine Lord may project himself fully or partially, in His form as Avatāra—Descending Divine, and for ever in some for certain definite Cosmic purpose or act in multiple person-

alities also. This is the secret of the *amsa-avataras*. This view can only be understood if we understand the general theory of the *Pañcarātra* which teaches the four-fold nature of the Divine—the Para—transcendent—Vāsudeva—Narayana: the vyuhas (emanates) of Vasudeva—Saṁkarṣaṇa—Pradyumna—Aniruddha. The Avatāras which are not limited to any number are also called the Vibhava (glory—grace forms); the Arcā (the idols in the temples—spots of Transcendent light to which any sincere seeker can go directly and offer himself or herself or seek refuge) and last but not least the Antaryāmin—the form of the Self within the Guru and Beloved, a descent of the Divine Form or Light in the heart of the Mystics, Āḷvārs, Dāsars and Nayamars.

All these forms are important and must be fully known. They are the Forms of the Divine who makes us participate in the Divine Life both inside and outside, who grants liberation from samsāra and ignorance, and service of the eternal Truth and light.

Being unaware of this structure of the mystical, Prof. Haas finds inconsistencies in the Avatara-doctrine. He sees in it every view except the right one. The metabiology of the avatāras is a western invention. The mystical is a personal view of reality and not an impersonal view. It is how the soul seeks and finds its highest truth and Self.

The ahistorical view may be that of the Mysticism of Identity. But identity is not always the poise of Spirit. Unity pervades and manifests multiplicit and gives meaning to them; so also multiplicity and difference reveal the richness of the unity and identity. Both are faces of mysticism. Mysticism reveals that the Divine must be embraced or sought after not from any one part of being or portion of experience but by all parts of one's being, the physical mental, vital and supramental. All sheathes of

organic existence should subserve the Divine, must be suffused with the Divine Light and truth, must ultimately be transformed by the same Ānanda. So long as any portion of the organic existence or soul is left untouched by or unopened to the influx of the Divine, there will be conflict, disease, mortality. The Divine either has all or has nothing to do with a soul. All or none formula is true here, as elsewhere in Logic.

The ahistorical mystical view is more akin to what the late Nicolas Berdyeav, the renowned Russian Mystic—Christian Apologist, stated. Monism and mysticism are antithetical, he said. The reason is not far to seek. Being can only be experienced as personal, and the Ultimate is experienced as the personal ' more ' or in Tagore's phrase " surplus." Further he rightly remarked also that the descent of the Divine is a fundamental historical event not in the sense in which the world war II is a historical event or the birth of Communism even or the French Revolution or the October Revolution. Its historical nature is suprahistorical really because it sets a pace to the transformation of the relationship that man bears to the All, the Divine. In this sense the Advent of Christ Jesus and the Crucifixtion of the Son of Man transcend the ordinary historical. But this aspect is something foreign to Professor Haas's understanding. Every one of the Advents narrated in the Indian Purāṇas is a significant transcendence over the animal and the human, a new step made in History conceived as the History of Spirit—the Līlā* of the Divine, the most wonderful phenomenon of providence descending into the scheme of His creation to give meaning and direction and eternity to the temporal play of events and planes and personalities.

There is a sense in which we can hold that the identi-

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* *Līla: līyam latīti Līla.*

ty-consciousness is fully transcendent to the temporal when it is a swoon into the infinite. Such a swoon is the desideratum according to some philosopher mystics, as the ecstacy is incomparable and irresistable and there is an actual impossibility of severance or return to the separative consciousness. It is this merging that is acclaimed highest by Advaita Vedānta. Some thinkers hold that without this inner coalescence and loss of individuality and personality there can be no real liberation. It may involve the total negation of the world and all creative process —niṣprapañcīkaraṇam so far as that soul is concerned. The abolition of Time is considered accordingly to be the business of the mystical or ahistorical consciousness.

But we are aware of another approach to the problem of Time in the Upaniṣads. The *Praśnopaniṣad* begins with an elucidation of this problem in a sense. The great sage of the *Atharvaṇa* Veda, Pippalāda speaks of the creation from Prajāpati in the following way. Prajāpati was at the beginning. He brought into being out of Himself Prāṇa and Rayi (souls and matter); Prāṇa is Sūrya and Rayi is Candramas. Then Ṛṣi Pippalāda states that Prajāpati is Samvatsara or Year. This Samvatsara has two ayanas the Uttarāyaṇa and the Dakṣiṇāyana. The former is Prāṇa, the latter is Rayi. So also Prajāpati is Māsa or month which consists of Śukla and Kṛṣṇa Pakṣas. The former is Prāṇa and the latter is Rayi. Then Prajāpati is said to be the Day which contains the day and the night, the former is prāṇa and the latter is rayi. He who would like to live the Mystic life, Brahmacarya, must not waste his prāṇa during the daytimes.*

The above shows that Time is conceived of in a triple form, the first is *daivika*, the second is of the *pitṛs*, and

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* Cf My article in New Indian Antiquary: "*Pañcarātra and the Upaniṣads*".

the last is *mānava*. The person who understands the mystic unity of the transcendence of the Prajāpati and how He works in and through the two-fold energies or souls and Matter will find that immortality is open to him. The five nights (rātris) above stated, namely Rayi, Candramas, Dakṣiṇāyana, Kṛṣṇapakṣa, and Rātrī are of the downward path, the path that leads to disintegration and darkness and Ignorance. The contrary movement is that of the Ascent (or the Souls) in a sense. He who would know the mystic unity of these two in and through the Supreme is the Seer and Knower.

Some times it is difficult to gather the intention of these descriptions at all. But the illustration granted by the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Harivaṁśa* is extremely valuable. If we look at the birth of Rāma as described by Vāmīki we find that he is born of the (in the) Five Prāṇas or Day-times—Agni-Prāṇa, (Āditya), Sūrya-Vaṁśa, Uttarāyaṇa, Śuklapakṣa, and Midday (karkāṭaka lagna in Caitra); and so also we find that Śrī Kṛṣṇa was born of (in) five Nights: Devakī (Rayi) Candra-vaṁśa, Dakṣināyana, Kṛṣṇapakṣa, midnight. The supreme purpose of these two descents is to establish the kingdom of Truth and Dharma and abolition of unrighteousness and evil. The significance of these two avatāras must be found in two different phases of the mystical Consciousness. The Divine is always the Prāṇa. The descent into a lighted world is where the dharmas are very clear and determined and the people know them with clarity and Rāma Rājya prevailed. The interference with this dharma and rājya was punished and the ancient order was restored. Certainly it was the exploit of the Mahāvīra Rāma that we witness in his superhuman ability in slaying the ten-headed Rāvaṇa of great prowess. Śrī Rāma revealed that he could and would protect every one and no power on earth could prevent that.

In the case of Śrī Kṛṣṇa it was a period of great indeterminateness. Mankind was itself afflicted with unrighteousness. The Dvāpara was at its end. It was the beginning of the Kali-Night—the night among the yugas. The descent of Kṛṣṇa was the descent of the supremest Power which alone could plunge into inconscience and perenneal darkness and in plunging illumine it at every level of its septi-planal darkness and above.

This Time-element in the Upaniṣad of the five Rātris or Five days is important in respect of man's own ascent and secret of holding on to the Divine Prāṇa in the darknesses or nights. This is expressed in the Viśiṣṭadvaita exposition as Pañcakāla vidhi—comprising *abhigamana*, *upadana*, *ijyā*, *svādhyāya* and Yoga. The five times of the day are to be devoted to the worship of the Divine in all his five fold aspects as the Transcendent, Vyuha, Vibhava, Arcā and Antaryāmin. The way of worship through doing kaiṅkarya for God alone with one-pointed mind (*ekāyana*) is the way to preserve the Praṇa in the rayi, the Soul within the body.

Thus the mystical division of Time into the two transcendent forms of Prāṇa and Sūrya (Āditya), and Rayi and Candramas; and the three temporal forms of Uttarayaṇa, Śuklapakṣa, and Ahas, and Dakṣiṇāyana, Kṛṣṇapakṣa and Rātri reveals the significance which the Mystic Consciousness had always attached to the pravṛtti and nivṛtti paths as including and involving each other.

It can in this context also refer to the ṣaṭ-sthala doctrine of the Vīaraśaiva theology. But it is not as clear. But the Pañcasamskāras and the five-symbols may have some reference to the five Nights. Manu indeed equate the Uttarāyaṇa with the day of devas, the Kṛṣṇapakṣa with the day of the Pitṛs though this is not the Upaniṣadic view. Obviously for Manu it was rather surprising that Śuklapakṣa should be granted to Āditya though the Moon it is who waxes.

TERMINUS AD QUEM FOR THE DATES OF MADHUSUDANA-SARASVATĪ'S THREE WORKS

(1. *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, 2. *Siddhāntabindu and* 3. *Mahimnaḥstotra-ṭīkā*)—*Saṁvat* 1650—1593 *A.C.*

By SADASHIVA L. KĀTRE

EVEN after a close perusal of the learned contributions of P. C. Divanji,[1], Kshetreshachandra Chattopadhyaya[2], Chintaharan Chakravarti[3], Ramajna Pandeya[4], Shrikrishna Pant[5] and others[6] on Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī and his date one is left to feel that, while the great Vedāntin has been plausibly placed by these scholars with broad time-limits, viz. 1540 to 1647 A.C., there is still scope and necessity for further research in the line of fixing the exact dates of composition of his various individual works or at least narrow limits for those dates.

In this direction it is a pleasure to note for the information of interested scholars that a much earlier lower limit for the dates of three of Madhusūdana-Sarasvati's works, viz. the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, the *Siddhāntabindu* and the *Mahimnaḥstotra-ṭīkā*, can be fixed today

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[1] *ABORI*, Vol. VIII, Pt. II, pp. 149-158, Vol. IX, Pts. II-IV, pp. 313-323, and Introduction to *Siddhantabindu*, GOS No. 64 (1933).

[2] *ABORI*, Vol. VIII, Pt. IV, pp. 425-427 and Vol. IX, Pts. II-IV, pp. 324-328.

[3] *ABORI*, Vol. IX, Pts. II-IV, pp. 309-312.

[4] Introduction to *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, Saraswatī Bhavana Texts Series No. 3 (1920).

[5] Introduction to *Siddhāntabindu*, Acyuta-Granthamālā No. Kha 3 (1932).

[6] E.g., Gopinatha Kaviraja: Introduction to Śrī Bholebaba's edition of *Brahmasūtra* (Acyuta-Granthamāla No. Kha 5, Saṁvat 1993)., p. 114; S. N. Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (1932), pp. 55, 225, etc.; M. Krishnamachariar: *Classical Sanskrit Literature* (1937), pp. 658-659, etc.

on the strength of evidence of a contemporary ms of the *Mahimnaḥstotra-ṭīkā*.

The said ms has come to the Manuscripts Library of the *Scindia Oriental Institute*, Ujjain, through a collection purchased in 1945 from a grocer's shop at Lashkar-Gwalior. The ms (Accession No. 7370) has thus providentially escaped from destruction at human hands! It consists of thirty thin folios of country paper of the size $10\frac{1}{4} \times 3\frac{1}{2}$ inches, with a margin of irregular dimensions left on the four sides of each page of the folios. The folios are extremely decayed, brittle and sorely damaged or worm-eaten everywhere, especially on their right edges. The opening and closing pages, i.e., Folios 1[a] and 30[b], are quite blank, while Folio 30[a] contains only four lines. The remaining folios contain ten to fourteen lines on each side with about fifty letters on each line. The script is Devanāgarī, the letters अ, ण, ल etc., being of the Hindi type. The scribe's handwriting, though in dark-black ink, is extremely clumsy and un-uniform. However, it is legible throughout and the ms appears to have been scribed with extreme caution and precision.

The ms begins:—

ॐ नमः शिवाय ॥
विश्वेश्वरं गुरुं नत्वा महिमाख्य[7]स्तुतेरयम् ।
पूर्वाचार्यकृतव्याख्यासंग्रहः क्रियते मया ॥
एवं किलोपाख्यायते कश्चित् किल गन्धर्वराजः etc.

Then it furnishes Madhusūdana's commentary on the main thirty-one stanzas of the hymn ending with the stanza कृशपरिणति चेतः क्लेशवश्यं क्व चेदं etc. These thirty-one stanzas, of which only the Pratīkas are inserted in the ms are with some variations in readings the same

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[7] Here and in subsequent colophon etc., most of the printed editions and Mss. read महिम्नाख्य०, but the present Ms uniformly reads महिमाख्य० everywhere.

as those of the *Mahimnaḥstotra* inscribed on a stone-wall of the Amaleśvara (or Mamaleśvara) temple in Saṁvat 1120 (=1063 A.C.) as noticed by R. G. Ojha.[8] The ms takes no note of the next popular verse[9] असितगिरिसमं स्यात्कज्जलं सिन्धुपात्रे etc. of the current recension of the hymn. The current popular version of the hymn also contains henceforth nine, or even more, additional stray verses in eulogy of the main *Mahimnaḥstotra,* but the com. in the ms takes note only of two of those verses viz. कुसुमदशननामा सर्वगन्धर्वराजः etc. and सुरवरमुनिपूज्यं स्वर्गमोक्षैकहेतुं etc. in the following manner :—

. . . तस्मात्सर्वपराधानविगणय्य परमकारुणिकेन त्वया त्वद्विषया भक्तिरेव ममोद्दीपनीयेति वाक्यतात्पर्यार्थः ॥३१॥ कुसुमेति-अयं श्लोकः स्तोत्रानन्तर्गतः सुगमश्चेति सर्वं भद्रम् ॥३२॥ सुरेति-इममपि श्लोकं पठन्ति ।

Thus according to the ms these two verses were known to the commentator, although as subsequent interpolations.

Then the com. and the ms conclude as follows :—

हरिशंकरयोरभेदबोधो भवतु क्षुद्रधियामपीति यत्नात् ।
उभयार्थतया मयेदमुक्तं सुधियः साधुतयैव शोधयन्तु ॥
यत्नतो वक्रया रीत्या कर्तुं शक्यं विधान्तरम् ।
यद्यपीह तथाप्येष ऋजुविध्या प्रदर्शितः ॥
श्लोकानुपात्तमिह न प्रसंगात्किञ्चिदीरितम् ।
श्लोकोपात्तमपि स्तोकैरक्षरैः प्रतिपादितम् ॥
महिमाख्यस्तुतेर्व्याख्या प्रतिवाक्यं मनोहरा ।
इयं श्रीमद्गुरोः पादपद्मयोरर्पिता मया ॥
भूतिभूषितदेहाय द्विजराजेन राजते ।
एकात्मने नमो नित्यं हरये च हराय च ॥

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[8] Vide his paper *Mahimnaḥstotra Kī Prācīnatā aur usakā Mūla-Pāṭha* published in the *Dvivedī-Abhinandana-Grantha* (Saṁvat 1990), pp. 247-261. The Amaleśvara temple is in the Nimar District of Madhya-Bharata on the south bank of the Narmadā, the Jyotirliṅga shrine of Oṅkāreśvara being on the opposite side of the river.

[9] Notably enough, some Mss. (e.g., Ms Accession No. 6212 of the *S. O. Institute* dated Saṁvat 1885)furnish even Madhusūdana's com. on this verse!

•इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीमद्विश्वेश्वरसरस्वती-
चरणारविन्दमधुकरेण श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीसमाख्याधरेण
केनचिद्विरचिता महिमाख्यस्तुतिव्याख्या परिपूर्णा ॥ शुभमस्तु ॥
शून्येषुषड्विधुमिते नृपविक्रमाब्दे
सोमेऽवलक्षदलकार्त्तिकिकाष्टमीषु ।
श्रीकण्ठभक्तकमलापतिना निजार्थं
टीका व्यलेखि महिमाख्यनुतेः प्रशस्ता ॥
श्रीमद्विश्वेश्वरचरणारविन्दाभ्यां नमः ॥

Thus the ms was scribed by one Kamalapati for his own use on Monday the 8th day of the bright half of the month of Karttika in Vikrama year 1650, i.e. *c*. November 1593 A.C. It therefore definitely belongs to the life-time of the commentator and is consequently of extreme importance in settling the original version of the commentary and the then version of the hymn itself. The extremely decayed appearance of the ms. and the form of script, too. point to the ms being over 350 years old and second the date furnished by the scribe. From a collective perusal of all the relevant factors, it may be surmised that probably the scribe Kamalāpati, too, was a pupil, or at any rate an admirer, of Madhusudana-Sarasvatī's guru Visvesvara-Sarasvatī, who, too, appears to be probably alive when the ms was scribed. It is not unlikely that the scribe's concluding obeisance refers to this Visvesvara-Sarasvatī nothing less than to God Visvanatha of Banaras.

The pronoun 'Kenacit' in the commentator's colophon pointing to the commentator himself may suggest that probably he had not yet secured a prominent place among the learned society of Banaras but belonged only to the back rows when he composed the commentary. If this surmise be accepted, it may lead to a further conjecture that Madhusudana-Sarasvatī's masterpiece work, viz. the *Advaitasiddhi*, which makes his place among the front rank Vedanta authors unchallengeable, was composed only at a later stage. Much stress, however, cannot be laid

today on these guesses as 'Kenacit,' might have been used by the commentator only as an expression of modesty.

At any rate, the date recorded in the ms leads us to many definite conclusions. It serves as a terminus *ad quem* not only for the date of the present *Mahimnaḥ-stotra-ṭīkā* but also for that of the two other works by Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī. While commenting on the verses 26 and 27 of the hymn, Madhusudana twice refers to his own *Vedāntakalpalatikā* in the following manner:—

(१) ..... चेति प्रमाणत्रयमुक्तम्। विस्तरेण चात्र युक्तयो वेदान्तकल्पलतिकायामनुसंधेयाः। तस्मात् 'न विद्मः' इत्यादिना साध्वेवोक्तमद्वितीयत्वम्।

—Line 9 of Folio 27[a] of the ms.

(२)...... यथा च शब्दादप्यपरोक्षनिर्विकल्पकबोधोत्पत्तिस्तथा प्रपञ्चितमस्माभिर्वेदान्तकल्पलतिकायामित्युपरम्यते।

—Line 14 of Folio 28[a] of the ms.

Since both these references to the *Vedāntakalpalatika* are traceable in the present msof the *Mahimnaḥstotra-ṭīkā*, we may be sure that the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* was composed some years prior to Saṁvat 1650. Further, we may also settle the *Siddhāntabindu* to be composed some years prior to Saṁvat 1650 because that work and the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* refer to each other as follows :—

(१) ....विस्तरेण प्रपञ्चितमस्माभिः सिद्धान्तविन्दौ।

——*Vedāntakalpalatikā*, Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts Series No. 3, P. 87.

(२) ....विस्तरस्तु वेदान्तकल्पलतिकायामनुसंधेयः।

——*Siddhāntabindu*, Acyuta-Granthamālā edition (1932), P. 211.

(३) ....विस्तरेणैतत्प्रपञ्चितमस्माभिर्वेदान्तकल्पलतिकायामित्युपरम्यते

——*Ibid*, P. 231.

and therefore appear to be composed almost synchronously.

The ms is of unique importance also in leading us to a final settlement of the controversy that had raged[10] in

[10] Vide the articles in *ABORI* mentioned in Footnotes 1 and 2.

1928 between P. C. Divanji and K. Chattopadhyaya regarding (1) if the *Prasthānabheda* originally formed part of Madhusūdana's com. on Verse 7 (त्रयी सांख्यं योग: etc.) of the *Mahimnaḥstotra* and was lately extracted therefrom on separate mss and given independent circulation, or (2) if it was originally an independent work and was incorporated into the *Mahimnaḥstotra-ṭīkā* only at a later stage. It is true that K. Chattopadhyaya had then convincingly established with the help of internal data that only the former alternative was possible, notwithstanding the existence of independent mss of the *Prasthānabheda*. But the present ms of the *Mahimnaḥstotra-ṭīkā*, as contemporary documentary evidence, forces that very conclusion on us in the way in which P. C. Divanji desired the question to be solved. I have carefully compared the pertinent portion of the com. on Verse 7 of the hymn in the ms with the text of the *Prasthānabheda* as published[11] in No. 51 of the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series only to confirm that they are identical almost word for word. The extremely few deviations[12] that can be noticed are clearly different readings, or additions and omissions by the scribes of later mss or their guides.[13]

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[11] As a supplement to the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (1928).

[12] It is not possible to enumerate all these deviations here. Still, by way of illustration, it may be noted that the pertinent text in the Ms omits the metrical enumeration of Upapurāṇas appearing on p. 5 of the printed *Prasthānabheda*. The concluding sentence of the pertinent text in the Ms, too, differs slightly from that of the printed *Prasthānabheda*.

[13] Recently Miss Sulochana A. Nachane, a Research Fellow of the B.O.R. Institute, Poona, submitted a paper to the 15th Bombay session of the *All India Oriental Conference* (vide the session's *Summaries of Papers*, 1949, p. 221) purporting to lower down the terminus *ad quem* for Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī's date to c. 1670 A.C. on the evidence of a dedicatory verse in a Poona Ms of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*. However, vide my another paper to appear in the next issue of the *Poona Orientalist* (Vol. XIII Nos. 3-4) for the other side of the case based on a different interpretation of that verse.

BHAGAVADGĪTĀ AND SĀṄKHYA PHILOSOPHY

By Prahlad C. Divanji

[I. Introductory remarks; II. Garbe's view as to the Sāṅkhya doctrine underlying the creed of the Bhāgavatas; III. Otto and Keith on the original form and progressive development of the Sāṅkhya doctrine; IV. Insufficiency of Keith's investigation; V. Place of Kapila in Indian Philosophy; VI. Concluding remarks.]

I. *Introductory Remarks.*

Any critical student of the *Bhagavadgītā* can easily perceive that its author must have composed it while he was under the predominating influence of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines. All thse Western scholars agree on this point. Differences of opinion have however arisen betweeen them on several other points, one of which is whether the Sāṅkhya doctrine as known to that author had or had not a place therein for a God or a Supreme Being permeating and controlling the forces of nature as they become manifest in the sentient and insentient creatures in this universe and transcending them all. If it had, there can be no scope for doubting the correctness of the view that *Gītā* has preserved for our enlightenment one or two earlier phases of the Sāṅkhya doctrine than that expounded in the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

II. *Garbe's view as to the Sāṅkhya doctrine underlying the creed of the Bhāgavatas.*

The name of the German scholar which has become very familiar to all the critical students of the *Bhagavadgītā* in India in connection with this topic is R. Garbe, because his Introduction to his German translation of that

work has been translated into English by Udgikar and he was most probably the first European scholar to make a bold attempt to start a definite theory that the work in its present form is a revised edition of a smaller work containing 554 or 530 stanzas prepared by a member of the priestly class by adding the remaining stanzas incorporating a Vedāntic view of God and establishing the necessity of continuing to perform the Vedic rites, that in its original form it was a canonical work of the ancient Bhāgavatas, the devotees of Bhāgavat, the Revered one, also called Vāsudeva, a monotheistic personal God, teaching the doctrine that singular devotion towards Him accompanied by the knowledge of the truth as taught by the Sāṅkhyas and intense meditation of Him while observing the rules of the ethical code approved by the Yogins was the best way of securing freedom from the cycle of births and deaths and the miseries to which the individuals are subject in their embodied state and for the attainment of the highest state of perfection and perpetual peace of mind.[1] In the course of a Preface to his German translation of an *Original Gītā* as reconstructed on relegating to an Appendix that of those stanzas and half-stanzas, which, in his view, contained "Vedantico-ritualistic appendages," "interpolations" or merely "pantheistic surplusages," he stated that he had in doing so acted upon the suggestion of Bothlingk that a critical examination of each stanza and even half-stanza must be made by a scholar thoroughly acquainted with all the philosophical systems of India in order to find out the contents of the original work.[2] This view as to the contents of the supposed original composition was at variance with those of his predecessors in that field like Holtzman,

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[1] Intro. to Garbe's translation of the *Gītā* rendered into English by N. B. Udgikar, pp. 5-8, 14 and 19-21 and Appendix thereto.

[2] Preface to the same by the Author.

Hopkins and others. One such view was that it must originally have been a philosophical work and must laterly have been adapted to the needs of the followers of the cult of Viṣṇu, with whom Kṛṣṇa had laterly been identified. The other was that it must originally have been a prayer-book of the said cult and must subsequently have been Brahmanised by the addition of the philosophical disquisitions and ritualistic interpolations.[3]

The *Original Gītā*, as so concieved by him, must, according to his conclusion, have been composed about the beginning of the 2nd century B.C.[4] His principal argument in support of it is that the *Yogasutra* a work of Patañjali, who, according to his view, was identical with the author of the *Mahabhuṣya*, seems to have borrowed the idea of God and the doctrine of Prapatti from the *Gītā*. Evidentally therefore Sāṅkhya doctrine which is found in the latter must be of an earlier date. The *Kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa is a work of not an earlier date than 300 A.D.[5] It follows from that line of reasoning that the author of the *Gītā* could not have derived his knowledge of the Sāṅkhya doctrine from the said *Kārikā*. The same result also follows from Garbe's admission that the words of the Sāṅkhya terminology such as 'Ahaṁkāra,' ' Buddhi,' 'Manas' and 'Ātman' have been used in the *Gītā* in different senses in different contexts.[6] This fact should have suggested the inference that the said work must have been composed at a time anterior to that in which those words had been adopted by the expounders of the Sāṅkhya philosophy to convey such fixed notions only as they had explained.

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[3] *Introduction*, op. cit., p. 21.

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 33.

[5] Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I. p. 589n; Keith, *The Sāṁkhya System*; A History of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, p. 43.

[6] *Intro. to Garbe's Work*, op. cit., p. 22.

Strange, however, as it may seem, Garbe has emphatically asserted at another place[7] that " it is entirely a mistake to percieve in it (i.e the *Gītā*) an older stage of the Sāṁkhya doctrine." He goes even further and asserts that the Sāṅkhya doctrine as incorporated therein is a deliberately deserted form of it.[8] He is again completely silent as to the source from which its author could, in his view, have drawn his material, the *Kārikā* being out of question, as shown above. This inconsistency is probably due to his ignorance of the older works of the system referred to by the authors of the standard works of the Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Vedānta systems such as Vyāsa, Vācaspati, Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri, as I shall later on show. Lastly, in his *Sāṁkhya Philosophie* he has, according to Keith,[9] expressed the view that " the Sāṁkhya philosophy was of too individualistic a type to have been produced otherwise than by some one man's mind," and that the difference between the doctrine as found in the *Gītā* and as expounded in the *Kārikā* is due merely to " the popularisation of it and its contamination with the other systems in the Epic." This is evidently an irrational and prejudiced view formed in ignorance of the considerable materials against it lying in the different strata of the Vedic and Post-Vedic literatures.

III. *Otto and Keith on the original form and progressive development of the Sāṅkhya doctrine.*

In view of the above nature of his conclusions it is no wonder that his own pupil, R. Otto, should have felt himself constrained to differ from him on several material points. In his " *Original Gītā* " [10] he has expressed and

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[7] *Op. cit.* p. 21.

[8] *Op. cit.*

[9] *The Sāṁkhya System*, Op. cit.,

[10] George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1939; Author's preface, pp. 13-16.

acted upon the views rejected by Garbe that the stanzas in the vulgate embodying the pantheistic view must have formed part of the original composition of the Epic poet, that the first 19 and the last 5 stanzas must also have formed part thereof, that the creed of the Bhāgavatas must not have " a clumsy mixture of a belief in the efficacy of singular devotion to a personal God and in the necessity of the acquisition of knowledge as understood by the Sāṅkhyas and of the performance of meditative exercises according to the practice of the Yogins " and lastly, that the cosmogony of the Sāṅkhyas as it existed prior to its incorporation in the *Gītā* had a place therein for a God or Supreme Being controlling the forces of nature as they become manifest in the sentient and insentient creatures of the universe.[11] This scholar does not however seem to have entered into an investigation of the questions whether the theistic Sāṅkhya doctrine found in the *Bhagavadgītā* was an earlier or later phase of that doctrine and if the former, whether it had a history behind it.

Keith has done that in considerable details in his work entitled *The Sāṁkhya System: A History of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy*.[12] He has therein recorded the conclusions that it is an earlier phase and that it is an indication of a development which had taken place in the Epic age from a primitive one, which can be gleaned from a hymn of the *Ṛgveda* (X. 121 and certain passages in the *Iśa*, *Chāndogya*, *Kaṭha*, and *Praśna Upaniṣads* and from that in a somewhat advanced stage in the *Śvetāśvatara* from amongst the Upaniṣads of the early and middle periods.[13] He has also noticed that there are references in the *Gītā* to the said doctrine as embodied in the *Nṛsiṁ*-

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[11] This is a statement of only the principal points of difference beween them. It is not intended to be exhaustive.

[12] London and Mysore, 1918.

[13] *Op. cit.* pp. 8-19.

hatapanıya, *Garbha*, *Culika* and other minor Upaniṣads. But their dates being very uncertain he has not drawn any conclusions therefrom having a bearing on the point under consideration.[14] The Saṅkhya doctrine as embodied in the *Mahābhārata* and especially in the *Bhagavadgītā* chapters of the Bhıṣmaparvan thereof thus represents, according to him, a stage in its development which is midway between those appearing from the literatures of the Vedic and Classical periods, to the latter of which the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa belongs. As for the founder of that system, he admits that there is a universal tradition as to Kapila being that individual but he is not convinced as to his being a historical personage, because he has been identified in the *Svetāśvatara* with Agni, Śiva and Viṣṇu and in the Śāntiparvan with Hiraṇyagarbha.[15] Āsurī too is, in his view, merely a name. As for Pañcasikha however, he believes him to be a historical personage, " though different from his name sake in the Śāntiparvan," and to deserve the credit of laying the foundation of the system. He places him in the 1st century A.D., i.e. to say, nearly 200 years prior to Iśvarakṛṣṇa[16] and about 100 years prior to the composition of the *Bhagavadgītā* in its original form, which event he places in the earlier half of the 2nd century A.D.[17] Although he agrees that it is older than the *Yogasūtra* he does not agree that the author of the latter was identical with that of the *Mahabhaṣya* and assigns the above date separately to it.

IV. *Insufficiency of Keith's investigation.*

I perfectly agree with Keith in the view that Garbe was wrong in concluding that the Saṅkhya doctrine as

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[14] *Op. cit.* p. 19.

[15] *Op. cit.* pp. 37-40

[16] *Op. cit.* p. 43.

[17] *Op. cit*, p. 30.

found in the *Kārikā* must have been formulated by a single individual at any one time. In my view also it had a progressive development. I do not however agree with him in the views that Kapila is a mythical figure, the Āsurī is merely a name, that the history of the Sāṅkhya system begins with Pañcaśikha and that it can be deemed to have been completely traced to the earliest beginning by tracing the ideas of the Mahat and the Guṇas of the Prakṛti to a Mantra in the *Ṛgveda* and to certain passages of the Upaniṣads. Such an investigation may suffice for proving the falsity of Garbe's theory but not for tracing the history to its primary source. Traditions preserved in the works of the system for centuries together cannot be ignored, though they may be tested and even rejected as unworthy of credence, if found to be inconsistent with other more reliable data. Moreover it is a wrong approach to any problem to start with a suspicion as to the truth of a tradition recorded by a series of writers not only of the same school but also of other schools as well, even though no contrary reliable data may have been found. On the other hand, the sage Kapila is spoken of in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (V. 2.) as one who was inspired with knowledge while meditating. The *Bhagavadgıta* in X. 25 marks him out as the Vibhuti of the Lord amongst the Siddhas, i.e. the persons who had achieved the special object which they had in view in trying to get into communion with a deity. Further light is thrown on his personality by Vyasa, the author of the *Bhaṣya* on the *Yogasutra*. While commenting on 1.26 he refers to a tradition according to which he was the " Ādividvān " (the first of the knowers) and " Bhagavan Paramarṣi " (the revered great sage). Vācaspati has traced that quotation to a work of Pañcaśikhacarya [18] Even while refuting the theory of the genesis of the

[18] *Anandashram Sanskrit Series* No. 47 p. 31.

universe from the Pradhāna and distinguishing the originator thereof from an earlier Kapila who was believed to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu or Vāsudeva, Śaṅkara does not deny that he was the author of a Smṛti work and a Siddha, which he was alleged to be by his objector.[19] Lastly, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* lays special emphasis on his being the first in the line of the Siddhas, on his having acknowledged as the first to acquire redeeming knowledge and as one who had made a searching investigation into the nature of the essence of the universe in order that human beings may be able to know their self as it really is. As regards Āsurī, he is one of the teachers mentioned in the *Vaṁśa Brāhmaṇa* at the end of the 6th Adhyāya of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and the quotation traced by Vācaspati to a work of Pañcaśikhācārya is to the effect that the revered great sage had out of compassion taught the Tantra, (*i.e.*, the Smṛti work referred to above) to " to Āsurī who was anxious to be enlightened." The first line of Kārikā 70, about which there is some controversy, is therefore a merely versified form of the statement of Pañcaśikha. There is therefore no reason for doubting the correctness of the said tradition and for giving credit for the genesis of the Sāṅkhya doctrine to Pañcaśikha, who never claimed it and for which there never were two opinions in India.

And now as to the commencement of the history of the Sāṅkhya philosophy: The earliest phase of the Bhāgavata religion is found in the old Vedic cult of Viṣṇu, Hari or Vāsudeva (not Kṣṛṇa, son of Vasudeva Yādava but the god Viṣṇu who resides in everything). It was this very cult which became subsequently developed into the Bhāgavata religion when a link was formed between the said cult till then confined to the Himālaya regions inhabited by

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[19] *Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra* II. 1.1 (N. S. P. edition, p. 435).

[20] *Bhā. Pu.* III. 24.19; 25.1; 33.35.

anchorites and the Kṛṣṇa cult prevalent in the north of Bhāratavarṣa. I have already traced the origin of both the Bhāgavata and Jaina religions to this old Vedic cult in my paper bearing that title.[21] I have shown there that the Sāṅkhya-Yoga doctrine, which insisted upon treating the complete renunciation of all worldly ties as the *sine qua non* of a life of singular devotion to the ideal of emancipation from the bondage of Karma, had been gradually developed by a long succession of retired members of both the priestly and princely orders of the later Vedic age on practising what was called " Jñāna-tapas " (austerities resorted to for the sole purpose of acquiring knowledge). In the first 9 Skandhas of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* there are many stories of such devotees of Viṣṇu having attained knowledge through His grace. The earliest of them is the sage Kapila and he has been identified with Hiraṇyagarbha,[22] who was probably the same as the first promulgator of the Yoga doctrine according to Vyāsa, the author of the *Bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra*.[23] May be, he was also the seer of the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn.[24] Just as Śaṅkara distinguishes between two Kapilas, Vācaspati too does so. He calls the first " Svayambhū " and "Anādimukta Paramaguru" (the earliest of the teachers whose release had no beginning) and the other Kapila an "Ādimukta Paramaguru " (the earliest of the teachers whose release had a beginning) and explains that the latter had been born and had acquired knowledge through the favour of Maheśvara.[25] Although the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* does not distinguish between the two it begins the story of Kapila right

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[21] *Annals* of the B.O.R.I. Vol. XIII, pp. 108-25.

[22] Vācaspati's Gloss on the *Bhāṣya* of Vyāsa on *Yogasūtra* I.26. (A. S. Series No. 47, p. 31).

[23] *Ṛgveda Saṁhitā*, X. 121.

[24] *A. S. Series* No. 47, p. 2.

[25] *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

from the marriage of his parents, the sage Kardama and Devahūti, daughter of Manu Svayambhū, describes in what a mystical fashion the said marriage had been consummated and how as the result thereof the child in whom the Lord Viṣṇu had specially placed his own light was born.[26] It appears from this that the author of this work had there given the life-story of the second, not of the first, Kapila It is this Kapila who is spoken of as having imparted the knowledge of the essence identified with Vāsudeva, and on doing that he is said to have retired thereafter to a far away lonely place. There is no mention there of his having imparted knowledge to Asuri. Still when it calls him a " Siddhagaṇadhisa " (the Head of the Group of Adepts) it seems to mean the same sage whom Vācaspati calls the "Ādividvan " and whom the *Gita* mentions as the Vibhūti of the Lord amongst the Siddhas. He is therefore clearly distinguishable from Svayambhū Manu, who according to the *Bhagavata* was his grandfather. Neither this nor any other Purāṇa nor any work based on their cosmology speaks about his parentage. The etymological meaning of the word "Svayambhū " is also against the possibility of his human birth being known to any person of the Paurāṇic age. That seems to be the reason why he is called the " Pitāmaha," identified with Vāsudeva or Viṣṇu and honoured as the " Maheśvara " also. The conception of the existence of three distinct deities, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra, discharging the separate functions of creating, preserving and destroying the worlds, seems to have originated at a later stage, which was either that of the expansion of the original one Puraṇa into three or the three into eighteen. The adherents of the Yoga school identify him with Hiraṇyagarbha, the golden egg, from which, according to the Vedic cosmology, the universe had

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[26] *Bho. Pu.* III. 24-33.

emerged. They also give him the credit of having promulgated the Yoga doctrine. None however ascribes to him the authorship of a Smrti work on the Sāṅkhya philosophy as Śaṅkara does to the human Kapila in his *Bhāṣya* on *Bra. Sū.* II. 1. 1. We can therefore reasonably conclude that Svayambhū Manu was the Vāsudeva of the Bhagavatas, that he must have been called Kapila because of the colour of his skin being dark-reddish, that he had devoted all his conscious life to the investigation and realisation of the nature and powers of the Vedic god Viṣṇu by the practice of deep meditation, that he was most probably also the seer of the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn, that his own parentage was unknown but that he had a daughter, whose name was Devahūti, that she had been given in marriage to the sage Kardama, that they became the parents of a male child, that the said child's body was of the same colour as that of his maternal grandfather and was therefore named Kapila, that this Kapila has devoted all his conscious life to the investigation of the problem of the cause of evolution of the different species of beings by meditation on the Great Lord of Beings, Maheśvara, and arrived at the concluison that close physical contact and co-operation of two kinds of forces, one positive, which he named the Puruṣa, and the other negative, which he named the Prakṛti, necessary for the evolution of all tne concrete forms of nature and that the nature and appearance of each of them was determined by the preponderance of the one or other of the three Guṇas (characteristics) of the negative force, resulting from the permutations and combinations of all the three in varying proportions.

It can be seen from the above that there was a close connection not only between the propounders of the cult of Viṣṇu and Sāṅkhya doctrine but that there was also such between the beliefs of votaries of the said cult and the Sāṅkhya doctrine as originally propounded because the

second Kapila could not have been inspired with the knowledge of the said doctrine except as the result of intense meditation on the relation subsisting between the aspect of the Supreme Deity pervading all beings and that responsible for their coming into existence. It is reasonable to take it for granted that his grandfather, who had offered his daughter in marriage to the sage Kardama, who had been passing his life in the contemplation of the Deity in seclusion, must have imparted to his grandson the knowledge of the nature and powers of Viṣṇu, which he had acquired by the favour of that Deity. The self-effect which the latter had made to probe into the secret of the origin of the different kinds of beings must have been decided upon as the result of that teaching. The Siddhi that he had acquired as the result of that effort could not therefore have remained unaffected by the belief in the existence of a Supreme Deity controlling the two forces whose contact and co-operation are the immediate cause of the diverse kinds of beings. And this is the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga which has been expounded in the 13th to the 18th chapters of the *Bhagavadgītā* and forms the foundation of the theoretical side of the Karma-Yoga, the practical side whereof has been expounded in chapters II to XII of that work. It is quite obvious from those earlier chapters that the Karma-Yoga is nothing else but an adaptation of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, which is the same as Jñāna-Yoga, made so as to suit the requirements of those who were either not fitted or not inclined to take to a life of complete renunciation in solitude.

The doctrine as expounded in that work can be briefly summed up thus :—The Highest Essence is the Paraṁ Brahman. He is neither Sat nor Asat and has no beginning and no end. The universe periodically evolves from, rests in, and becomes absorbed in it, without its being in any way affected by those changes because it is "Avya-

ya'' (Indestructible). The process of evolution takes place at its will and so does that of involution. The materials for giving rise to the different forms of the sentiment and insentient creatures are his two Prakṛtis, the Mūlaprakṛti and Jīvas. In the Avyakta state, which returns at the end of each Kalpa, there is no differentiation whatever. Hence these two are eternal in the sense that they remain as entities during intermediate destructions or absorptions, which take place during the same Kalpa. When the process of evolution is to be commenced the Highest Essence impregnates the Brahman or the Mūlaprakṛti on assuming the role of Puruṣottama, the best of the active forces. The said Prakṛti becomes thereby divided into the eight universal products Bhūmi etc., by the permutations and combinations of its three Guṇas in varying proportions. All the beings are the products of the said eight component parts of the Prakṛti undergoing further permutations and combinations All these changes take place on account of the Guṇas of the Prakṛti. But they are incapable of action without getting into contact with the Purusas, who are sparks issuing from the fire of the Highest Essence and therefore in each product there is a Puruṣa. Relatively to each individual product its individual Puruṣa is its Kṣetrajña because that product, such as it is, is his field of action and enjoyment. This association is the result of the "Moha" (delusion) caused by the "Tamoguna" inherent in each product in a greater or lesser degree. He is liable to that kind of influence, though the Puruṣottama is not, owing to his forgetting his true nature as the result of being placed in the company of the products of the original Prakṛti. Being a spark from the divine fire the powers of willing, knowing and acting are inherent in him but they are limited by the nature of the product of the Prakṛti with which he has chosen to identify himself for the time being and that

nature is determined by one of the three Guṇas predominating in that particular product. It follows from this that every created being which has existence for the time being has a Jıva claiming it as its body, not every sentient being only. Over and besides its own individual Jıva, each being has in it the presence of the Supreme Soul because He permeates every particle of the primordial matter, which in its concrete form appears in every form of existence in the eight forms of the ether (Akasa), air (vayu), heat (Agni), water (Jala), earth (Pṛthvī), mind (Manas) intelligence (Buddhi) and egoism (Ahaṁkara), mixed up in varying proportions. The Jıva is of the same nature as the latter and all the powers of the latter are inherent in him too but he is not conscious of them and cannot get their benefit because he is deluded by the Guṇas of the Prakṛti inherent in the products of which he is conscious as distinct entities and is affected by the results flowing from the acts which he does with a sense of egoism. The consequence thereof is that he is subjected to miseries of diverse sorts including transmigration. The remedy for being free from them lies in his own hands because it consists of the knowledge of the distinction between his true self and the non-selves with which he is surrounded as the result of desire for enjoyment. Such knowledge is imparted by a Guru if approached meekly and reverently This is not however enough to make him immune from the miseries spoken of above. He must make sincere efforts to realise the truth contained in the teaching of the Guru, which is that he is essentially the same as the Supreme Soul called Brahman. The efforts consist of changing the natural habit of the mind to entertain desires for the acquisition of the objects of sensual enjoyment and of the senses to become engaged in acts towards that end and turning the mind to think of perpetual happiness and peace, which is Brahman. There are several ways of do-

ing this and one must choose one or more of them on finding out the inherent weaknesses of the mind. When such realisation takes place one becomes a *Sthitaprajña* as defined in Ch. II. 54—72 of the *Gītā*. The state of such a saint is described in the last of those stanzas as the *Brāhmisthiti*. If one reaches that state even at the time of death one attains *Brahma-nirvaṇa* (repose in Brahman). For attaining this state at the time of death the specific remedy is described in *Gītā* VIII. 12—13.

This is called Sāṅkhya-Yoga the word "Sāṅkhya" wherein means—knowledge including its realisation not a mere enumeration of the categories.[27] The Acaryas of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga are called *Jñānins* and *Tattvadarśins* in this work but *Jñāna* or *Tattvadarśana* is of a different sort from that of the classical Sāṅkhyas in this respect that it is absolutely necessary according to the former to realise the truth known from an external source, by going through the process of Yoga accompanied by submission to a strict moral discipline. The practice of Yoga again involves a belief in the Supreme Soul, who has no place in the doctrine of the classical Sāṅkhya system. There is moreover no categorical enumeration of the 25 Tattvas of the latter anywhere in the *Gītā* nor the gradual evolution of the 11 *Indriyas* and the five Tanmātrās thereout from the *Ahaṅkāra*, the origin of the latter from the *Mahat-tattva*, no recognition of Brahman as the source of all creation and the evolution of the *Pañca Mahabhutas* from the *Pañca Tanmatras*. On the contrary the Lord says in *Gītā* VII. 4 that Mulaprakṛti is differentiated into eight parts, Bhūmiḥ, Āpaḥ, Analaḥ etc., which means that Ahaṅkara, Buddhi and Manas had come into existence simultaneously and that the five Tat-

[27] *Bha. Gī.* XIII. 24 and III. 3. See also the commentaries of the numerous commentators on XVIII. 13 besides that of Śaṅkara, such as Anandatīrtha, Puruṣottamji, Śrīdhara and Nīlakaṇṭha.

tvas too had come into existence along with them. The statement in XIII. 5 of the constituents of the Kṣetra together with modifications does no doubt contain a mention of 24 universal categories but in the first place they are not the same as the 24 elements mentioned in the 22nd Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa and secondly they have not been mentioned in the order in which they can be supposed to have come into existence. Moreover, even there the five Tanmātrās do not appear and the five objects of sense-perception are amongst them though they are not amongst the 24 elements mentioned in the said Kārikā. Lastly, Mahat, the first evolute in the classical Sāṅkhya theory of cosmogony according to the said Kārikā, does not appear amongst the 24 in the *Gītā*. The term " Mahat " occurs twice in *Gītā* XIV. 3—4 but in the first of those stanzas it precedes the word " Brahman " and in the second succeeds it. At both the places it is used as an adjective, not as a noun and therefore cannot be identified with the first product of the classical Sāṅkhya Prakṛti All this goes to show that the Sāṅkhya theory of cosmogony was yet in the process of formation and had not appropriated to itself and given definite technical meanings to the terms found in the *Gītā*. It is therefore more reasonable to infer that the said work represents an earlier rather than a later consciously-mutilated phase of the said doctrine. It is possible that it is a stage earlier even than that appearing from the Upanisads of the middle period, to which attention has been drawn by Keith, because those who contributed to its development up to the stage appearing from the *Gītā* were the sages who had been living in ages earlier than that of Veda Vyāsa. It is at least definitely an earlier one than that represented by the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Śāntiparvan there being no reference therein anywhere to the Caturvyūha theory of the Pāñcarātrikas. There is probably no other distinct literature pertaining to that stage extant to-day but there

is a probility of much having existed at the time of the composition of the *Bhagavadgītā*, as shown by numerous quotations from it in my paper on the "*Probable Sources of the Bhagavadgītā*." [28]

V. *Place of Kapila in Indian Philosophy.*

The second stage in the development of the Sāṅkhya doctrine is found reflected in Chapters XII to XVIII of the *Gītā*. In that stage we do not find the discovery of any new element or the introduction of any definite order of evolution of the cosmic and individual forces. It is however characterised by an intensive study of the two primary forces, the Prakṛti and Puruṣa, and their relation with the controlling force, the Supreme Soul, and of the diverse ways in which the three Guṇas of the Prakṛti become manifest in the different concrete forms of nature with which a Sāṅkhya-yogin was required to deal in his attempt to reach his goal by diminishing the Rājasic and Tāmasic elements in his individual nature. The study of the first class led to the technicalisation of the terms "Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña," "Prakṛti and Puruṣa," "Jñana and Jñeya," and "Paramātmā or Purusottama," the functions of the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa in the life of an individual and the possible ways of approach by the Puruṣa to the Puruṣottama, including the rules of conduct to be observed during the journey along the said ways leading the rules known to the Unknown.[29]

Although all those who were engaged in these investigations were Bhāgavatas, they seem to have been divided in this age into two schools of the Sāṅkhyas and the Yogins, the former devoting their attention to the cosmic side of evolution and depending for the advancement of their know-

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[28] Journal of the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. IV., pp. 289-94.

[29] See the contents of Chapters XIII and XV of the *Gītā*.

ledge on their own individual efforts and faith in the inherent powers of the Atman believed to be essentially identical with the Paramatman, otherwise called Brahman, while the latter making all possible efforts to suppress their ego in the hope of being ultimately united with the Paramātman through His grace. The Brahman sage who had attained a remarkable degree of success in his efforts of the former type was Kapila II, the "Ādividvān" of Vyāsa and Vacaspati, who is acknowledged in the *Gīta* as the Vibhūti of the Lord amongst the Siddhas (adepts) and is universally believed to be the founder of the Sāṅkhya system of thought. The royal sage whose name is associated with the doctrine of the Karma-yoga is the Janaka of Mithila. Although the earliest royal sage to whom this Yoga is said in the *Bhagavadgīta* (IV. 1—2) to have been imparted is Ikṣvāku, the founder of the Solar dynasty of kings, it was only since the achievement of remarkable success by King Janaka of Mithilā[30] in his efforts to realise the ideal of complete detachment from the things of this world that the Karma-yoga doctrine seems to have been recognised as a reliable alternative mode of pursuit of the highest object of man's endeavour.

As for the literature which the said sage Kapila can be believed to have left behind him for his successors, Bādarayaṇa Vyasa while refuting the view that the *Pradhāna* inert substance, was the material cause of this universe, refers to a Smṛti work in which that view had, to his knowledge, been put forth[31] and his commentator, Śaṅkara, and the latter's followers who have glossed over his commentary, distinctly say that the said view had been put forth in a number of Smṛtis composed by Kapila and his followers.[32] It is a very unfortunate circumstance that none of those Smṛti works is available to-day. We are how-

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[30] Op. cit. III. 20.
[31] *Bra. Sū.* II. 1.1.
[32] *Op. cit.*, N. S. P. edition. pp. 432-36.

ever in a position to get some definite notions, about the work of Kapila himself at least from the later writers. Thus for instance, Śaṅkara in his commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* XIII. 19 calls it *Śāstra Kāpilaṁ*.[33] He also says there that it is an accepted authority on the subject of the Guṇas and their Bhoktṛ (Enjoyer) because the Kāpilas are experts in the matter of the exposition of the operation of the characteristics and their enjoyer. That the followers of the said Acarya should, like him, look upon the word "Guṇasaṅkhyāna" occurring in the said stanza of the *Gītā* as referring to the contents of an authoritative work by Kapila is not to be wondered at. What is remarkable however is that a reference to the commentaries on the stanza by the commentators of the other schools of Vedānta, such as Ānandatırtha, Puruṣottamji, Śrīdhara and Nilakaṇṭha shows that they too assign the same meaning to the said expression and that none of them says that it refers to the *Ṣaṣṭhitantra-Śastra*, on which the *Sāṅkhya-kārika* has been avowedly based or to any other work. We are therefore on *terrâ firmâ* when we conclude that the author of the *Bhagavadgīta* has, in the said stanza, cited, as his authority for the threefold division of Jñāna, Karma and Karta on the basis of the three characteristics, the *Śāstra-Kapila* mentioned by Śaṅkara and that most probably it is the Smṛti work referred to by Bādarāyaṇa in his Sūtra above referred to. Further, it is not without significance that the only stages in the process of evolution spoken of in the *Gītā* are those of the existence of the two primary and eternal entities, the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa, the initial eightfold division of the former resulting in the simultaneous emergence of the five elements together with the Ahaṅkara, Buddhi and Manas and the manifestation of the Guṇas of Prakṛti in the objects of the universe, both

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[33] *Bhagavadgītā* with the Commentaries of Śaṅkara and others, Vyankateshwar Press edition, p. 488.

physical and metaphysical. The word "Pradhāna" occurs nowhere in the *Gītā* and as shown above the simultaneous emergence of the universals is diamatrically opposed to the classical Sāṅkhya doctrine. Moreover the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa in the *Gītā* are not quite independent entities but are under the control of the Lord, the Puruṣottama. Creation and dissolution again are not automatic processes but take place at His will. The beings emerge when He impregnates the Prakṛti and even the Guṇas of the latter owe their existence to Him. What migrates from body to body is not the Liṅga Śarīra composed of 17 constituents, Mahat and others, along with the Jīva but only five senses of knowledge and the mind, according to *Bha-Gī*. XV. 7—8. Lastly, the means for emancipation is not the kind of abstract knowledge mentioned in Kārikās 55 to 64. It is only a step to the higher knowledge which arises as the result of intense singular devotion towards the Lord in the abstract called the *Avyakta* which being an intelligent entity is different from the *Avyakta* of the *Kārikā*, or the Lord as specially incarnated in the body of Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva. It is clear from all this that the *Bhagavadgītā* represents a stage in the development of the Sāṅkhya doctrine which is later than that represented by the *Smṛti* of Kapila and an earlier one than that represented by the *Kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. And since the said *Kārikā* is avowedly a mere abridgement of the *Ṣaṣṭhitantra-Śāstra* of Pañcaśikhācārya, according to Kārikā 72, the *Gītā* represents a stage of the said doctrine earlier even than that which the said treatise can be believed to represent. Complete physical renunciation with a view to attain Naiṣkarmya-siddhi, a state of total inactivity, was its most prominent feature and the goal held forth by it was the attainment of the state of Brahman in the abstract otherwise called the *Avyakta* by the knowledge which comes to one by intuition from the realisatio

of the essential indentity of the individual soul with Brahman during a state of complete dissociation of that soul from the physical body, the senses, the mind and the intellect, which can be induced by the practice of Abhyāsa-yoga. The *Bhagavadgītā*, on the other hand, has been speciallly composed with a view to dissuade aspirants from breaking off social connections in order to attain the said goal. It therefore adduces several cogent arguments to convince them that the objective of total inactivity can be more easily attained by resorting to Karma-yoga, which means the disinterested discharge of such duties as fall to one's lot as the consequence of one's social position, under the confident belief that by doing so one has been rendering service to the Almighty God, and full faith in His assurance given to Arjuna when He had become specially incarnated as Śrī Kṛṣṇa for protecting the good and chastising the wicked, namely that by rendering such service with singular devotion to Him He is pleased and confers on the devotee a boon by which he becomes free from the bondage of Karma and consequently from all kinds of miseries including transmigration. That being so, whatever philosophical knowledge of the Sāṅkhya system has been embodied in *Gītā* must be deemed to have been borrowed by its author from the said *Smṛti* work of Kapila, the "Ādi-vidyān ' of Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra and the " Vibhūti " of the Lord amongst the Siddhas according to the *Gītā* itself, and from such other Smṛti works of his followers as may have preceded him. He was not a Vedic seer and not identical with the "Anādimukta " Kapila who has been identified with Hiraṇyagarbha but was his daughter's son and had a human birth. And whereas the former is traditionally believed to be the first teacher of Yoga as the means of salvation, the latter is so believed to have laid the foundation of the path of Knowledge. The position of this second Kapila in the history of Indian

philosophy is therefore that of its father. King Janaka who is referred to in the *Gītā* as having attained "Saṁsiddhi" by Karma itself came later on. Both of them lived in an age earlier than that of Kṛṣṇa. Veda Vyāsa, the author of the *Bhārata Epic* including the *Bhagavadgītā*, who has interpreted the doctrine of Sāṅkhya-yoga of the first and assimilated the Karma-yoga of the latter with the Bhakti-yoga or the Bhagavata religion of the Sātvatas with Kṛṣṇa-Vasudevas but glorified him in the Epic in the later age of Parikṣit and Janamejaya.

VI. *Concluding remarks.*

The *Bhagavadgītā* is thus a work, the Sāṅkhya doctrine embodied wherein had been formulated on making use *inter alia* of the first and second phases thereof gathered from the Śāstra-Kāpila of the founder of that line of thought and the other Smṛti works of his followers available in the time of its author. In each of those phases there was a place in its cosmogony for a Supreme Being, who permeated all the creatures and controlled them from within and supplied the highest ideal to be attained by an aspirant by making a persistent effort while leading a life of complete isolation and abstinence from all conscious activity, secular as well as religious, mental as well as physical. The second phase thereof differed from the first in laying special emphasis on the realisation of the truth of the doctrine so far as it related to the difference between the nature and functions of the two beginningless entities, the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa, and the diverse ways in which the characteristics of the former become manifest in the diverse objects of the physical and metaphysical worlds. There is no trace in it of the third phase in which a rational connection was established between the Prakṛti and the five gross elements on the cosmic side and the Prakṛti and the intellect, mind and sen-

ses on the individual side, by introducing the concepts of the five subtle elements called the *Tanmatras* and the *Liṅga Sarıra*. This phase is now found in the *Saṅkhya-Kārika* but its origin goes back to the time of the composition of the *Ṣaṣṭhitantra-sastra* a work referred to as its source not only in the said work but also in the commentary on the *Yogasūtra* of a later *Vyāsa*. The latter also contains many quotations from that work.[34] The belief that the human soul is bound by the fruits accruing from his own acts and is therefore required to submit to miseries in this life and frequent births and deaths was there even in the first phase and consequently there was too that of the necessity of resorting to a means for securing release from that bondage. But the means recommended was not knowledge alone as in the third phase but knowledge supplemented by either Abhyasa-yoga or Karma-yoga. The *Bhagavadgītā* added thereto a third alternative of Bhakti-yoga which was assimilated to the latter. The said first phase is distinguishable from the Vedic cult of Viṣṇu, which was one of the numerous cults of the Vedic gods testified to by numerous Mantras of the *Ṛgveda* and the *Atharvaveda*.[35] Besides those cited in the foot-note below there are numerous stray Mantras in the *Ṛgveda* which lead to the inference that many other Vedic seers had been reflecting over the nature of the Akṣara, the human soul, the human organism, the worldly phenomena and the nature of the relation, if any, between them.[36] Kapila belonged to the said cult of Viṣṇu and had by concentration and meditation been able to partake of the nature of that

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[34] See Ānandashram Sanskrit Series No. 47, pp. 8, 31, 62-63, 64, 72-73, 80, 83, 89, 158-59, 187. Most of these quotations go to show that it must be a work written in the Sūtra style.

[35] *Ṛg. Ve.* X. 90, 121, 125, 129: I. 164, 46; *Atha. Veda.* X. 2; XI. 8; XIII. 1; XIX. 53.

[36] See *Ṛgveda-tattvaṁ* of Gulabrai V. Chhaya (Rajkot, 1926) pp. 14, 27, 31, 40, 48 and 51.

god to such an extent that he was believed by his followers to be an incarnation of Vāsudeva alias Viṣṇu. His method of approach to the deity is designated as the " Sāṅkhya-yoga." The first member of that compound means the knowledge of the truth not an enumeration of the categories of the Sāṅkhya system because all its categories had not been ascertained and definite causal connections between such of them as had been ascertained had not been established. All those who followed that method came to be known as the " Sāṅkhya-yogins " and those of them who attained their objective came to be known as the " Sāṅkhyācāryas " (Teachers of the Sāṅkhya doctrine.) These Sāṅkhya-yogins were the followers of the Nivṛtti-dharma (rules of conduct pertaining to a life of retirement) and depended upon their personal efforts and the power inherent in all actions to bear the appropriate fruits, which in the case of theirs were called Siddhis. The Aksara or Brahman served only as an ideal and being devoid of attributes was not expected to enable them to solve their difficulties and to resist the numerous temptations that lay in their way. It was only after they made a fairly good progress in discriminating between the nature and functions of the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa that the pure self, the substratum of the Puruṣa, was expected to help them in those directions. Some of the Sāṅkhya-yogins, therefore, made an investigation into the different ways in which the three characteristics of the Prakṛti became manifest in the different objects of the physical and metaphysical worlds with which they had to deal even in their life in solitude. Others who though following the same master were against physical renunciation and the repudiation of all social and religious duties and were consequently the followers of the Pravṛtti-dharma, relied upon their faith in the immortal spirit of their master to help them in their difficulties. These were mostly royal sages

and came to be known as the Karma-yogins The one of them who had attained conspicuous success in that path was Janaka Videha of Mithilā, who remained unmoved even when his capital was on fire. Whereas the tradition of Sāṅkhya-yoga had continued uninterrupted till the time of Śrī Kṛṣṇa that of the Karma-yoga had been broken before his time. Śrī Kṛṣṇa revived it in his life-time by his own extraordinary achievements and Veda Vyāsa expounded it methodically in the *Bhagavadgītā* and illustrated its actual practice by the conduct of the principal characters of the *Bhārata Epic*, on crucial occasions, decided upon under the personal guidance of Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

PRĀYAŚCITTA

(*According to the Smṛti-nibandhas of Bengal*)

By SURESHCHANDRA BANERJEE

Introduction

"PRĀYAŚCITTA" or expiation occupies a great bulk of the *Dharmaśāstra* literature of India, the other two important topics of this literature being *Ācāra* (custom) and *Vyavahāra* (law). It is a matter of common knowledge that the whole life of a Hindu in ancient India was regarded as the performance of a series of duties strictly in conformity with the Śāstric injunctions. The scope of the offences of both omission and commission was, therefore, naturally very wide. This necessarily resulted in the framing of rigid rules of expiation. As the offences were bound to be of very diverse types in accordance with the diversity of human nature the rules of expiation also were varied and numerous. It is this importance of these rules of *Prāyaścitta* in the life of a Hindu which, perhaps led the *nibandhakāras* of Bengal to devote considerable time and energy to the compilation of these rules into a manageable size. The subject is, however, so vast that, in spite of their best endeavours at the presentation of the most important rules within a short compass, their "compendiums" have grown into rather volumnious treatises. We shall, however, confine ourselves to a consideration of the broad matters dealt with by these writers leaving aside such details as are devoid of any interest but academic.

Works dealing with Prāyaścitta

The principal *nibandhas* of Bengal dealing with *Prāyaścitta* are chronologically the following :—

1. *Prāyaścitta-prakaraṇa*[1] (or,—*nirūpaṇa*) of Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa.
2. *Prāyaścitta-viveka*[2] of Śūlapāṇi.
3. *Prāyaścitta-tattva*[3] of Raghunandana.

Of the above works the *Prāyaścitta-prakaraṇa* (hence forth abbreviated as PP) deals with the broad matters relating to *Prāyaścitta*. The *Prāyaścitta-viveka* (henceforth abbreviated as P. V.) of Śūlapāṇi is much more comprehensive dealing as it does with the subject very exhaustively. The *Prāyaścitta-tattva* (abbreviated as P. T.) appears to be a very systematic and well-planned work on the subject as is evident from the résumé of its contents found at the beginning of the work.[4] It should be noted, however, that Raghunandana is frank enough to admit clearly that his work has no claim to be exhaustive.[5]

The subject of *Prāyaścitta* being vast and complex its study naturally calls for a clear and definite plan. We propose herein to study the topic under the following heads :—

1. Conception and fundamental principles of *Prāyaścitta*.
2. Conception of *Pāpa*.
3. Classification of sins.
4. List of important transgressions recorded in the Bengal School with broad rules of their expiation.

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[1] Ed. G. C. Vedāntatīrtha, Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi, 1927.

[2] Ed. J. Vidyasagar, Calcutta, 1893.

[3] Ed. Hrisikes Sastri, Calcutta, 1935 BS. [There are several other editions printed in Bengali characters besides that of J. Vidyasagar in Devanāgarī.]

[4] PP. 2-5.

[5] *Cf.* प्रायश्चित्तविवेकादावन्यज्ज्ञेयं विचक्षणः (F. 5). This remark also shows that the PV was regarded as the most authoritative by Raghunandana himself.

5. Rules of purifying various things.
6. The expiatory rites mentioned in the *smṛti-nibandhas* of Bengal.

Conception and fundamental principles of Prāyaścitta

Among the triad of the nibandhakāras mentioned above Śūlapāṇi is the first to attempt a precis· definition of the term *Prāyaścitta*. On the authority of Aṅgiras he arrives at the following derivative meaning of the word :—

Prāyas—tapas or austerity.

Cilta—niścaya or certain knowledge. Thus putting the component parts together the word *prāyaścitta* would denote " such austerities as are known for certain to be capable of washing off sin."[6]

Citing the authority of Hārīta, Śūlapāṇi also adds that *Prāyaścitta* is the name given to those austerities which serve to destroy accumulated evil.[7]

From these authorities Śūlapāṇi concludes that a particular rite, in order to be *prāyaścitta*, must have as its object only the destruction of sin (पापक्षयमात्रसाधनम्) and nothing else. Stress is laid on the word ' only ' thereby excluding such rites as secure any other object for the performer. For example, the Vrata called ' *Prājāpatya* ' which is a mode of *Prāyaścitta*, when observed with the object of removing a certain sin, ceases to have the appellation of *Prāyaścitta* when looked upon and performed as a means of attaining heaven (स्वर्ग). The word *mātra* also excludes the sacrifices known as *Tutapuruṣa* and *Aśvamedha* which besides aiming at the destruction of sin, also lead to the attainment of the abode of the Supreme Being. Govindānanda, in his commentary on the P V.,

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[6] प्रायो नाम तपः प्रोक्तं चित्तं निश्चय उच्यते।
तपो निश्चयसंयुक्तं प्रायश्चित्तमिति स्थितम्।—quoted in PV, p. 2.

[7] प्रयतत्वाद्वोपचितमशुभं नाशयतीति प्रायश्चित्तम्—P.V., p. 3.

however, adds that even *Aśvamedha* can be regarded as *Prāyaścitta* when it is done for expiating the sin of *Brahmahatyā*.[8]

Raghunandana does not add materially to the above explanation of the conception of *Prāyaścitta*. He, however, very aptly describes the function of *Prāyaścitta* by a happy analogy taken from the ancient writers. A man is freed from sin by means of penance, gifts, sacrifices even as a piece of dirty cloth is cleansed by the application of alkali, heating, by severe beating and washing.[9]

Prāyaścitta has been defined as a means to an end the end being the destruction of sin. The question naturally arises—what is meant by ' sin ' ?

'Pāpa'—*Meaning of the term, sources and varieties of*

According to the popular notion *pāpa* or sin consists in the omission of what is enjoined by the *śāstra* (विहितस्यान नुष्ठानात्) and the commission of what is prohibited (निन्दितस्य सेवनात्) Śūlapāṇi, on the authority of Yājñavalkya, maintains that besides the acts of omission and commission, the two well-known sources of *pāpa*, it also arises from a third cause, viz., non-restraint of the senses (इन्द्रियाणामनिग्रहात्). The inclusion of this third cause of *pāpa* gives rise to certain interesting points as noted by Śūlapāṇi. At the first sight the inclusion of the third cause appears superfluous inasmuch as indulgence in the pleasures of the senses has been expressly prohibited by Manu[10] so that non-restraint of the senses may be regarded as a sin of commission. Śūlapāṇi puts forth an ingenious justification for the inclusion of this cause. First of all he refutes the *Kalpa-*

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[8] यदा तु ब्रह्महत्यापापापनोदनायाश्वमेधः क्रियते तदा सोऽपि प्रायश्चित्तमेव —PV., p. 3 (commentary).

[9] यथा क्षारोपस्वेदचण्डनिर्णोदनप्रक्षालनादिभिर्वासांसि शुध्यन्ति एवं तपोदानयज्ञैः पापवन्तः शुद्धिमुपयान्ति —P.T., p. 6.

[10] इन्द्रियार्थेषु सर्वेषु न प्रसज्येत कामतः—Manu. IV. 16.

taru which seeks to justify the inclusion of this third factor by taking it to mean that it is intended to stress the gravity of sin consequent upon the repeated indulgence (अभ्यास) in sensual pleasures. In refutation of this argument Śūlapāṇi points out that if the argument of the *Kalpataru* be accepted then the rule laid down by Manu, that the repetition of an act known to be prohibited must be avoided, becomes a duplication of Manu's prohibition of indulgence in sensual pleasures referred to above.

According to Śūlapāṇi the sin arising from the third cause consists in *daṁśa* (bite) and *abhiśāpa* (curse). To the objection that these two should not properly be regarded as sin on the part of the victim, who is the object of these and not the agent, Śūlapāṇi replies that these should be so regarded in view of their inclusion, by dependable authorities, among the causes giving rise to sin (पापोत्पादकप्रकरणे पाठात्). Śūlapāṇi does not consider *daṁśa* and *abhiśāpa* to be sins but the effects of sins committed on some previous occasion.[11] The legend of the sage Māṇḍavya being killed on the stake (शूल) after being cursed as a thief, and that of king Parīkṣit being bitten by a serpent in spite of his being guarded by a large number of people, seem to show absence of sin on the part of the victims. But Śūlapāṇi holds that in these cases too their misfortunes must be ascribed to curses pronounced by some sage as a result of some of their past misdeeds arising out of their attachment to sensual pleasures.

From the above arguments Śūlapāṇi concludes that the causes of *pāpa* are threefold, the two causes often referred to by writers on *Dharmaśāstra* being only a general statement.

The argument that only those who are eligible for the duties enjoined by the Vedas (वेदार्थव्यवहारी) are entitled to

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[11] तयोरपि पूर्वकृतेन्द्रियार्थप्रसंगजनितमुनिशापोत्पन्नत्वात्—PV—p. 12.

perform *prāyaścitta* is rejected by Śūlapāṇi who quotes authoritative texts to the effect that even the lowest class of people—*caṇḍālas*, have definite Śāstric duties the breach of which renders them liable to expiation.

General remarks on 'Prāyaścitta'—Prāyaścitta whether *Kāmya* or *Naimittika* or both.

Prāyaścitta is performed with the object of getting rid of sin. Hence ordinarily it may be called *Kāmya* (i.e., that which is done with a Kāmanā or object in view. But Śūlapāṇi and Raghunandana take great pains to establish that *Prāyaścitta* is also *Naimittika* i.e., that which is done as a result of some cause or *nimitta*. Their arguments, stated without the technicalities, stand thus :—

Prāyaścitta is no doubt *Kāmya* the washing off of the sin being the object aimed at. No *Prāyaścitta*, however, is called for unless there is some *pāpa*. In other words, *pāpa* is the cause or *nimitta* of the *prāyaścitta* which is, therefore, *naimittika*. The *Cāndrāyaṇa*, which is a form of *Prāyaścitta*, is an instance in point. The *Cāndrāyaṇa* is performed.

(i) when such a *Pāpa* as necessitates the performance of *Cāndrāyaṇa* for its expiation attaches to the performer (स्वफलार्थं).

(ii) when the performer wishes to destroy *Pāpa* (पापक्षयार्थं) stated plainly the reasoning is as follows :—

A *Prāyścitta* is *Kāmya* inasmuch as it is performed by a man with the desire (कामना) of destroying sin and it is *naimittika* inasmuch as it is performed by one who is conscious of a positive sin committed by him.

Result of sin committed consciously (*Kāmakṛta*) and unconsciously (*Akāmakṛta*)

The criminal motive plays a great part in determining the gravity of an offence in the Criminology of all the civi-

lised nations of the world. Similarly the *Dharmaśāstrakāras*, possessing as they did a highly judicial sense, were quite alive to the fact that the same punishment meted out to an offender acting with the full knowledge of his sin should not be given to an offender who, at the time of committing the offence, is not conscious of the act done by him. Of the *Nibandhakāras* of Bengal Śūlapāṇi deals with this question at considerable length.

Pāpa is called *Kāmakṛta* when the man committing it is aware of the sinfulness of his action. When the case is reverse it is called *Akāmakṛta* or '*Ajñānakṛta*.' For example, cow-killing is *Kāmakṛta* when the slaughterer does so with the intention of killing it and, therefore, knowing fully well that he is slaughtering a cow. It is *Akāmakṛta* when, for instance,

(1) a cow is killed being mistaken for any other animal, say, a *gavaya*.[12]

(2) a cow is killed by a shaft hurled towards another animal.

In the former case there is no knowledge of the cow as such and in the latter there is no intention of killing the cow though it is known to be a cow.

That certain concessions were always allowed to one who committed a sin unconsciously is proved by Śūlapāṇi on certain authoritative texts. A verse from Manu enjoins mere *Vedābhyāsa* (study of Vedas) as expiation of sin committed unconsciously whereas *Prāyaścitta* is enjoined in the case of sin perpetrated consciously. This, as Śūlapāṇi points out, implies lighter *Prāyaścitta* for a sin committed unconsciously than for one committed consciously. The following verse of Yājñavalkya, which seeks to distinguish clearly between the results of sin committed with

[12] The Gavaya—a species of ox erroneously classed by Hindu writers as a species of deer. (Skt.—Eng. *Dictionary* by M. William).

or without knowledge has evoked a good deal of interesting controversy among the latter writers. The text of Yājñavalkya in question is as follows :—

Prāyaścittair—apaity—eno Yad—ajñāna—kṛtaṃ bhavet ।
Kāma to vyavahāryas—tu vacanād—iha jāyate ॥

This as explained by Śūlapāṇi, means that *prāyaścitta* is competent to remove only sin that is committed unconsciously. But in case of sin committed consciously the sin is not washed off though the sinner becomes eligible for social intercourse (व्यवहार्य). An objection may be raised against this eligibility for social intercourse on the part of the sinner whose sin persists even after the performance of *prāyaścitta*. To this Śūlapāṇi replies that this eligibility has the sanction of this very injuction of Yājñavalkya (वचनात्). Śūlapāṇi, however, makes it clear that social intercourse in this case means only touch, sight, etc. The perpetrator of sin with knowledge is, however, excluded for the purposes of major social intercourse, viz., dinner, marriage, etc. In other words, he will have the same social status as persons having diseased nails (कुनखी) etc., which indicate the remnant of some grave sin on their part.

As an alternative interpretation of the above verse of Yājñavalkya, to which he himself seems to be more inclined, Śūlapāṇi suggests that by inserting an 'a' (अ) before *vyavahārya* we may take the above verse to enjoin that in case of sin committed with knowledge, the *pāpa* will be washed off all right but the prepetrator of the sin will remain *avyavahārya* i.e. unfit for any social intercourse. That this view was held by Śūlapāṇi himself is also proved by his refutation of Jikana's view to the contrary.[13]

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[13] See p. 9 infra.

Bhavadeva is not very clear when he remarks that the word *avyavahārya* in the above verse has no special significance beyond strongly condemning the conscious commission of a sin. His interpretation is based on the injunction, found at many places to the effect that a sinner is purified with his death.[14] This interpretation of Bhavadeva is open to objection for the simple reason that, as he himself points out, death is the penalty for *mahāpātaka* alone committed consciously. The question of those who consciously commit sins, for which death is not prescribed, remains unsolved according to Bhavadeva.

Jikana, who is quoted by Sūlapāṇi, holds that two effects are produced by *pāpa*:—

(1) Impurity attaches to the body of sinner (शरीरगतमप्रायत्यम्)

(2) Sin attaching to the soul (आत्मगतं पापम्)

The first effect of *pāpa* renders a man unfit for touch etc., by other people and for the performance of Vedic rites. Jikana maintains that in case of *pāpa* committed consciously the first effect only is removed by *prāyaścitta* while the second is removed only through suffering (भोगादेव) This view of Jikana is refuted by Śūlapāṇi on the authority of a verse, quoted from Manu, which lays down that the competence of *prāyaścitta* for expiating sin committed consciously has the sanction of *śruti*.[15]

Tantratā.

In connexion with *prāyaścitta* an interesting question arises as to whether or not a person committing a particu-

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14 नानावचनेषु "मृतः शुद्धिमवाप्नुयादित्यनेन" पापक्षयरूपशुद्धिप्रतिपादनात् —p. 10.

15 The Vedic tradition, as given by Śūlapāṇi, is briefly this:—Prajāpati enjoined the 'prāyaścitta known as 'upahavya' upon Indra as means of expiating his sin arising from his intentionally throwing certain ascetics to be devoured by gods. This implies that ज्ञानकृतपाप is capable of being removed by 'prāyaścitta'.

lar kind of sin or more occasions than one is required to perform *prāyaścitta* for each occasion separately. As this process involves a needless repetition of the same act bearing the same fruit the writers on *Dharmaśāstra* enunciate principle of *tantratā* which, stated plainly, means that for expiating the sin arising from the repeated commission of the same kind of sin the single performance of the expiatory rite prescribed for removing the sin is enough.[16] For instance, a man incurs the sin of *Brahma-vadha* by killing two or three *Brāhmaṇas*. For washing off his sin he is required to perform the *prāyaścitta* prescribed for washing off sin of *Brahma-vadha* only once and need not repeat it as many times as he committed the sin.

The principle of *tantratā* applies only to those Śāstric rites which produce some kind of *adṛṣṭārtha* or unseen result and which are of the same kind '*ekajātīya*'. That both these conditions are necessary for the application of *tantratā* can be illustrated by *dāna* and *Śrāddha*. The principle of *tantratā* will not apply to these cases because though they are *adṛṣṭārthaka* yet they are not of the same kind. To revert to our example of *brahma-vadha* the *prāyaścitta* for each separate *brahma-vadha* is both *adṛṣṭārthaka* and *ekajātīya* so that the principle of *tantratā* holds good in this case.

Prasaṅga

Another interesting question that arises in connexion with *prāyaścitta* is this. A man commits a grave sin (गुरुपाप) as well as a lighter one (लघु). Is it necessary for him to perform *prāyaścitta* separately for expiating the resulting sins? Here, in order to avoid repetition, as in the case of *tantratā* the writers on *Dharmaśāstra*, followed by the *nibandhakāras* of Bengal, resort to the principle of

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16 अनेकमुद्दिश्य सकृत्प्रवृत्तिस्तन्त्रता—P.T., p. 9.

prasaṅga. The incidental performance of one act as a result of the performance of another is known as *prasaṅga*.[17] This may be illustrated as follows:—

A man beats a *Brāhmaṇa* with a stick and threatens another *Brāhmaṇa* by raising a stick towards him. In this case the *prāyaścitta* for expiating the graver sin incurred by the former act will also serve to atone for the comparatively lighter sin incurred by the latter. Again if a man commits *Brahmavadha* as well as *Kṣatriyavadha* he is required to perform only the *prāyaścitta* prescribed for the former in order to get rid of the sin of both. The logic is simple. The *prāyaścitta* for the former consists in a 12-year vow (द्वादशवार्षिकव्रत) whereas that for the latter consists in a three-year vow (त्रैवार्षिकव्रत). Now the observance of a twelve-year vow necessarily involves the observance of a three-year vow as well.

The motive behind the adoption of these principles of *tantratā* and *prasaṅga* appears to be obviously to secure brevity and ease (लाघव) for the sinner.

Concessions in ' Prāyaścitta '

In connexion with the treatment of *prāyaścitta* for cow-killing Raghunandana deals with the factors on which the concession should depend. A text, quoted from Hārīta lays down that *Prāyaścitta* should be ordained in consideration of the age of the sinner, the time, (e.g. summer etc.) of committing the sin and the capacity of the sinner. From other texts, quoted, by Raghunandana, it appears that the sex and caste of the sinner were also regarded as factors calling for concessions. For instance, the *prāyaścitta* for cow-killing should be half in case of *Śūdras*. Similarly women and children also enjoy certain concessions. Now an interesting case arises where the sinner

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[17] अन्योद्देशेन प्रवृत्तावन्यस्यापि सिद्धिः प्रसंगः—P.T., p. 27.

is at the same time a child and a female. In such cases *prāyaścitta* will be half for the child and half of half or one-fourth for the female so that the sinner has to perform a quarter of the *prāyaścitta* prescribed for the purpose. It has, however, been made clear that if the above person who is both a child and a female is also a *Śūdra* by caste the *prāyaścitta* cannot be further reduced the irreducible minimum being the quarter of a *prāyaścitta*.

Classification of ' Pāpa '

As has already been pointed out, the life of a Hindu has been, ever since the formulation of the *Dharmaśāstra* close upon the Vedic literature, regarded as an endless round of duties to be performed in rigid adherence to the rules enjoined by the *Dharmaśāstra*. Naturally, therefore, the chances of lapse were numerous. Consequently the rules of expiation were also too many to be memorised. This necessitated the codification of the rules into a limited compass and the result is embodied in the digests on *prāyaścitta*. From a bewildering mass of such rules, dealt with in the digests, which are professedly mere compendiums, one wonders if any material abridgment of the original *śāstra* has been really effected

In the Bengal school of *smṛti pāpa* has been broadly divided into the following classes:—

1. *Atipātaka*.
2. *Mahāpātaka*.
3. *Anupātaka*.
4. *Upapātaka*.

The kinds of sins included under the above-mentioned classes may be conveniently classified as follows:—

1. Those arising out of prohibited food and drink.
2. Those arising from sexual intercourse with prohibited persons.

3. Those arising from killing.
4 Those arising from theft.
5. Those arising from association with the sinners.

Prohibited foods and drinks.

Many things are prohibited to be used as food by people of different castes. The degree of sin for taking prohibited food varies in the case of different castes while articles prohibited for certain people are not so for otheis. In this connexion it is interesting to note that an authority, quoted by Śūlapāṇi, divides prohibited foods into the following classes[18] :—

1. जातिदुष्ट—naturally injurious, e.g., लशुन (garlic), पलाण्डु (onion), etc.
2. क्रियादुष्ट—defiled by some action (क्रिया), e.g., touch etc., of apostates.
3. कालदूषित –stale.
4. आश्रयदूषित[19]— spoilt by being kept in a condemned receptacle.
5. संसर्गदुष्ट —Rendered harmful (दुष्ट) by contact with prohibited articles of food, e.g. सुरा, लशुन, पेयुष[20] etc.
6. शकृल्लेख —like encrement (शकृत्तुल्या) i.e., articles towards which a feeling of aversion rises in the mind.

Among the prohibited drinks *Surā* is the most important. According to popular notion *Surā* means any kind of wine. But the *nibandhakāras* of Bengal quote a number of authoritative texts to show that the sense of *Surā*

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[18] See PV—p. 248.

[19] What precisely is meant by this is not clear. It seems to mean things spoilt owing to their being kept in bad receptacles (आशय).

[20] Milk of a cow before the lapse of ten days from the birth of its calf.

in the *Smṛti* literature is much more restricted than its popular denotation. In *Smṛti Surā* is the name given to the following three kinds of wine only :—

(1) *Paiṣṭī*—liquour distilled from rice.
(2) *Gauḍī*—liquour distilled from molasses.
(3) *Mādhvī*—liquour from honey.

Texts have been quoted to show that *Surā* was not regarded as identical with madya.[21]

From a number of certain authorities again it has been concluded that the word *Surā* has two senses;[22] viz.

(1) Primary (मुख्य)—in this sense it means the liquour of the first kind noted above.
(2) Secondary (गौण)—in this sense it means the other kinds of liquour due to their intoxicating effect.

The drinking of *Surā* in its primary sense is a *mahāpātaka* for the *Brāhmaṇas*, *Kṣatriyas* and *Vaiśyas*. Manu's text[23] equally prohibiting all the three kinds of *Surā* for the twice-born has been construed to mean that while *paiṣṭī surā* is condemned for the twice-born caste in general the *Brāhmaṇas* are debarred from drinking the other two kinds of *Surā* as well the drinking of which does not constitute any sin for *Kṣatriyas* and *Vaiśyas*.

The prohibition intended for the members of the twice-born castes applies eually to the females of those castes also.[24]

Both Bhavadeya and Śūlapāṇi reject the opinion of Bālaka who is inclined to consider contact of *Surā* with

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1 मद्यसुराशब्दयोर्भिन्नार्थप्रतिपादकानेकवचनविरोधात्—PP. p. 40.

:2 तेन पैष्टीशब्दाभिधेयव्रीह्यन्नविकार एव मद्यविशेषो मुख्यसुराशब्दार्थं इति निर्णीयते। मद्यान्तरेषु मदकारित्वगुणयोगाद् गौणोऽयं सुराशब्दः—PP-p. 41.

32 गौडी पैष्टी च माध्वी च विज्ञेया त्रिविधाः सुराः।
यथैवैका तथा सर्वा न पातव्या द्विजोत्तमैः ॥ XI. 94 (NSP. Ed.).

24 स्त्रीणामपि ब्राह्मणीक्षत्रियावैश्यानां सुरापानं महापातकमेव—PP. p. 42.

one's lips (ओष्ठसंयोग) as equivalent to *Surāpāna*. Śūlapāṇi means to say that the word *pāpa* has a technical sense, viz., swallowing below the throat (कण्ठ-देशादधोनयनम्).

Prāyaścitta for *Surāpāna*.

Broadly speaking the following acts cause *pāpa* of varying degrees under *Surāpāna*.

1. Drinking with knowledge.
2. Drinking without knowledge.
3. Drinking per force applied by some other person.
4. Drinking once.
5. Drinking repeatedly.
6. Drinking *Surā* diluted with *takra* (Bengali 'ghol') in such a way that the smell of *Surā* is imperceptible.

The *prāyaścitta* for *Surāpāna*, the rigidity of which varies with the varying degrees of sin, may be :—

(i) Death.
(ii) Observance of the twelve-year vow.
(iii) Observance of the three-year vow.
(iv) Observance of one-year vow.
(v) Re-initiation to Vedic Studies (पुनरुपनयनं).

In a résumé of the elaborate rules of *prāyaścitta* Śūlapāṇi indicates the following broad rules :—

1. For consciously drinking of *Surā* by *Brāhmaṇas*, *Kṣatriyas* and *Vaiśyas* the expiation is death, or, as a substitute therefor, the observance of the twenty-four year vow.

2. For unconsciously drinking of *Surā* by a *Brāhmaṇa* expiation consists in the twelve-year vow; failing that gift of 180 milch cows, failing 500 *cūrṇis* along with 40 *Purāṇas*.[25]

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[25] Cūrṇi=100 Kapardas; Purāṇas=16 paṇas of cowries [See M. Williams: Skt.—Eng. *Dictionary*].

Some of the important rules bearing on *prāyaścitta* for *Surāpāna* are as follows:—

The performance of the twelve-year vow (द्वादशवार्षिकव्रत) is regarded as equivalent to half of death.

As the putting of *Surā* into the mouth is not equivalent to its *pāna* the *prāyaścitta* for the former is half of that for the latter.

In the case of the drinking of *Surā* of the *paiṣṭi* class the full prāyaścitta is to be performed by a *Brāhmaṇa* while it will be reduced by a quarter (पाद) in the case of each of the other two castes. That is to say, the *prāyaścitta* will be three-fourths for *Kṣatriya*, half for the *Vaiśya* and a quarter only for the *Śūdra*.[26]

Death and *punarupanayana* as forms of *prāyaścitta* cannot possibly be reduced so that these must be undergone by the members of all castes incurring the particular kind of six for the expiation of which such *prāyaścitta* is enjoined. The observance of the twelve-year vow is the substitute for death in the case of uninitiated *Brāhmaṇas* and unmarried girls of the *Brāhmaṇa* caste.

The vicarious performance of certain religious acts—a peculiar feature of Indian ritualism—applies to the case of the rules of *prāyaścitta* also. The brother and such other relations should perform *prāyaścitta* on behalf of a boy who has not been initiated to Vedic studies (अनुपनीत). This rule is provided on the assumption that such boys are themselves incapable of doing *prāyaścitta*.

An authority quoted by Bhavadeva, clearly sets the age-limit between five and eleven (both exclusive) for the vicarious performance of *prāyaścitta* and exempts a boy

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[26] It is difficult to reconcile this text with the other text according to which a Śūdra does not incur any sin by drinking surā. Bhavadeva seems inclined to consider the portion of the text relating to Śūdras as without any significance. शूद्रस्य तु सुरापाने निषेधाभावात् इदं वचनमनवकाशमिति—PP. p. 46.

below five years of age from all sin. But Bhavadeva, by comparing the above text with certain other texts, opines that this exemption applies to cases excepting *Surapana* for which the *prayascitta* should be reduced by half in the case of boys below five years of age. because the prohibition of *Surapana* relates to the caste (जात्याश्रय). Sulapaṇi, following Jikana, differs from Bhavadeva in construing the text, referred to above, exempting a boy within five years of age from sin, to apply to *Kṣatriyas* and *Vaiśyas* only.

Persons with whom sexual intercourse is prohibited

Under this category sexual intercourse with *gurvaṅgana* has been most vehemently condemned as it constitutes a *mahaputaka*. The meaning of the term *gurvaṅgana* has been the subject of a good deal of controversy among the Smṛti writers. After referring to various shades of opinion on this point the Bengal school has taken the word to mean " mother." This compound word admits of dissolution in two ways:—

(i) *Karmadhāraya*—गुर्वी चासौ अङ्गना चेति

(ii) *Saṣṭhı-Tatpuruṣa*—गुरोरङ्गना

As has been mentioned above the *nibandhakaras* of Bengal have, by comparing various authoritative texts, accepted the former alternative which literally means a " woman who is a guru." In the Smṛti literature the term गुरु is very often applied both to " father " and "mother". Thus the word gurvaṅganā in the former sense, means " mother." [27] Difficulty, however, arises in the case of those texts which use the term *gurupatnı* instead of gurvaṅgana. Patnı etymologically means a woman married to a man and conveys no sense without any reference to a man[28] and one's own *patnı* cannot possibly

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[27] शरीरोत्पादकत्वेनोपाधिना मातापित्रोर्गुरुशब्दाभिधेयत्वात्।—PV—p. 132.

[28] पत्युर्नो यज्ञसंयोगे—Pāṇ. IV. 1.33.

be one's *guru.*[29] *Gurupatnī*, therefore, cannot be dissolved as a *Karmadhāraya*. Nevertheless this word has also been taken in the sense of " mother." Here a knotty question arises as to whether or not the *Sapatnī* or co-wife of mother should also be regarded as a *gurvaṅganā*. After refuting certain earlier authorities who seem inclined to include the mother's co-wife in the category of *gurvaṅganā* both Bhavadeva and Śūlapāṇi express their opinion unequivocally that sexual intercourse with one's own mother only[30] and not with her co-wife also is a *mahapataka*. The word *gurutalpa* found in certain texts in connection with the sin accruing from *gurvaṅganāgamana* has been interpreted as " one to whom the mother is a wife," [31] that is to say "one who commits adultery with one's mother." The sense in which *gurvaṅganā* has been understood by the *nibandhakāras* of Bengal has been made abundantly clear by Śūlapaṇi in his following remark :—

> nissandigdhārthaṁ mātṛ-padameva prayoktumucitaṁ munīnāṁ, na tu guru-patny-ādipadaṁ sandigdhārthaṁ.[32]

This means that the word mātṛ having a definite meaning should be used instead of words like *gurupatnī*, etc. which are of doubtful import.

By the principle of *atideśa* (extended application) sexual intercourse also with mother's co-wife, sister, daughter of one's preceptor (आचार्य), wife of one's preceptor, one's own daughter comes within the purview of gurvaṅganāgamana.[33]

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[29] गुरुश्चासौ पत्नी चेति यदपेक्षया पत्नीत्व तदपेक्षया गुरुत्वायोगात् न कर्मधारय —PV, p. 132.

[30] स्वमातृगमनमेव महापातकमिति प्रसिद्धम्—PP. p. 8.

[31] गुरुस्तल्पं कलत्रं यस्येति मातुरेव ग्रहः —PV. p. 132.

[32] PV—p. 133.

मातुः सपत्नीं भगिनीमाचार्यतनयां तथा।
आचार्याणीं स्वां च सुतां गच्छंस्तु गुरुतल्पगः ॥

[33] Yaj. III. 232o—233a quoted in PV, p. 130

Among other persons with whom sexual intercourse is prohibited, but sexual intercourse with whom constitutes a lesser sin than mahāpātaka, the chief are the following:—

Wife of an unrelated person, woman of a lower caste, wife of washermen, etc., a woman in her monthly course and pregnancy, woman in general in the case a celibate (ब्रह्मचारी).

It is interesting to note that intercourse with lower animals, such as cow, etc., is also forbidden on pain of *prāyaścitta*.

The severity of the rules of *prayascitta* for these sins, as in the case of the sins of other categories, varies with the varying degree of the sin committed. The broad rule is that death is the *prāyaścitta* for *gurvaṅganagamana* when committed absolutely of one's own accord (ज्ञानतः) and the 12-year vow is enjoined for the person committing it without knowledge (अज्ञानतः) of the exact sin committed by him.

Culpable Murder.

The greatest sin under this category arises from the murder of a Brāhmaṇa (ब्रह्महत्या).

Murder has been defined as an action leading to one being deprived of one's life.[34] Murder may be of two kinds, viz., direct and indirect. Murder is direct when one perpetrates the murder directly, i.e., without the instigation or help of anybody else. Those who are indirectly responsible for murder or aid and abet the action of murder are as follows:—

(1) *Anumantā*—(lit. one who permits).

Śūlapāṇi distinguishes between two kinds of *Anumantā*, viz.

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[34] प्राणवियोगफलकव्यापारो हननमिति—PP. p. 1.

(1) One who instigates a person to commit murder by saying that he (the former) will obstruct the man due to whose interference the murder is not possible.[35]

(2) One who does not prevent a man determined to commit murder.[36]

(2) *Anugrāhaka*—(lit. one who helps).

This is of two kinds:—

(a) One who causes distraction of mind of the person murdered so that he cannot make good his escape (वध्यगतवमनस्यापादनन ,

(b) One who obstructs a man intending to come to the rescue of the person murdered (तदीयानुग्राहकान्तरव्युदासेन)

The second class of anugrāhaka is somewhat different according to Śūlapāṇi who takes it in the sense of " one who causes slight injury." [37]

(3) *Nimittī*—(lit. one who is the cause).

This is the designation given to a man who causes such anger in the mind of another as impels the latter to commit suicide.[38]

(4) *Prayojaka*—(lit. instigator).

This is of two kinds :—

(a) Instigating an unwilling person to commit murder (अप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तक).

(b) Encouraging one who is already prepared to commit murder (प्रवृत्तोत्साहजनक).

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[35] यद्विरोधाद्धननं न सम्भवति तस्य विरोधिनो मया निरोधः कर्त्तव्य इति प्रयुक्तिरनुमतिः—PV.—pp. 48-49.

[36] एतं हन्मीति वचनशक्तस्याप्रतिषेध एव—PV. p. 49.

[37] This injury is perhaps taken to be inflicted in the process of murder. Otherwise the mere infliction of injury cannot be considered to cause such a grave offence:—

निमित्ती च यत्कृतमन्यूत्पादनेन प्राणत्यागः सोऽभिधीयते—PP.—p. 1.

It may be contended that the first class of *prayojaka* is a direct murderer inasmuch as in such a case the person instigated acts merely as a weapon, or, a tool in the hands of the instigator. This argument is refuted thus :—

The weapon by which a murder is committed has no effort to make, it being an inanimate object, but in the case of a *prayojya* (the person instigated) he has to make some effort for the murder which cannot possibly take place merely as a result of instigation.. In other words, the conscious effort of the perpetrator of the murder intervenes between the act of instigation and the act of murder so that the person instigated comparable to a weapon and the person charged with direct murder.

As regards indirect causes of murder it has been clearly stated that such indirect causes only as are contemplated in the authoritative texts are to be considered,[39] otherwise certain anomalies will arise. For example, if all indirect causes are to be considered responsible for murder then the maker of an arrow with which a man is murdered will also have to be regarded as indirectly responsible for the murder. From this it follows that one does not become responsible for murder when a person accidentally dies as a result of some action done by the former simply with the intention of doing some good to the latter.[40] Similarly one does not incur the sin of suicide when one dies from obstruction of the throat caused by food while one is taking food obviously for doing good to oneself. The net result of the foregoing argument comes to this. No responsibility for murder can be attributed to one who has no malafide intention even though a person may die as a result of some action on the part of the former.

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[39] येषां वाचनिकं हन्तत्वं प्रतीयते तेषामेव निषेधविषयत्वम् —PP. p. 2

[40] यत्रोपकारकरणे दैवाद्वधो निष्पाद्यते तत्र वचनवलान्न वधभागित्वम् —PP. p. 3.

Although *Brahmahatya* in general has been condemned as constituting a *mahapataka* yet exception is made in the case of murder of a Brāhmaṇa who is an *atatāyin* in the technical sense of the term. From a comparison of the various texts quoted by the different *nibandhakaras* the following may be classed as *ātatāyins*:—

1. *Agnidaḥ*—One who sets fire (to one's house ?)
2. *Garadaḥ*—One who poisons another.
3. *Śastrapāṇi*—One having (a deadly weapon in hand).
4. *Dhanāpaha*[41]—Stealer of money.
5. *Kṣetrāpahārin*—Stealer of land (one who encroaches upon another man's land ?).
6. *Dārāpahārin*—Abductor of one's wife.
7. *Patnyabhigāmin*—One having illicit connection with another's wife.
8. *Abhicāraṁ Kurvāṇaḥ*—(or atharva-hantā)—one trying to kill another by magic spells.
9. *Rājagāmi-paiśunam*—False attribution of a defamatory statement concerning the king, which, if brought to the notice of the king, is sure to lead to the death of the person to whom it is attributed.[42]
10. *Tejoghna*—One who causes destruction of the Brāhmanical power by the administration of liquor (?).[43]

The right of self-defence is evidently the basis of the exemption granted in respect of the murder of *ātatāyin*.

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[41] Here dhana has been said to imply such an amount which, if stolen, would leave nothing for the owner to fall back upon. for subsistence:—

धनस्य तु बहुतरस्यैवापहर्ता यदपहरणे वर्त्तनोच्छेद एव भवति स एवाततायीति द्रष्टव्यः—PV., p. 5.

[42] यदभिधाने सत्यवश्यमेव प्राणात्ययो भविष्यतीति तदभिप्रेतम्—PP. p. 5.

[43] मद्यपानदानेन ब्राह्मतेजोविनाशोऽभिप्रेतः—PP. p. 5.

This being so the murder of an *atatāyin* cannot be justified in cases where a person can save himself from the clutches of the *ātatāyin* by escape etc.[44]

Bhavadeva adds one interesting point in this connection. One actually engaged in the acts the performance of which makes a man *ātatāyin* should be so designated. Therefore, one who indulged in such acts on some previous occasion, or is likely to indulge in future is excluded from the category of *ātatāyin*.[45]

In connection with *ātatāyi-vadha* it has been provided that the performance of the above acts will not make a man *ātatāyin* if he does so from a spirit of retribution of some harm done to himself.[46]

Here a puzzling question arises as to whether an *ātatāyin* of the Brāhmaṇa caste can be killed, with impunity. The text of Sumantu, quoted by Bhavadeva and Śūlapāṇi in this connection, runs as follows:—ātatāyi-vadhe na doṣo'nyatra go-brāhmaṇāḥ.

This text has been the subject of a good deal of controversy. Bhavadeva splits up the text as follows:—ātatāyi-vadhe na, and doṣo'nyatra, etc.

He construes it to mean that the provision of *prāyaścitta* does not apply to the case of ātatāyivadha even when the *ātatāyin* is a Brāhmaṇa, and that the sin of murder of persons other than *ātatāyins*. Śūlapāṇi, however, comparing this text with certain other texts the most noteworthy of which is that of the *Bhagavadgītā*[47] speaking of *pāpa* arising from the killing of *ātatāyins*, arrives at a

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[44] सर्वत एवात्मानं गोपायीतेति श्रुतिमूलमिदम्, अतः पलायनादिनापि आत्म-रक्षणाभावे इदं बोद्धव्यम्—PV—p. 59.

[45] प्रवृत्तक्रिय एवाततायी नत्वतीतक्रियो भविष्यत्क्रियो वा—PP. p. 5.

[46] पूर्वकृतापकारस्य मारणोद्यतस्य नाततायिता—PV, p. 60.

[47] पापमेवाश्रयेदस्मान् हत्वैतानाततायिनः—*Bhagavad-gītā*, I., 35 quoted in PV., p. 61.

different conclusion. Śūlapāṇi concludes that no sin arises from the killing of an *ātatāyin* when he is inferior to the person killing him in point of austerity, learning, caste, etc. But sin will certainly accrue to the murderer of an *ātatāyin* when the latter is superior to the former in point of the qualities mentioned above.[48] Such texts as provide for the killing, with impunity, of *ātatāyins* of great personal distinction must, according to Śūlapāṇi, be construed to imply superiority of the person killing the *ātatāyin*.[49] As an alternative interpretation of the above text of Sumantu Śūlapāṇi suggests that it may be supposed to refer to such *ātatāyins* of the Brāhmaṇa caste as are notivated by a spirit of retribution for some wrong done to themselves previously. In other words, no sin will accrue as a result of killing a *Brāhmaṇa ātatāyin* unless he acts as an *ātatāyin* from a spirit of revenge.

Prāyaścitta for Brahma-vadha.

The following are some of the interesting points regarding the expiatory rules which we do not propose to deal with in all the minor details.

It has been made clear that when *prāyaścitta* for a particular kind of brahma-vadha, not specifically provided for, it will have to be determined after a consideration of the following factors relating to the culprit:—

1. Caste. 2. Capacity. 3. Qualities. 4. Murder—whether intentional or otherwise.

The general rule is that death will be the expiation in the case of members of all castes for the intentional mur-

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[48] तेन हन्त्रपेक्षया तपोविद्याजातिकुलैरुत्कृष्टो नाततायी वध्यस्तदन्यो वध्य एव —PV., p. 61.

[49] यद्यपि गुरुं बहुश्रुतं हन्यादिति श्रूयते तथापि गुरोः सकाशात् कुलविद्यातपोभिः शिष्यस्याप्युत्कर्षसम्भवात्—PV., p. 61.

der of a *Brāhmaṇa*[50] and the twelve-year vow when the murder is not intentional.[51]

In connection with *Brahma-vadha* an interesting question is raised by some, e.g. Śrīkara. According to them no *prayaścitta* is enough for expiating the sin of *Brahma-vadha*, committed with both 'knowledge' and 'intention.' The line of their argument is something like this:—

When a *Brāhmaṇa* is killed either by accident or through mistake by a man intending to kill a Śūdra the culprit incurs the sin of *Brahma-vadha* done with *Kāmanā* [52] but not with knowledge. Again when one is forced by others, against one's will, to kill a *Brāhmaṇa* who is known as such incurs the sin of *Brahma-vadha* done with knowledge but not with Kāmanā. This is emphatically refuted by Bhavadeva the gist of whose arguments is that in such cases *Kāmanā* is the sufficient criterion and the mention of *jñāna* is meaningless. This is because mere 'knowledge' does not induce one to commit murder. Every act of murder must be preceded by 'intention.' In the example cited above the *Kāmanā* is *Śūdra-Viṣayā* (relating to a Śūdra) and not *Brāhmaṇa-Viṣayā* (relating to a Brāhmaṇa) and as such the sin of *Brahma-vadha* does not arise at all. The assertion of the absence of *prāyaścitta* in a case where 'knowledge' and 'intention' exist simultaneously is therefore, tantamount to the declaration of the absence of *prāyaścitta* in the case of intentional murder of a *Brāhmaṇa*—this is absurd according to Bhavadeva who is definitely of opinion that by death is expiated

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51 कामतः साक्षाद्ब्रह्मवधे विशेषाश्रवणात् सर्वेषामेव वर्णानां मरणान्तिकम् PP., p. 8;

अकामतो द्वादशवार्षिकं कर्त्तव्यम् —PV., p. 88.

52 *Kāmana* is no doubt present here, but this *Kāmanā* is not for *Brahma-vadha*, but for *Śūdra-vadha*, so strictly speaking, the person should not be accused of intentional *Brahma-vadha*.

the sin of intentional murder of a *Brāhmaṇa*. What Bhavadeva means to say is that in the above cases of *Brahma vadha* by mistake or under compulsion the sin incurred will be for *ajñāna-kṛta-brahma-vadha*. In the former case the want of knowledge is obvious and in the latter as there is no intention on the part of the murder his knowledge of the *Brāhmaṇa* as such is equivalent to non-knowledge.[53]

As has been already stated the text of Yājnavalkya, viz. 'Kāmato-avyavahārya', etc. which apparently implies that the sin committed intentionally is not expiated even after the performance of *prāyaścitta* has been interpreted by Bhavadeva as merely condemning the intentional commission of sin. That a sin committed intentionally can be washed off by the prescribed form of death is borne out by many a text, e.g. mṛtaḥ Śuddhim-avāpnuyāḥ. As an alternative interpretation of the above text of Yājñavalkya Śūlapāṇi suggests that this may mean want of *prāyaścitta* in the case of a *Kṣatriya* etc. murdering a qualified *Brāhmaṇa*.[54] Śūlapāṇi, however, holds that this text of Yājñavalkya, as a matter of fact, does not imply want of expiation but merely means that even after death, the substitute whereof is the twenty-four year vow, a *Kṣatriya* etc. murdering a qualified *Brāhmaṇa* does not acquire eligibility for social intercourse.[55]

As pointed out above murderers can be divided into seven classes. The general rule of the twelve-year vow for unintentional Brahma-vadha will have to be reduced as

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[53] यत्तु श्रीकरेण कामतो असत्कल्पैव—PP.—p. 9.
एतेन यत.......न व्यभिचारः—PP. p. 10.

[54] क्षत्रियादिकृतसगुणब्राह्मणवधविषयं वा—PV—p. 67.
क्षत्रियादीनां.......सगुणब्राह्मणवधे निष्कृत्यभावः—Ibid. p. 68.

[55] वस्तुतस्तु निष्कृत्यभाववचनं मरणविकल्पितचतुर्विंशतिवार्षिकप्रायश्चित्तेऽपि कृते व्यवहार्यताभावपरं, न तु प्रायश्चित्ताभावपरम्—Ibid.

follows in the cases of the following classes[56] of murderers who have been arranged in order of the gravity of their respective sin :—

		years
1. *Apravṛtta-pravartaka*	Vow for	10½
2. *Vaimanasyā-pādaka* (*anugrāhak*)	,, ,,	9
3. *Pravṛtto-tsāha-janaka* (prayojaka)	,, ,,	7½
4. *Vadhyasyā-nūgrāha-kā-ntara-Vyudāsaka* (*anugrāhaka*)	,, ,,	6
5. *Anumantā*	,, ,,	4½
6. *Nimittī*	,, ,,	3

It is obvious that in prescribing *prāyaścitta* in the above cases the twelve-year vow has been taken as the basis and as many one-eighths of twelve years have been reduced as the respective position of the sinners in the above list. The principle stands thus :—

$$1/8 \text{ of } 12 = 3/2$$

(1) $12 - 3/2 = 10\frac{1}{2}$

(2) $12 - (2 \times 3/2) = 9$

(3) $12 - (3 \times 3/2) = 7\frac{1}{2}$ and so on.

Bhavadeva adds that the basis vow for twelve years being prescribed in case of unintentional murder the above *prāyaścittas* also which are based on the twelve-year vow must be taken to apply to those cases, where the sin is committed unintentionally and the *prāyaścitta* will be doubled when the sin is intentionally committed. Bhavadeva's attitude is not very clear with regard to the anomally that arises here. According to him for the first class of offender, mentioned above, the *prāyaścitta* is 10½ years, provided the sin is committed intentionally. If it has to be doubled in case of *jñāna-kṛta-vadha* then the

[56] For a detailed explanation of the terms see p. 17 Supra.

figure will be 21 which will exceed the basic twelve-year vow—a position which is absurd. It must be noted that the above principle of awarding *prayaścitta*, enunciated by Bhavadeva, has been totally rejected by his successor Śūlapāṇi on the ground that it lacks sufficient authority.[57] According to Śūlapāṇi the *prayaścitta* should be as follows :—

(1) *Sākṣād-vadha-kartā*—Twelve-year vow.

(2) *Anugrāhaka* (*Svalpa-prahartā*)—Nine years.

(3) *Prayojakta* (*apravṛtta-pravartaka*)—Nine years.

(4) *Anugrāhaka* (*Vadhya-pratirodhaka*)—Six years.

(5) *Prayojaka* (*Pravṛtta-prayojaka*)— Do

(6) *Anumantā*—Three years.

(7) *Nimittī*—Three years.

This principle of reducing the *prayaścitta* by one quarter (*pada*) has been based by Sulapaṇi on the general rule of *prayaścitta* laid down by ancient authorities in connection with the killing of a cow.[59]

The twelve-year vow instead of the usual death will be the *prayaścitta* even for intentionally murdering a *Brahmaṇa* who is fallen by caste. The text which runs as

Vipre tu sakalaṁ deyaṁ padonaṁ Kṣatriye matam।
Vaiśye'rdhaṁ padaśeṣaṁ tu Śudra-jātiṣu Sasyate||

has been construed by Bhavadeva and Sūlapāṇi to relate to matters other than *Brahma-vadha* or, as Śūlapāṇi suggests, to prohibited food.

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57 अष्टमाष्टमभागहानिरिति भवदेवव्याख्यानं प्रमाणशून्यम्—PV—p. 73.

58 द्वादशरात्रमब्भक्षो द्वादशरात्रमुपवसेत्—*Apastamba* quoted in PP., p. 14 and तद्वधार्थं मानसमात्रप्रवृत्ताविति द्रष्टव्य्—PP., p. 15.

59 पादमेकं चरेद्रोधे द्वौ पादौ बन्धने चरेत्।
योजने पादहीनं स्याच्चरेत् सर्वं निपातने ॥—*Samvarta* quoted in PV., p. 73.

It is interesting to note that the *nibandhakāras* of Bengal, like modern jurists, distinguish attempt to murder from actual murder and prescribe *prayaścitta* accordingly. The very intention of murder has been regarded as culpable.[60]

In connection with *prāyaścitta* for murder *prāyaścitta* for assault, and hurt—simple or grievous—to use the terms of the Indian Penal Code—has also been considered—a fact which bears testimony to the keen judicial sense of the writers who were not merely engaged, like the priests of to-day, with the minute details of the practice of *prāyaścitta* but were concerned with the theory or principle underlying it.

Prāyaścitta is also ordained for suicide and attempt threat.

The *prayaścitta* for *Brahma-vadha* varies with the varying castes of the sinner, the *prāyaścitta* for higher castes being heavier than that for the lower castes.

In the cases of many a *Brahma-vadha* of similar nature the specific *prāyaścitta* need not be performed repeatedly, i.e. once for each *Brahma-vadha* separately, but it should be performed only once according to the principle of *tantratā*.[61] The single performance of the appropriate *prāyaścitta* is sufficient for the expiation of the sum-total of sin incurred on various occasions. Bhavadeva approves also of the application of the principle of *prasaṅga* to *prāyaścitta*. This may be illustrated thus. A man commits *Brahma-vadha* on two occasions one involving greater sin than the other. The sinner here need not perform *prāyaścitta* separately. But by the principle of *prasaṅga* the *prāyaścitta* for the greater sin will remove

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60 See PP., p. 45.

61 तुल्यरूपाणां ब्रह्मवधानां तन्त्रेण सकृत्प्रायश्चित्तानुष्ठानादेव सकलपापक्षयसिद्धः पुनरनुष्ठानवैयर्थ्यात् —PP.—p. 17.

the lesser sin also. For instance, the observance of the twelve-year vow will absolve a man also of the sin incurred by committing that kind of *Vadha* the sin on account of which is expiated by the observance of the nine-year vow.

Of the other kinds of killing viz. killing of women, of *Kṣatriyas*, etc., of lower animals and of cows, dealt with under 'killing,' the *prāyaścitta* for cow-killing deserves our attention most because, now-a-days, a person guilty of homicide is sufficiently punished by a Court of law. But usually a Hindu even to-day regards cow-killing as a great sin and the Hindu Society insists on his performing the appropriate *prāyaścitta*.

Prāyaścitta for Cow-killing :

The following are some of the noteworthy points in connection with the *prāyaścitta* for *govadha*. The killing of a cow, belonging to a *Brāhmaṇa*, causes greater sin than that of the one belonging to a person of the lower castes. In other words, the ownership of the cow killed determines the nature of the *prāyaścitta* for killing it.

The cow has been held in high esteem by the Hindus from time immemorial. Hence people are warned through the *prāyaścitta* rules against any negligence or maltreatment of the cow. The follwing are the most important factors relating to the cow that determine the nature of *prāyaścitta* for *govadha* :—

(1) Pregnancy.
(2) Extreme old age.
(3) Extreme emaciation.
(4) Disease.
(5) Blindness, madness.
(6) Obstruction to the free movement of the cow at the time of eating or grazing.
(7) Confining at improper times.

(8) Negligence in maintenance.

(9) Falling into wells, etc.

Sūlapaṇi elaborates the principles of *tantratā* and *prasaṅga* in their application to the rules of *prayascitta* by extensively quoting Mimāṁsā rules. His conclusions are, however, substantially the same as those of his predecessor. One interesting point, raised by Śūlapāṇi, is this. The principle of *tantratā* will not apply to the case where many *Brāhmaṇas* are killed simultaneously but only to those cases where several *Brāmaṇas* are killed successively.[62] Śūlapāṇi insists on the performance of the specific *prāyaścitta* for the former. As illustrations of the application of *tantratā* to the rules of *prayascitta* Sulapani cites the following instances :—

(1) The performance of a single *Aśvamedha* sacrifice by Yudhiṣṭhira for having successively killed many superiors, viz. Bhīṣma, Karṇa and Droṇa

(2) The single consecration by Rāma of the image of Śiva at Setubandha for expiating the sin incurred by successively (क्रमकृते) killing Rāvaṇa, Kumbhakarṇa, etc.

Theft:

It has been defined by Bhavadeva as the creation of one's right of using, at will, over a thing belonging to another having the right of using it, at will, without the latter's permission.[63]

Śūlapāṇi, while substantially agreeing with Bhavadeva regarding the meaning of 'theft,' adds one interesting point. He lays stress on the point that in a theft in

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62 क्रमशः कृते तु पापभेदात् समानप्रायश्चित्तत्वात् ..... तन्त्रतैव ।

63 परकीययथेष्टविनियोगार्हे द्रव्ये तदनुमतिव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य यथेष्टविनियोगार्हत्वप्रतिपादनं स्तेयम् —PP.—p. 72.

the strict sense of the term the thief must have a definite knowledge of the fact that the thing stolen by him belongs to another person.[64]

Bhavadeva explains the creation of the thief's right over the thing stolen on the analogy of the creation of the purchaser's right over the thing purchased. The only difference is that the thief destroys the right of the owner by surreptitiously removing the thing elsewhere while the purchaser does so by paying off the cost demanded by the owner. Bhavadeva, however, makes it clear that the owner does not incur the blame of theft by taking back the stolen thing from the possession of the thief.

Śulapāṇi rejects the views of those who define theft as the mere taking away of another person's property either secretly or openly. According to Sulapāṇi the mere removal of another's property to some other place cannot be called theft as it does not cover the case of a thing deposited with one (निक्षेप)by another. In support of his argument that the thief's knowledge of the thing stolen to be definitely belonging to another is essential in a theft Śūlapāṇi mentions two cases:—

(1) From amongst many rings belonging to many persons one man takes one not belonging to himself mistaking it to be his own and sells it.

(2) A brother enjoys an unpartitioned property belonging to all the brothers including himself—here he does not know his definite share and, may be, that he enjoys a portion of the property belonging to his brothers.

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64 परस्वत्वेन विशेषतो ज्ञायमाने द्रव्ये परानुमतिव्यतिरेकमन्तरेण ममेद यथेष्टविनियोज्यमिति कृत्वा व्यवहारः स्तेयम्—PV., p. 115.

In these cases the definite knowledge of the thing as belonging to others is lacking, hence no question of theft can arise. Similarly, if one finds a treasure-trove and uses it as his own he does not incur any blame because, according to Śūlapāṇi, this thing is not known by the discoverer to be belonging to another or its owner may not be traceable.[65] The last case, however, gives rise to some difficulty which Śūlapāṇi obviously overlooks. The discoverer certainly knows that the treasure-trove does not belong to himself. Again even if the owner is not traceable the fact of the thing belonging to another still remains. In the example of the brother enjoying the entire property there is some anomally. The brother enjoying the property may not know the definite shares of the brothers but he cannot possibly avoid the knowledge of the other brothers having right over it.

"Knowledge" as the essential element of theft has been further illustrated by Śūlapāṇi thus. A man steels a piece of cloth in which he subsequently discovers a lump of gold tied up. Here he should be charged with theft of cloth, and not of gold the existence of which was not within the knowledge of the thief at the time of committing the theft. Here also a legal nicety arises as to why should not the man be accused of theft of gold because his malafide intention is evident if he retains it because, as soon as he comes across it he has knowledge of its being the property of someone else. Similar is the case with the theft of gold mistaking it for an inferior metal, say, lead.

Theft has been included among the *mahāpātakas*. Though in the list of *mahāpātakas* theft in the general sense seems to have been mentioned, yet it must be taken in the sense of theft of gold only (सुवर्णस्तेयपरम्) in order to

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[65] Under modern law a treasure-trove becomes the property of the State.

be classed as *mahāpātaka*. Now the question is whether theft of gold belonging to anybody and everybody constitutes a mahāpātaka. On this point both Bhavadeva and Śūlapāṇi, citing earlier authorities, agree in holding that here the gold must be taken to belong to a *Brāhmaṇa*. Both of these writers, after refuting the opposite views, arrive at the conclusion that theft of a particular quantity of gold only and not of gold in general is a *mahāpātaka*.[66]

Under theft, theft of gold being regarded as a major sin the thefts of other kinds are left out of our consideration for the present.

Prāyaścitta for theft of gold

The broad rules of *prāyaścitta* for theft of gold are as follows:—

Death is the *prāyaścitta* for consciously stealing gold —this is applicable to all castes. For unconscious theft the *prāyaścitta* is the observance of the twelve-year vow. Śūlapāṇi adds that before performing the prescribed form of *prāyaścitta* the sinner is required to return the thing stolen or its value to the owner.[67]

Saṁsarga (association)

— Association with persons guilty of *Brahma-hatyā*, *Surāpāna*, *Steya* and *Gurvaṅganā-gamana* described above, has been regarded by ancient authorities as constituting a *mahāpātaka*. Association with any kind of sinner taints a man with sin. But association of a person with the perpetrator of a *mahāpātaka* renders the former *mahāpātakin*; therefore, we confine ourselves to this particular kind of association.

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[66] परिमितहेमापहारी महापातकं न जातिमात्रापहार इति—PV., p. 111.

[67] प्रायश्चित्तं चापहृतद्रव्यं स्वामिने दत्त्वा करणीयम्—PV., p. 117.

From the different authorities quoted in the nibandhas, the following kinds of association appear to give rise to sin:—

1. Using the same bed.
2. Using the same seat.
3. Being in the same row (पंक्ति).
4. Mixing of utensils (भाण्ड) and cooked food (पक्वान्न)
5. Sacrificing (याजन) for a sinner.
6. Teaching a sinner.
7. Eating together.
8. Inter-marriage or sexual intercourse.
9. Talk.
10. Touch.
11. Contact with breath.
12. Travelling together (यान).

Saṁsarga may be of two kinds according as it causes immediate *pātitya* or as it causes *pātitya* after a continuous association for a certain period. *Saṁsarga* of the former class includes:—

1. Sacrificing for a sinner
2. Sexual intercourse or marriage.
3. Initiation to Vedic studies (स्वाध्याय)
4. Inter-dining.

The kinds of association that cause *pātitya* when indulged in for a year are as follows:—

1. Eating in the same row with a *mahapātakin*. (भोजनमेकपंक्तिभोजनम्)
2. Sharing the same seat.
3. Using the same bed.
4. Travelling in the same conveyance

The rules of *prāyaścitta* for *Saṁsarga* are too many to be considered in detail. We, therefore, give only the very prominent ones. The general rule is that the person

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associating with a *mahāpātakin* will be liable to the same *vrata* as is enjoined for that particular class of *mahāpātakin*. The word *vrata* has been construed by Bhavadeva to mean the twelve-year vow (द्वादशवार्षिकव्रत) Hence it is to be understood that though the *prāyaścitta* for the conscious commission of a *mahāpātaka* is death yet the *prāyaścitta* for conscious association with any of the *mahāpātakin* is the observance of the twelve-year vow. Half of this *prāyaścitta* is enjoined for the unconscious commission of the same sin.[68]

Dravyaśuddhi (*Rules for purifying things*)

The rules of *prāyaścitta* relate to the purification of human beings when the impurity of sin attaches to them. Similarly there are certain rules for the purification of various things rendered impure by various causes. Under the latter class there is a number of minor and uninteresting details. The broad rules only are noted below:

It should be pointed out that of the three writers of Bengal on *Prāyaścitta* only the first, viz. Bhavadeva deals with *Dravyaśuddhi* as a separate topic while the other who do not devote any part of their treatise exclusively to this subject—a fact which tends to show that in the times following the age of Bhavadeva the rigidity of these rules was considerably relaxed and the rules were not regarded important enough to justify their treatment in a separate chapter. So far as these rules of purification are concerned Bhavadeva has to contribute nothing beyond compiling certain ancient texts laying down the causes of the impurity of various things and the means of their purification.

The chief causes of impurity and the chief means of purification are indicated below:—

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[68] सद्यो वा संवत्सरेण वा संसर्गे यत्र महापातकित्वं तत्र ज्ञानतो द्वादशवार्षिकम्, अज्ञानतस्तदर्धमिति बोद्धव्यम्—PP., p. 106.

LAND

Causes of impurity	*Means of purification*
Delivery of a woman, death and burning of human beings, urine, filth, living of dogs and boars, asses and camels.	Digging, burning, besmearing, washing, rain-water, filling up, walking over by cows, lapse of time.

HOUSE OF A 'DVIJA' (twice-born)

Causes of impurity	*Means of purification*
Death of a dog	Lapse of ten nights.
Death of a Śūdra	Lapse of one month.
Death of a dvija	Lapse of three nights, or of one night in the case of outer compound (बहिर्भूमि) if it is burnt, washed or besmeared.

NOTE: Bhavadeva adds that even after the lapse of the prescribed periods of time purification has to be effected by washing etc. accompanied by incantations (समन्त्रकेण प्रोक्षणादिना).

Death of a person inside a room.	Casting off of the earthen vessels, cooked rice, besmearing the room with cowdung, sprinkling of the entire room with *Kuśa* or gold-water by *Brāhmaṇas*.

NOTE: According to the custom obtaining among the Hindus of Bengal even to-day a dying person must be taken out of the room so that his death may take place outside. The popular notion, though very crude, is that the soul of a person dying inside a room is prevented by the limits of the room from going upwards towards heaven.

WATER

Perfumes (गन्ध) Colour (वर्ण) Juice (रस)	From the authorities quoted by Bhavadeva there seems to be no means of purifying the water polluted in this way.

A vast mass of deep water[69] (अक्षोभ्यानां प्रभूतानामपाम्) does not become impure by any source of impurity. Water, though itself pure, when preserved for a night, must be thrown off.

Golden Vessels etc.

General rules:—Water purifies Conch (अब्ज), vessels made of Gold, jewel, pearl, coral, silver. Vessels of Kāṁsya are purified by ashes, copper vessels by sour water (अम्लाम्भः) i.e. water mixed with some sour things, and by heating. Things made of horns and teeth of animals are purified by paste (कल्क) of white oilseeds (सिद्धार्थ). Wooden things, when extremely defiled, can be purified by earth (मृदा), water and by abrading (तक्षणम्). Earthen vessels may be purified by heating, but when defiled by contact with wine etc., these must be thrown away.

Vessels of *Kāṁsya*, smelt by cows, used by *Śūdras*, while taking food defiled (उपहत) by dogs, cows etc	10 kinds of *Kṣāra* (alkali)
Vessels of *Kāṁsya* defiled by contact with *surā*, urine, stool.	Heating, scourging (लिखन)
Metallic (तैजस) Vessels when in	Heating.

[69] This is rather vague inasmuch as the extent of depth is not given.

contact for a *long time* with stool, wine, semen, blood, urine.	
Contact for a *short while* of the above vessels with the above things.	Scourging or keeping in Cow's urine for seven nights.
Extreme defilement of *loha-bhāṇḍa* i.e. all kinds of metallic vessels, and of vessels made of jewel, stone.	Scouring by earth (मही) for seven nights.

CLOTHES

While sources of ordinary impurity in the case of clothes are not specifically mentioned the means of purifying them given are :—

(1) Sprinkling with water (प्रोक्षण).
(2) Wash (प्रक्षालन)
(3) Drying in the sun.

The means of purification varies in the case of different kinds of clothes. It is interesting to note that comparatively easier means of purification (अल्पशौच) are prescribed for clothes made of costly stuff, e.g. silk, wool, etc. In part of Bengal those who are fastidious about purifying things are found even now to relax the rigidity of their rules in the case of costly clothes, the custom appearing to have no other reason than the risk of spoiling costly things involved in an elaborate purification. The greatest source of impurity in the case of clothes is their contact with urine, stool, blood, semen, etc. and the means of purification in such cases is washing with earth and water (मृद्भिः)

The rest of the rules of *dravyaśuddhi*, given by Bhavadeva, are concerned with minor things such as ghee, oil, etc. These are not interesting enough to be considered in detail. We give below only those rules which are of general interest. Raw flesh (आममांस) and honey (क्षौद्र) do not become impure even when touched by a *Cāṇḍāla*

(अन्त्यज). To man are always pure the bed, wife, child, cloth, sacred thread (उपवीत). *Kamaṇḍalu* all belonging to himself but not to others. The leaves flowers and fruits of trees growing on an impure spot are not themselves impure.

VRATA[70]

Vratas may be either devotional or purificatory and expiatory. It is only with the latter kind of *vratas* that the works on *Prāyaścitta* are concerned. These *vratas* sometimes have been defined differently by different writers. We propose to give here a list of the important *vratas* mentioned in the works on *Prāyaścitta* along with a short description of each:—

Names of Vratas	*Description*
1. *Prājāpatya*	According to Manu :— Eating only in the morning for three days, only in the evening for following three days, eating for next three days what is obtained without asking (अयाचित), fasting for three days following.
2. *Atikṛcchra*	Yājñavalkya :— Same as *Prājāpatya*, the only difference being that in it one will eat only as much as can be contained in one's palm (पाणिः पूर्यते येनान्नेन तन्मात्र भोजनात्)

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[70] For meaning of the term and *vratas* dealt with in the *Smṛti-nibandhas* of Bengal see "*Purānic basis of the Vratas mentioned in Bengal Smṛti*" by S. C. Banerji, *Indian Culture*, XIII, No. I, pp. 35-43.

Manu :—Same as *Prājā-patya* the difference being that in it one will eat one morsel of food at each meal.

3. *Kṛcchrātikṛcchra* Vaśiṣṭha :—

Drinking once only as much water as can be contained in one's palm—such for nine days, fast for three succeeding days.

Yājñavalkya :— Drinking water for twenty one days.

4. *Siśukṛcchra* Manu :—

Eating only in the morning for one day, only in the evening for the following day, eating food, obtained without asking; for next day, living upon *Vāyu* for one day.

[Śūlapāṇi adds that *Vāyu* here means vapour rising from boiling milk आवर्तितदुग्धवाष्पभक्षः]

5. *Taptakṛcchra* Yājñavalkya :—

Taking hot water, hot milk, hot ghee, vapour rising from boiling milk—each for three days.

6. *Saumyakṛcchra* Yājñavalkya :—

Taking oil-cake (पिण्याक) scum of rice. liquefied curd (तक्र) water, crushed wheat, (शक्तु) etc.—each for one day, fast for one night

7. *Sāntapana*	Yājñavalkya:— Taking for one day all of the following things:— Water in which Kuśa grass has been soaked (कुशोदक), cow's milk, curd, cow's urine, cowdung, ghee, fast for the following day.
8 *Mahāsāntapana*	Yājñavalkya :— Same as *Sāntapana*, the difference being that in it one has to take each of the things, mentioned in connexion with *Sāntapana* for one day the usual fast being the same, so that this is to be performed in the course of seven days.
9. *Parāka*	Manu :—Fast for ten days.
10. *Brahmakūrcavrata*	Jāvāla :— Fast for one day and one night especially on the Full Moon day, then taking *pañca-gavya*[71] in the following morn-g.
11. *Cāndrāyaṇa*	Manu :— Reducing one morsel of food every day during the dark fortnight, and increasing by one morsel every day during the bright fortnight.

[71] The five products of the cow:—(i) Milk, (ii) Curd, (iii) and Cowdung, (iv) Urine, and (v) Ghee.

12. *Tulapuruṣa* Yājñavalkya:—

Taking each of the following articles for three consecutive nights:—Oil-cake, scum of boiled rice, liquefied curd (तक्र) water and crushed wheat (शक्तु).

13. *Māsopavāsa* Jāvāla:—

Fast for one month.

14. *Dvādaśavārṣika* Manu:—

Living, for twelve years, in a hut made in a forest, living on alms, carrying human skull.

As an alternative to these *Vratas*, which cannot sometimes be observed by one owing to various reasons, the Bengal school of writers enjoy the practice of *dhenusaṅkalana* that is to say, the gift of a certain number of cows or the value thereof. The rules of *dhenu-saṅkalana* are more or less mechanical and, therefore, not very interesting. Hence we do not deal with these rules in detail.

The sinner's appearance before assembly

(प्रायश्चित्तिनः पर्षदुपस्थानम्)

Śūlapāṇi records the practice of a sinner appearing before an assembly of the learned for getting the appropriate *prāyaścitta* ascertained by them. The other two writers are silent on this point—a fact which tends to prove that this custom was no longer in vogue in their times. The general rules of this assembly are as follows:—

A person being definitely aware of the sin. committed by him, has got to appear before an assembly of *Brāhmaṇas*, versed in *Mīmāṁsā*, *Nyāya*, the four *Vedas*, the *Vedāṅgas*, *Dharmaśāstra*, etc The number of members con-

stituting this assembly will be usually between ten and twenty-one, but it may be increased even up to a hundred in cases of grave sins like *mahāpātaka*. The members of the assembly prescribing *prāyaścitta* without having a knowledge of *Dharmaśāstra* are themselves said to be trained by sin. Equally guilty are those members who, in spite of knowing the appropriate *prāyaścitta*, keep silent.

To *Kṣatriyas etc.* intending, to know the *prāyaścitta* the members of the assembly will not tell the appropriate *prāyaścitta* directly but through a Brāhmaṇa (अन्तरा ब्राह्मण कृत्वा)

THE DRAMATIC THEORY OF RABINDRANATH TAGORE

—A Study in Synthesis—

By AMAR MUKERJI

LIKE W.B. Yeats Rabindranath Tagore has left behind in his works numerous statements about various aspects of the drama which when brought together and analysed with care may well become the basis of Tagore's dramatic criticism. These statements run from a couple of lines to a couple of pages and deal with such varied aspects of the drama as character, plot, the importance of the fifth act, sorrow in tragedy, the use of music in drama and so forth. Of course one has to admit that these opinions were never consciously expressed with the intention of formulating a dramatic theory but even then it appears that a certain attitude to the drama runs through them, an attitude that throws considerable light on his own dramatic works.

Before proceeding further two things should however be carefully remembered: first, that when Rabindranath commenced his writing Bengali literature was saturated with western influence; and secondly that in spite of this influence there was in the poet a profound admiration for the Eastern tradition of the arts which he so frequently admitted in his letters and speeches. Regarding the first for instance Tagore had written :

> আধুনিক বাংলা সাহিত্য যে ভিতের উপর বাসা ফাঁদচে সে ভিৎটা ইউরোপীয়। তার ··· ··· ··· নাটক প্রাচীন রীতির আশ্রয়ে তৈরী হয় নি —সেই কারণেই ইউরোপীয় আদর্শে তাকে বিচার করা ছাড়া অন্য পন্থা আর নেই ;[1]

[1] *Prabasi*, B. S. 1339, Magh, p. 468. Also preface to P. R. Sen's *Western Influence in Bengali Literature* 2nd Edition.

which meant that modern Bengali drama had to be judged against Western standards. But this was probably more true of the other dramatists writing in Bengal and not of Tagore who in his earliest and his last plays had gone back so frequently to the Indian tradition of the drama viewed as a dṛśya-kāvya. In fact when closely examined, his dramatic opinions seem as well to vacillate between eastern and western aesthetics: the earlier ones expressed under the influence of the English romantic drama; the latter ones reinforced by his appreciation of Sanskrit drama and of Bengali yātrā and kathakathā.[2] Not that at certain places he had not brought together the two standpoints but this was sought to be done more effectively in the dance-dramas than in the enunciation of his principles.

In this context we may now proceed to analyse Tagore's description of the drama. We quote him below:

নাট্য হোলো কাল্পনিক ঘটনাবলির এমন করে গেঁথে তোলা যাতে সে আমাদের মনে যাথার্থিকের আবির্ভাব আনে। একেও খেলা বলছি এই জন্যে যে বাস্তবের মধ্যে ঘটনাবলির সুসংবদ্ধ বাছাই থাকে না, থাকে বহু অবাস্তরের মিশল। সংহত, সুসংগত ঘটনা গ্রন্থনে যে নিবিড় যথার্থের রূপ জেগে ওঠে বাস্তবে তা নেই। নাটকে এই যে বাছাই করা গাঁথনির কাজ এও শিল্পীর কাজ। এই শিল্পজাত যথার্থের অনুভূতি যে নিছক সুন্দর হবেই তা নয়; তার বিশ্বাসযোগ্যতা স্বতই আমাদের বিস্ময়ের আনন্দ দেয় কিন্তু তাই যথেষ্ট নয়। যথার্থ বড়ো নাটক আর যাই হোক কখনো অকিঞ্চিৎকর হতে পারে না। তার নিবিড়তা তার সত্যদৃষ্টি তাকে তুচ্ছতা থেকে উদ্ধার করে।[3]

As it is obvious these lines have hardly anything to say on the form of the drama—on the elements which contribute to the making of what we call the dramatic technique. On the other hand Tagore clearly raises some

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[2] *Visvabharati Educational Supplement*, XIII, 1-2, p. 44.
[3] *Kavita Quarterly*, 1349 B. S., Chaitra, p. 176.

important points regarding the substance of the drama and seeks to evolve certain almost precise notions about it as a literary type and a form of art which for its total effect involves not alone *a* view of reality (which is essential to all art) but an ordered, selected view which lends a particularity as well as vividness to that reality. Such a selection almost inevitably leads us, though indirectly, to the conception of 'imitation' which involves many more things that what Zola pleaded for in his Therésé Raquin. According to this French naturalist of course drama would remain simply an excerpt from life. "That is to say," to quote Nicoll, "the aim of the true dramatist ought to be the providing on the stage of as faithful a replica as may be of a scene which either has actually occured or has been conceived in such terms as to make it life-like."[4] But apparently Tagore's emphasis was not on such a faithfulness to reality and this was not exactly the ideal which he furthered in his plays. On the contrary he believed that the intention of the dramatist is to select his material in such a way that while not denying the basical arrangement of the cosmic order (of which man was a part) he could reinforce his universe with "an informing power by means of which he is able to suggest infinite significance in his scenes and in the words of his characters".[5] This is essential in view of the facts that art cannot be entirely imitative and that "a mere copy of any incident or the reproduction of things as they occur in real life is not true to nature in the best sense."[6] Being true to nature really means the portraying of the subtle workings of the mind and heart and such actions as are relevant to that end sacrificing if need be during that process "the petty, increased vraisemblances of time and

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[4] *The Theory of Drama* p. 25.

[5] Ibid. p. 26.

[6] H. A. Jones: *The Renascence of the Drama.*

place." As Schlegel rightly held, the art of the (dramatic) poet "consists in separating from the fable whatever in the daily necessities of life.......interprets the progress of important actions, and concentrating within a narrow space a number of events calculated to attract the minds of the hearers".[7] Tagore has echoed almost the same idea when he said that in drama there is a selected and ordered assemblage of events and not a mere description of them. This naturally comes very near to the Aristotelian conception of imitation which does not debar the utilization of things of reality but seeks to give as Darlington put it "a sense of comprehension of the changeless depths below the changeful surface of life".[8] To do this is, according to Tagore, the business of the dramatic artist whose real achievement lies in the efficiency or otherwise of his composition, of his methods of representation and interpretation.

But incidently it is here that Tagore unconsciously comes near the Sanskrit anukṛti which connotes a much wider meaning than what it etymologically conveys. Bharata himself stressed this anukṛti meaning the delineation of human nature, thoughts and feelings while Keith had pointed out that "the doctrine that the drama is an imitation does not differ from the doctrine of mimesis" though "there is an esssential distinction in what is imitated or represented".[9] The difference is in accord with the genius of the two peoples and if the Indian who lacks stereoscopic imagination cannot portray action[10] he can easily depict a state or condition or even feeling that is only the action's underside.

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[7] Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature.

[8] Literature in the Theatre.

[9] The Sanskrit Drama.

[10] Alapchari Rabindranath p. 129.

We will revert to this later to show how Tagore gradually moved from the European model to the Indian variety; here we have now to consider the next problem he had raised. Is the imitation of reality going to be always beautiful, he asks, what happens if it becomes ugly? The ugly by itself because of its remarkable ugliness may become a source of amazement. Even the terrible and the evil may be so and we have instances of it in the dramas of Shakespeare.[11] But then what saves these from being insignificant and trivial? With Shakespeare of course it is the presence of a moral law whose subversion had caused Lear so much of pain but then even when negatived as in the case of Iago its pervading atmosphere gives, according to Tagore, the plays their universality. It soon develops into the richness of a profound vision that with Tagore at least subsists on an idea of harmony which rescues a play from sordidness and oblivion.

The question now arises as to how and by what particular methods Tagore seeks to achieve the universality in drama. Is it arrived at externally through the events he had referred to above or through lyricism which he had condemned in his preface to *Tapatī* or through characterization of which he had spoken elsewhere? The events are, according to accepted dramatic principles, the very basis of plot which is again for Aristotle the 'soul' of drama. This is so because the events lead to situations which must come together and combine in such a way as to develop a plot where the incidents are causally related. Such a relationship is almost at the basis of all dramatic art for once interest is roused in a logical sequence of events it tends to become cumulative and the dramatist can count on a more or less steady rise of interest as the play moves to its crisis, climax and crescendo. Drama then gains in

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[11] Bradley: *Shakespearian Tragedy* p. 35.

action as well as in the suspense, in which former quality it is distinguished from the novel. As Tagore said " the events of human life in their outward aspect are all displayed as movement"[12] meaning perhaps that in its inward aspect it is exhibited in character. It thus becomes clear how much indebted to Aristotle was Tagore when he formulated that plot and character are the two essential elements of the drama. If the former gives to the entire series of incidents a coherence and sequence, the latter reveals through it interesting details about men and women who face these happenings. The combination of these two, it is obvious, leads to the unity of action through which again the characters expose themselves.

In respect to characterization in particular Tagore has some precise statements which clarify his position. At one place he writes:

> মানবচরিত্রে যে সমস্ত সম্ভবপরতা আছে সেগুলিকেই ঘটনাবলির বৈচিত্রের মধ্যে দিয়ে ... ... নাটককে বিচিত্র করে তোলা হয়। মানব-চরিত্রের মধ্যে চিরনূতনত্ব আছে ঘটনার মধ্যে নেই। ঘটনা নানাপ্রকারে নানা জায়গায় ঘটে, একই ঘটনা ঠিক দুই জায়গায় ঠিক একরকম ঘটে না। তার মূলে যে মানবচরিত্র আছে, সে চিরকালেই নিজেকে প্রকাশ করেছে। এই জন্যে এই মানবচরিত্রের প্রতিই লেখক দৃষ্টি রাখেন কোন ঘটনার নকল করবার প্রতি নয়।[13]

Here Tagore contrary to what he had said before about the importance of plot, focusses our attention on the problen of characterization which is one of the major technical problems forced upon the dramatist. We do feel sometimes, though against Aristotle's dictum, that the interest in the outline of a story is often a superficial one and that the touches of characterization give it fulness. To be sure our interest in what happens is more with the sort of

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[12] Visvabharati Quarterly VI, 1, pp. 2-3.

[13] Rachanavali Vol. VII, p. 525.

persons as they are involved in a particular set of incidents than in the incidents themselves. As Tagore has aptly remarked, incidents can never repeat themselves in exact order and even if they did they would be of no interest to us until they let us know of the sort of persons involved in them, thereby arousing a complex sense of feelings, emotions and values that give them their significance. Thus according to Tagore, the incidents are revelatory of men. To what extent? And what type of men?—these are the questions that Tagore had unfortunately left unanswered. In regard to the first, we have to remember that since "drama is not life and life is not drama"[14] it is quite often that the process of selection spoken of earlier involves a simplification and clarification of traits which do not usually appear so straight. Not that complex characters have not been exhibited in dramas; but even in their complexity a precise emphasis is often made on their motivation. Thus in all probability we know Hamlet's mother more intimately than our own, we know Raghupati of *Bisarjana* better than many an othodox Brahmin. The conventions of time and place do aid the creation of this insistent effect but of them we shall speak elsewhere.

Of the second question regarding the type of characterization Rabindranath says thus:

নাট্যে নৈতিক সদগুণের চেয়ে এই characterএর মূল্য বেশী ;[15]

where it is clear that he very much deviates from Aristotle's dictum that characters must be " good ". As F. L. Lucas opines, by the term " good " Aristotle meant "virtuous"[16] implying perhaps the existence of a peculiar moral order where purity of soul is an essential virtue. An amoral or unmoral character goes clearly beside the crite-

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[14] Eric & Bentley: The Art of the Drama p. 201.

[15] Paschim Yatrir Diary p. 149 Cf. Theory of Drama p. 73.

[16] Tragedy p. 107.

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rion and we know how Aristotle's dictum was more than transgressed by Euripidies and a host of other dramatists. In fact the master himself while talking of plot demanded "that the character of the tragic hero shall not be too good."[17] Tagore's emphasis was elsewhere as would appear from the following description of character:

> ইংরাজী ভাষায় character শব্দের একটা অর্থ স্বভাব, নৈতিক চরিত্র। আরেকটা অর্থ চরিত্ররূপ। অর্থাৎ এমন কতকগুলি গুণের এমন সমাবেশ যাতে এই সমাবেশটি বিশেষ ভাবে লক্ষগোচর হয়। পূর্বেই বলেছি এই রকম বিশেষ গোচরতাই আর্টের ধর্ম। [18]

The implications are too evident to need clarification; it remains only to add, keeping especially in view Tagore's own plays that it is not the habit of the dramatic personae in which we are interested but in the assemblage of some such traits which put forth the person or persons before us in indelible marks. These really constitute the individuality of the character and bring out his personality into bold relief. Clytemnestra, Macbeth, Hamlet and Solevig are the unmistakable figures who appear before us because within their frame-work they have their own completeness. In other words, they have all an individual manner of expression which distinguishes them from others—though here, and in spite of such characters as Iago's, critics like Reynold believe that the moral basis cannot be done away with.[19] Of course fundamentally speaking it is not inartistic to be moral though to be amoral is not especially artistic either. But the difficulty is that the dramatist who talks of ethics and starts preaching does not allow us to draw our conclusions from what he shows of his persons. It is a pity that Tagore did not depict an entirely malicious character to exhibit the other extreme of his theory.

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[17] Ibid. p. 110.

[18] Diary, op. cit., p. 149.

[19] Anatomy of Drama p. 72 et seq.

What he was inclined to do however almost in the wake of romantic criticism[20] was to extract individual persons from their surroundings—meaning the events—and to regard them as being independent of them. But in practice particularly in the *Rājā O Rānī-Mālinī* group he had adopted a different method while in the machine-dramas he was conscious of the milieu. Of course the emphasis varied from one play to another but it was there and unmistakably so. There Tagore as an active practitioner of the dramatic art seems to realise that " characterizations are an aspect of plot when it is fully developed; and plot is the consequence, in large measure, of character".[21] If Tagore in his season plays had attenuated the former, he had also suggested the latter more by hints than by direct exposition.

The problem of exposition leads us at once to that of dramatic structure which, unfortunately, beyond a couple of casual references, Rabindranath has not discussed in any detail. During a conversation recorded by Rani Chanda[22] he had emphasised the importance of construction in drama while at another place, perhaps following the Shakespearian five-act technique, he had said:

> নাট্য-সৃষ্টির সর্বপ্রধান অংশ তার পঞ্চম অঙ্ক। নাটকের মধ্যে যা কিছু চঞ্চল তা ঝরে পড়ে গিয়ে তার যেটুকু স্থায়ী, সেই-টুকুই পঞ্চম অঙ্কের চরম তিরস্করণীর মধ্যে দিয়ে হৃদয়ের মধ্যে প্রবেশ করে।[23]

We are almost immediately at the catastrophe of a play and if Tagore has put it in the fifth act it is obvious that the action, in the Elizabethan manner, starts through exposition and ends with the conclusion. Clearly the particular function of the last portion of the plot is not

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[20] Theory of Drama p. 73.

[21] Anatomy of Drama op. cit.

[22] Alapchari Rabindranath p. 129.

[23] Prabasi B. S. 1334, Phalgun, p. 591.

only to bring the earlier action to a close but to convey through that closing what Aristotle called the anagnorisis, the realization of truth. Whether the error is moral or not is not the question here; the point is that the clash that we see in the play is so resolved as to leave behind a more final, perhaps a more cosmic solution of the problem posed earlier—a solution where the suspense and irony are set at rest to produce an effect of artistic blessedness at the idea that there is an end in the causally connected series of events against which the characters had thrived.[24] The meaning becomes obvious when we consider some of Tagore's plays. In *Bisarjana* which is Tagore's most successful five-actor, Joyasingha's suicide brings realization and calm to the agitated Raghupati after he had progressed in rapid strides from one state to another. In the other plays this effect is not left for the fifth act because Tagore abandoned the five-act technique but in any case that function is always discharged by the last scene whatever its position be. It should however be remembered that with Tagore's concept of tragedy what was more important to the hero was not the solution of his difficulty but an increased awareness of himself.

Of this concept of tragedy we can only speak here in brief. Tagore had himself outlined it in his famous passage on *Prakritir Pariśodha* thus:

" The Prakritir Parisodh may be looked upon as an introduction to the whole of my future literary work; or rather this has been the subject on which all my writings have dwelt—the joy of attaining the Infinite within the Finite".[25]

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[24] S. Alexander in his *Poetry and the Individual* speaks of "the strange calm which succeeds the spectacle of tragic dissolution. . .that comes from awe of the fulfilment." Hegel also speaks of "the satisfaction of the spirit."

[25] *My Reminiscences.*

Put this alongside the following and Tagore's theory of tragedy takes a positive shape:

"The tragedy of human life consists in our vain attempts to stretch the limits of things which can never become unlimited—to reach the infinite by absurdly adding rungs of the ladder of the Finite".[26]

The implication is that the tragedies of Tagore develop round the struggle that ensues between man's finite nature and infinite competence, between the demand on him of a force which leads towards his becoming and the force that is his being. In short it means that whether it is the Sannyāsī, Vikramadeva, Mālinī, Sudarśhana, the King or even the dancer Srimati they suffer pain and agony because under the pressure of egoism, passion, ignorance or pride they, for a while, forget the Infinite in them and emphasise the narrowness of a limited world. Thus as I have written elsewhere, the eternal conflict of the soul is between its joy that is its inherent nature, and the facts of sorrow, the states of fear, hatred, indifference and doubt that prevent us from attaining the infinite bliss. Such a conflict—fundamental in its nature—naturally involves many more things than the realization of a philosophical idea in drama; it is intensified further when a second conflict runs across the first—the closure of man's senses by man's own imagination and appetites versus the urge of Nature through the call of the seasons to open the senses in order that man may meet one another more intimately. These two conflicts practically contain everything that a good tragedy con contain.[27]

In such a concept of tragedy Death assumes a rather peculiar significance. To Rabindranath Death had never been in itself anything very terrible and he did not believe that with death ended life. On the other hand it is evi-

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[26] Creative Unity.

[27] See Modern Review June, 1949, pp. 477 et seq. for details.

dent from *Phalguni* that death only begins the creation of a fuller life.[28] Almost in the same vein Rabindranath wrote about the use of death in tragedy in these terms:

সাধারণতঃ লোকে সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়া রাখিয়াছেন যে মরণ না হইলে ট্রাজেডী হয় না। শেষকালে মিলন হইলেই আর ট্রাজেডী হইল না। পাত্রগণের মিলন কাব্যের বাহ্য আকার মাত্র, তাহা লইয়া কাব্যের শ্রেণী নির্দেশ করিতে যাওয়া দূরদর্শনীয় নহে। যে অনিবার্য্য নিয়মে সে মিলন বা মরণ সংঘটিত হইল, তাহারই প্রতি দৃষ্টিপাত রাখিতে হইবে।[29]

Nothing can be more true than this and as Tagore has alptly illustrated with the story from the *Mahābhārata* the real tragedy of the victors began when they found that though masters of an empire, they had lost something more valuable and deeper—the very basis of life. There as Tagore believes the real tragedy starts with the termination of the hostilities and deaths become insignificant, dramatically speaking. Conversely according to Tagore:

সূর্য্যমুখীর সহিত নগেন্দ্রের মিলন হইয়া গেল বলিয়া বিষবৃক্ষ ট্রাজেডী নহে ··· ··· যখন মিলনের মুখে হাসি নাই, যখন মিলনের বুক কাটিয়া যাইতেছে তখন তাহার অপেক্ষা আর কি ট্রাজেডী আছে![30]

Exactly so: and from the point of technique at least the expository scenes of Tagore's plays clearly start at the point where the tragedy had almost attained its height. This opinion is the more true of the plays following *Śāro-dotsova* because there death is what D. H. Lawrence once called the disaster and not a tragedy. The height of dramatic achievement is reached when as in *Natir Puja* death comes as a disaster as well as a tragedy. But then as in *Raktakaravi* or in *Muktadhara* (to quote Lawrence

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[28] See Tagore's letter to Amiya Chakravarty in Sahityer Pathe, Appendix.

[29] Samalochana p. 75.

[30] Adhunik Sahitya, essay on Bankimchandra.

again) " if it were a profound struggle for something that was coming to life in us, a struggle that we were convinced would bring us to a new freedom, a new life, then it would be a creative activity in which death is a climax in the progression towards a new being." With some variation this being in Tagore is almost tantamount to the attainment of the Infinite which happened in the case of Amal or a bit indirectly, even with Jatin of *Gṛhapraveśa*.

We do not of course intend to suggest that Rabindranath showed the same dramatic skill in the handling of death in the *Rājā O Rānī-Bisarjana-Mālinī* group of plays In *Rājā O Rānī* the deaths are unnecessary while of the utility of Supriya's death Prof. Lesny is justifiably sceptical. In *Bisarjana* death comes nearer being a disaster which is tragic but then, as is evident from the above statements which Tagore made every early in his career, there the influence of tradition cannot be easily be overlooked. This class of incidents were freely admitted to the Shakespearian stage which was fairly chocked with corpses [31] It bespoke more a Shakespearian world of passion than of Tagore's dramatic Universe.[32]

What then is the emotional effect of such a tragedy—we now ask, following Lucas. If Tagore's tragedy ends with conversion, better stated realization, where does the Aristotelian conception of purgation come in? Can we transfer the metaphor which is of an 'aparient' and say that we are utterly purged of our finite nature especially when we know that in our finite nature is ingrained our competence to be infinite? Or, can we extend Lessing's explanation and say that Tagore's tragedy is corrective? We cannot also be sure if we can apply to Tagore's tragedy Lucas's description that it is pleasurable because therein our

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[31] Types of Tragic Drama by Vaughan pp. 143 et seq.

[32] See my article "Tagore's Dramatic Universe and Technique" in National Herald May 8, 1949.

excess emitions are given a periodic outlet.[33] We cannot, because the element of pity is hardly aroused a quarter as much in Tagore as, so to say, in *Antigone* or even in *Hamlet* since the conflict in Tagore's plays rarely gathers their passionate intensity. With Tagore the tragic tussle belongs to a different plane and seeks to live by a subtle sense of affinity which does not go to the extent of being piteous and terrible. As such we must find different reasons for the source of his tragic pleasure.

Fortunately enough on this score Tagore has supplied us with full data to which we shall repeatedly go. In *Religion of Man* he said: "We enjoy tragedy because the pain which they produce rouses our consciousness to a white heat of intensity".[34] One may immediately ask: if this is so, is our consciousness roused by the pain which we experience in real life and not through the medium of art? And to this Tagore replies that the element of pain inherent in a object of art is pleasant to us because being ' distanced ' from us, it cannot harm us directly but can, in its turn, enable us to enjoy it completely.[35] Then tragedy becomes a luxury of sorrow because we go to its overpowering forces as they indirectly help the fulfilment of our personality. To quote Tagore:

চারিদিকের রসহীনতায় আমাদের চৈতন্যে যখন সাড় থাকে না, তখন সেই অস্পষ্টতা দুঃখকর। তখন আত্মোপলব্ধি ম্লান ··· ··· বস্তুত, মন নাস্তিত্বের দিকে যতই যায় ততই তার দুঃখ।

দুঃখের নিবিড় উপলব্ধিও আনন্দকর কেননা সেটা নিবিড় অস্মিতা সূচক ··· ··· দুঃখ আমাদের স্পষ্ট করে তোলে আপনার কাছে আপনাকে ঝাপসা করে দেয় না। গভীর দুঃখ ভূমা, ট্রাজেডীর মধ্যে সেই ভূমা আছে, সেই ভূমৈব সুখং। [35]

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[33] Lucas op. cit. pp. 25-6.

[34] P 41.

[35] See Tagore's view quoted in Natya Sahityer Bhumika pp. 76-7.

Again:

দুঃখের অভিজ্ঞতায় আমাদের চেতনা আলোড়িত হয়ে ওঠে ... ... দুঃখের অনুভূতি সহজ আরামবোধের চেয়ে প্রবলতর। ট্রাজেডীর মূল্য এই নিয়ে। ... ...

বদ্ধ জল যেমন বোবা, ঘুমটা হাওয়া যেমন আত্মপরিচয়হীন, তেমনি প্রাত্যহিক আধমরা অভ্যাসের একটানা আবৃত্তি যা দেয় না আমাদের চেতনায়, তাতে সত্তাবোধ নিস্তেজ হয়ে থাকে। তাই দুঃখে ... ... অপ্রকাশের আবেগ কাটিয়ে মানুষ আপনাকে প্রবল আবেগে উপলব্ধি করতে চায়। [36]

Such a view appears to contrast sharply with Aristotle's catharsis since the purgation is not of excess emotions but of our unconsciousness which tends to carry us to the region of forgetfulness. In case of Tagore's tragedies at least, one does often feel that the last scene or the last act ends, as previously stated, not with the hero's sense of frustration but with the sense of a fulfilment be it in the domain of the spirit. Dr. N. R. Roy's failure to see the necessity of the last scene of *Bisarjana* lies in his incompetence to note this[38]: to appreciate that in what appears to be the disaster of man is inherent his rousing into consciousness without which man cannot belong to the cosmic process of becoming.[39] The Raja in *Śāradotsava* the Acharya in *Acalāyatana* and even Citrāngadā of the dance-drama gradually come to this realization—pointing to the fact that the meagre pity and terror there are soon reduced to an overwhelming sense of pleasure which crowns the earlier moments of pain.[40] It is here that one feels that Rabindranath somehow or the other came near Hegel's conception that " the universal need for expression in art lies there-

36 Sahityer Pathe, appendix, op. cit.
37 Ibid pp. 52-53.
38 Rabindra Sahityer Bhumika Vol. 2. p. 54.
39 Sadhana p. 6 et. seq.
40 It is especially interesting to note how Sudarshana went through the process before she saw the real King.

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fore in man's rational impulse to exalt the inner and outer world with a spiritual consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognises his own self''.[41] With Tagore however the impulse is rational as well as intuitive while the recognition of his heroes' self is of course the final desideratum. To escape from the rather rational limitation of his own self through the shock of a profound crisis —to delimit the finite nature—and to go back full circle to the Infinite from which we have come: these are the basis and source of Tagore's tragic pleasure. But then, as Ronald Peacock once suggested, since such a concept of tragedy tends to be more personal than universal the difficulty appears when the emotion roused by it cannot infect people who witness the play[42] Most probably Tagore knew this for, characters like Surangama, Dadathakur and Dhananjoy act as foils to the tragic heroes by universalising, as it were, their personal tragedy and seeking thereby a more extensive effect. Thus the pleasure of Tagore's tragedy emerges from the remaking of the harmony that we had lost—through a process not exactly of self pity but of self-understanding.

And this self-understanding can, almost in the same vein, be the object of his laughter:

> সুন্দরকে সুন্দর বলিয়া যেমন আকাঙ্খার তৃপ্তি হয় না ... ... সেই জন্য সত্যকে সত্য কথা দ্বারা প্রকাশ না করা সম্বন্ধে একেবারে হাল ছাড়িয়া দিয়া ঠিক তাহার বিপরীত পথ অবলম্বন করিতে হয়। তখন বেদনার অশ্রুকে হাস্যচ্ছটায়, গভীর কথাকে কৌতুকে পরিহাসে পরিণত করিতে ইচ্ছা করে। [43]

That Tagore's theory of comedy is the twin of his theory of tragedy and that his comedy performs the same function by making us the object of ridicule are by now clear. It also becomes evident that in comedy of Tagore is done in one way what is done in his tragedy in another.

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[41] Phil. of Fine Art.
[42] Poet in the Theatre p. 197.
[43] Rachanavali Vol. VII, p. 540

Thus if the pain of tragedy is converted into pleasure with rousing of our consciousness, laughter too, as Mr. McDougall has suggested. can be a preservative against excess of sympathy which would definitely hamper our destination and so, would be exhausting. The lack of harmony which is the source of tragedy becomes then the source of comedy:

অসংগতি কমেডিরও বিষয়, অসংগতি ট্রাজেডীরও বিষয় [44]

though in the latter the absence of harmony is soon converted into incongruity. The defeat of commonsense may of course be at the root of this incongruity that manifests itself in the contradiction which we so much emphasise between the Finite and the Infinite. In such a context, exaggeration (to quote Fiebleman) ridicules the current estimates by putting the emphasis too far and understatement points our refusal to see that limits can be delimited.[45] Laughter then, leaving aside its physiological aspects,[46] is 'a release of a sort from the limitations of the human lot, a recognition of the fact that obstacles in the path of improvement are not impossible obstacles".[47] The comic in a situation implies the cognition of this limitation : an awareness where, as Tagore said, novelty, curiosity and desire for speciality have their roles.[48] They combine together with speed and expectancy to affirm the cosmic order by " criticising the limitations and our willingness to accept them." In other words " comedy affirms the direction towards infinite value by insisting upon the absurdly final claims of finite things and events "; and it is only in the light of such an approach, as Pramathanath

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[44] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 625.

[45] In Praise of Comedy pp. 184-204.

[46] Which Tagore explained in the manner of Herbert Spencer his favourite author in his early youth. See Rachanavali Vol. II, pp. 620-25.

[47] Fiebleman op. cit.

[48] Rachanavali Vol. II.

Bisi suggests that the comedies of Tagore have to be eventually examined, revealing for instance, how in *Cira-kumāra Sabhā*, Tagore could, inversely and by indirection. show us the comic in the fragmentary exemplification which accumulates the intensity of a tragedy in *Prakritir Pariśodha*.[49]

There exists another difference between *Prakritir Pari-śodha* and its twin comedy. It lies in that while the earlier tragedies are written in poetry verging too much, as Thompson says "on the side of eloquence"[50] the comedy is written in prose. Not that Tagore could not write a com-medy in verse: we have *Laksmīr Parikṣā* to show that he could; but then he chose prose as the vehicle of expres-sion for many of his major plays after *Mālinī* and here is the reason for it:

প্রশান্ত ··· ইচ্ছা প্রকাশ করেছেন যেন আমি নেড়া ছন্দে ব্লাঙ্ক ভার্সে নাটক লিখি। আমি স্পষ্ট দেখলুম গদ্যে তার চেয়ে ঢের বেশী জোর পাওয়া যায়। পদ্য জিনিষটা সমুদ্রের মতো—তার যা বৈচিত্র তা প্রধাণতঃ তরঙ্গের— কিন্তু গদ্যটা স্থূলদৃশ্য, তাতে নানা মেজাজের রূপ আনা যায়। তাকে ব্যবহার করার অধিকার সহজ নয়, সে তার আপন বেগে ভাসিয়ে নিয়ে যায় না—নিজের শক্তি প্রয়োগ করে তার ওপর দিয়ে চলতে হয়।—ক্ষমতা অনুসারে তার চলার বৈচিত্র কত তার ঠিক নেই। বস্তুতঃ গদ্য রচনায় আত্মশক্তির সুতরাং আত্মপ্রকাশের ক্ষেত্র খুব প্রশস্ত।[51]

For a lyrical poet like Tagore to make this statement is indeed surprising especially when we know that in the *Prakritir Pariśodha* group of plays he had used "a sort of a rhyming blank-verse", "giving way his natural pull to-wards the decorative," towards "a rich and elaborate

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[49] Rabindranatya Prabaha Vol. I, p. 2. Also B. Bhattacharya in Bharatvarsha B. S. 1350, Aswin, p. 3.

[50] Op. cit. p. 134.

[51] Pathe O Pather Prante p. 96.

language loaded with luxuriant ornamentation.[52] It may be possible that Tagore got this lyrical note from the English romantic drama but then his success with the form was considerable and if he yet went to prose it was most probably because of his acquaintance among others with the plays of Ibsen, Maeterlinck and Andreyev.[53] But Tagore differed from them in so far as he pushed his tragic conflict too far into the world of soul, to the region where the play of emotion bordered, as he said on silence:

> বাস্তববাদীরা মনে করে অবকাশটা নিশ্চল, কিন্তু যাহারা অবকাশ-রসের রসিক তাহারা জানে বস্তুটাই নিশ্চল, অবকাশটাই তাহাকে গতি দেয়। ··· ··· নিশ্চলের যে ভয়ঙ্কর চলা তাহার রুদ্র বেগ। যদি দেখিতে চাও তবে দেখ ঐ নক্ষত্র মণ্ডলীর আবর্ত্তনে, দেখ যুগ-যুগান্তরের তাণ্ডব-নৃত্যে যে নাচিতেছে না, তাহারই নাচ এই সকল চঞ্চলতায়।[54]

Under such condition action tends towards the internal and the spiritual and invokes some of the most subtle emotions of the soul-life. In fact it centres on the mood of suspense, of suffering and of beauty expressed in terms of the submission of the soul to the all-enveloping realization where (to quote Tagore) "infinite action is necessary to attain the infinite being." In this case action, almost as in Maeterlinck, tends to be distilled into its quintessence giving the lie to the statement that Tagore's plays lacked action. Moreover, this action had the reality of an intense personal feeling, a measure of concreteness which he left he did not attain in the lyric. Such a view of course demanded the use of prose with greater concentration and length: prose which would enable him to feel more tangibly as it were that he was after all successful in giving to his plays a solidity which he did not give to his lyrics. And

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[52] Thompson op. cit.

[53] Tagore by D. P. Mukerji p. 128.

[54] Quoted by B. Roychaudhury op. cit. p. 215, Cf. Samalochana p. 75.

once this was done, and the proximity of his dramatic world established, Tagore's prose gave him a greater self-confidence—a greater creative pleasure almost, especially when it meant a conscious endeavour and a concentrated effort to vary its tempo and rhythm with the difference in character and situation.

But he could hardly keep to this differentiation in his plays and we know that his dramatic prose veered round a special kind of prose music which is more akin to poetry that anything else. It may not have the formal structure of verse but it has its suggestiveness and melody and its capacity to transfer us to a remote world that transgresses the realms of actuality. Such an approach however was not strictly maintained when Tagore made Nature an active participant in his plays, and he felt that if prose by being direct and precise revealed human mind, it was left to music to capture Nature's mystery and message by its suggestive, illimitable tunes. Let us quote Tagore's own words:

কথা জিনিযটা মানুষের আর গানটা প্রকৃতির। কথা সুস্পষ্ট আর বিশেষ প্রয়োজনের দ্বারা সীমাবদ্ধ, আর গান অস্পষ্ট আর সীমাহীন ব্যাকুলতায় উৎকণ্ঠিত। সেই জন্যে কথায় মানুষ মনুষ্যলোকের এবং গানে মানুষ বিশ্ব-প্রকৃতির সঙ্গে মেলে। এইজন্য কথার সঙ্গে মানুষ যখন সুরকে জুড়ে দেয় তখন সেই কথা আপনার অর্থকে আপনি ছাড়িয়ে ব্যপ্ত হয়ে যায় ··· ··· মানুষের সংসারের প্রাত্যহিক সুপরিচিত সংকীর্ণতার সঙ্গে তার ঐকান্তিক ঐক্য আর থাকে না।[55]

The emphasis is unmistakable since music, according to Tagore, seeks to create an universality which the mere story of men can but incompletely produce. The implication perhaps is that if words are the language of reason, music is the language of feeling—without creating in Schopenhauer's words " this or that sorrow or pain or horror or merriment

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[55] Rachanavali Vol. XV, p. 467 et seq.; also Vol. XVI, p. 384.

or peace of mind"[56] but timeless feeling patterns of life : joy and sorrow and longing—in their vast elemental plaintive therenodies.[57] In fact the very advàntage of music is that it allows the receipient to become a creator, by investing its feeling patterns with the irrefragable content of his own being where the gap between personal sorrow and the bliss of nature is gradually obliterated.

And this was exactly the function of Nature in Tagore's plays. As a matter of fact he goes to the extent of opining that, in keeping with the tradition of Indian thought, the conflict between man and nature must in the end be reconciled and men should find "no barriers between their lives and the grand life that permeates the universe".[58] He goes on to illustrate this by pointing the contrast between Eas ern and Western dramatic literature and particularly between Kālidāsa and Shakespeare. "In the Western dramas," writes he, "human characters drown our attention in the vortex of our passion. Nature occasionally peeps out, but she is almost always a tresspasser who has to offer excuses.[59] But in our dramas such as the *Śākuntalam* and *Uttarāmacarita* nature stands on her own right proving that she has her own function—to impart the peace of the eternal to human emotion".[60] And when this is done, when we have established the harmony with Nature[61] manifesting itself through the seasons, we discover the fundamental unity of creation not in the domain of mere fact but in the region of spiritual existence. Tagore's nature-plays seek to develop this effect[62] and dramatically speaking, when he makes men

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56 Schopenhauer works p. 338.

57 Knox op. cit. p. 151.

58 Creative Unity p. 47.

59 This is not very accurate for instance about Shakespeare see Nicoll pp. 112-13.

60 Creative Unity pp. 50-51.

61 See my article in the Triveni, Sep. 1948.

62 Sadhana p. 6.

speak and nature's symbols sing he does so because if prose is associated with a measure of temporal ideality, music transcendends it and soars to the region of universal feeling.

But Tagore as an incessant experimenter with technique was not satisfied with this and soon proceeded to create in his dance-dramas an architectural effect which his previous plays had not known. One cannot be sure if Tagore's visit to Russia had anything to with this particularly when we know that there he had witnessed Komisarjevsky developing on the stage a similar coordinated effect. In the history of Indian dramaturgy however, Bharata had long ago prescribed that "there is no science no handicraft. no knowledge, no art, no *yoga*, in fact no act—which is not incorporated in the drama" which was again according to the Hindu tradition, essentially a dṛśyakāvya. Fundamentally Tagore recognised this when he said :—

নাটক দেখতে যারা আসে পশ্চিম মহাদেশে তাদের বলে audience অর্থাৎ শ্রোতা, কিন্তু ভারতবর্ষে নাটককে বলে দৃশ্যকাব্য—অর্থাৎ তাতে কাজকে আশ্রয় করে চোখে দেখার রস দেবার জন্যেই অভিনয়। [63]

Consequently Tagore was never an admirer of the modern attempt at making scenic representation usurp the place of imagination and seemed to agree with what Sir Sidney Lee once wrote:

"The deliberate pursuit of scenic realism is antagonistic to the ultimate laws of dramatic art......Dramatic illusions must ultimately spring from the active and unrestricted exercise of the imaginative faculty by author, actor and audience in joint partnership".[64]

Similarly Tagore says in his article on the Stage: "Any one of the arts is only to be seen in her full glory when she is the sole mistress...We all act to ourselves when we play

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[63] Javayatrir Patra p. 243. F. L. Lucas vehemently disagrees with this. See Tragedy pp. 144 et seq.

[64] Shakespeare and the Modern Stage

which cannot be sufficiently interpreted by such invisible acting has never yet gained the laurel of its author".[65] At another place he writes: "If the Hindu spectator has not been too far infected with the greed for realism and the Hindu artist has yet any respect for his craft and skill the best thing they can do for themselves is to regain their freedom by making a clean sweep of the costly rubbish that has accumulated round about and is clogging the stage".[66] This rubbish was, as we gather from his preface to *Tapatī*, the curtains which were in effect merely juvenile:

> আঁকা ছবির দ্বারা অত্যন্ত বেশী নির্দিষ্ট না হওয়াতেই দর্শকের মনে অবাধে সে আপন কাজ করতে পারে। ··· ··· মন যে যায়গায় আপন আসন নেবে সেখানে একটা পটকে বসিয়ে মনকে বিদায় দেবার নিয়ম যান্ত্রিক যুগে প্রচলিত হয়েছে, পূর্বে ছিল না। আমাদের দেশে চিরপ্রচলিত যাত্রা পালাগানে লোকের ভীড়ে স্থান সংকীর্ণ হয় বটে কিন্তু মন সংকীর্ণ হয় না। [67]

Elsewhere he had demanded that drama should be self complete but he soon realised the error of this view and when talking of the stage production of *Phalguni* had expressed the desire that it should build up the most complete effect possible.[68] This he (later on) believed ought to be brought about by the addition of rhythmic grace to the movement which accompanies any event of outstanding importance. "The dance here," wrote Rabindranath, "is just giving a rhythmic prominence to the events of the story, keeping in the background or leaving altogether the words. In dramas where words are matrical it is surely inconsistent

[65] and [66] Quoted by K. S. R. Sastri in his Rabindranath Tagore, pp. 86-87.

[67] Rachanavali Vol. XVII.

[68] Ibid Vol. XII, notes to *Phalguni*.

to leave the movements realistic Our very word for drama 'nāṭaka' shows that dance was its essential feature".[69]

Such a view immediately involves the acceptance of a new dramatic technique born out of a consideration for the poet in the theatre[70], and of a desire to go back to the ancient tradition. Dr. M. Ghosh believes that "from the word 'naṭa' and such words as 'naṭayati' it appears that the ancient Hindus had their plays danced and not acted...Hence in course of the abhinaya of the play, rhythm in all its possible aspects plays an important part and its rhythmical character conveyed through abhinaya and dance make it suitable for suggestion of the deepest and the most tender emotions".[71] With this dance in drama Aristotle has associated music[72], while Tagore had felt that rhythm is manifest both in the tunes and the dance. "Of the words that are the vehicle of poetry", wrote he, "the rhythm is governed by the natural laws of music but the meaning is artificial depending on sound symbols mutually adopted by men. Both are necessary for the poem...In dance rhythm alone is not sufficient for this kind of performance".[73] He even believed that the " heroes of Shakespeare not only fight in metre but die to it." That is to say, the effects of words have for purposes of coordination, to be extended, and transformed into rhythmical effects while the movements and gestures have to be of the dance type. " In dramas," concludes Tagore, "where the words are metrical it is surely inconsistent to leave the movement realistic."

The idea then, as stressed already, was of imaginative reality and the distance from actuality that this atti-

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[69] V. B. Quarterly op. cit. That this was a part of Sanskrit tradition is borne out by Ghosh in Prachin Bharatiya Natyakala p. 48.

[70] See my article in Hindustan Review April 1949.

[71] Quoted by A. Nicoll in Mask, Mimes and Miracles.

[72] Preface to his edition of the Abhinaya Darpana.

[73] Ibid.

tude involves was more than compensated by the flowing measure of songs and dances that his dance-dramas came to contain. Tagore emphasised that drama was an imaginative art:

> তা ছাড়া যে দর্শক তোমার অভিনয় দেখিতে আসিয়াছে তাহার কি নিজের সম্বল কানাকড়িও নাই ? ··· ··· যাহারা বিশ্বাস করিবার জন্য, আনন্দ করিবার জন্য আসিয়াছে তাহাদের এত ঠকাইবার আয়োজন কেন ? তাহারা নিজেদের কল্পনাশক্তি বাড়ীতে চাবী বন্ধ করিয়া আসে নাই। [74]

And therefore music, verse and dance in association with rhythm must achieve its effects by fostering the necessary illusion He chose to use the fullest effects of lyrics, dance, music and mimetic art:

> নাট্যাভিনয়ে আমাদের হৃদয় বিচলিত করবার অনেকগুলি উপকরণ একত্রে বর্ত্তমান আছে। সংগীত, আলোক, দৃশ্যপট, সুন্দর সাজসজ্জা সকলে মিলিয়া নানাদিক হইতে আমাদের চিত্তকে আঘাত করিয়া চঞ্চল করে তাহার মধ্যে একটা অবিশ্রাম ভাবস্রোত নানামূর্ত্তি ধারণ করিয়া প্রবাহিত হইয়া চলে। অভিনয় স্থলে ··· ··· ভিন্ন ভিন্ন আর্টের মধ্যে কতটা সহযোগিতা আছে।[75]

So far it was good—because the combination of these create a spectacle that does aid the maintenance of dramatic illusion. Towards this Tagore strove during the last half of his dramatic career ever emphasising that the play should satiate both the eye and the ear. But then did not this amount to a going back to the stage realism which he had condemned earlier—a realism whose specimen we find in *Shayama*? If Tagore had omitted the curtain had he not requisitioned the effects of costuming, light, colour and shade to make us forget (what he once

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[74] Rachanavali Vol. II, essay on "*Rangamancha*".

[75] Ibid. Vol. XII, p. 60-63.

insisted upon) that "the plays's the thing." As Lucas said, by stealing the drama from the ear to the eye Tagore had indirectly accepted that there was some shortcoming which prevented his plays from being popular successes. That he was trying to circumvent this is evident from the trend of his craft in *Shayama* and in *Muktir Upāyo* which have gone almost unnoticed. Tagore's contribution to dramatic theory should however be always significant.

THE VARUṆA HYMNS IN THE ṚGVEDA[1]

(Translated and annotated)

By V. M. Apte

Translation V. 85.1

(1) Sing forth a prayer, lofty, profound (and) pleasing, to the celebrated Varuṇa, the Suzerain, who struck apart the earth as an underspreading for Sūrya, as the immolating priest (strikes apart) the skin (of the sacrificial victim).

Notes V. 85. 1.

(a) *arcā*: metrical lengthening of *arca*=2. s. Ipv. of *arc*, ' to praise.' (d) upastíre is better taken as the Infinitive of *stṛ* ' to strew ' with *ūpa* than as the dat. sing. of *upastír* f. which gives us two awkward datives of nouns in one pāda. There is great force in the contention of Sāyaṇa, who quotes T.S. 1.2.12.1 to show that by *pṛthivī* here is meant the extended firmament—the third or uppermost layer of the *pṛthivī* as distinguished from *bhūmi*, a distinction explicitly made in v. 4 below and in the immediately preceding hymn where the *pṛthivī* is said to quicken *bhūmi* (v=1), to scatter the swelling cloud (v.2) and to send down the showers of heaven from the lightnings of her clouds (v.3). For the second hemistich, compare 1.24.8 where Varuṇa is said to have made a broad path for Sūrya and II.15.2 where Indra is said to have spread out the *pṛthivī*. For the simile, cf. I.85.5 where the Maruts are said to moisten the earth like a hide Indra brings together heaven and earth like a skin (VIII. 6.5).

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[1] The first instalment covering *ṚV*. I. 24. 6-15; 25. 1-6, the second covering *ṚV*. I. 25. 7-21 and the third covering II. 28 have been published in the January-February, May-June-July and November issues of 1947, respectively of the *Bhāratīya Vidyā*.

Translation V. 85.2.

(2) On the forest (—top)s, has he extended the firmament, strength (he has extended) unto the Chargers, (and) milk unto Kine. Varuṇa has established (the capacity for) feeling in the hearts (of beings), Agni in the Waters, Sūrya in heaven and Soma on the Mountain.

Notes V. 85.2.

(a) *Vāneṣu*: Sāyaṇa's interpretation of this word as "the tops of trees" has much to commend itself in view of the quotation (he gives) from the Vājasaneyaka, which almost annotates our pāda. It is also possible to render it as the 'waters,' which is, not infrequently, the meaning of the word in the *ṚV* (See Grassman's Wörterbuch and the *Naighaṇṭuka* (I.12) and then understand by the 'waters' the *Cosmic Waters* (for the hypothesis of which, see notes on *ṚV* II. 28.4), were it not for the reference to the same (=waters) in pāda (c) in which Fire is placed by Varuṇa. The 'fire-bearing' waters can be accounted for satisfactorily by the hypothesis of the Cosmic Waters. (b) *usrı́yā* is the Fem. of *usrı́ya* ('ruddy') from USRA ('red'). The ruddy ones are the Cows (=the ruddy beams of the Dawn ?).

Translation V. 85.3.

(3) Varuṇa has poured forth (*prá sasarja*) the cask with a downward opening, on to heaven and earth, on to the firmament. With that, the ruler of the entire world moistens the earth, as the rain (moistens) the barley.

Notes V. 85.3

(a) *Nicīna-bāram*: a parallel expression is *Jihmá-bāram*, 'with a cross-wise or athwart opening' which means virtually 'with the opening downwards.' *Kárandha* is explained by Sāyaṇa following Yāska, as a 'cloud' and

though rendered literally by Grassman, Müller and others as 'a cask, barrel' or 'a water-skin' is understood by them as a figurative expression for 'the inverted cask of the cloud.' The theory of Tilak[2] that these expressions refer to the *antepodal* region (like 'Hades' of the Greeks and Egyptians), conceived by the ancients as an inverted tub or hemisphere full of darkness and *full of waters* is interesting. The Aśvins (he points out) had to make an opening in its side and push the waters up so that they may eventually come down in the form of rain to satisfy the thirst of Gotama (I.116.9). (d) It is doubtful if *yáva* in the *ṚV*. means exactly ' barley ' as in later literature. ' Corn or grain ' in general would be a better rendering.

Translation V. 85.4.

(4) When Varuṇa desires milk, right then (*ād id*) he moistens the earth (*bhūmi*) and *pṛthivī* (the upper earth); the mountains (then) drape themselves with the clouds; (and) the Heroes developing (or displaying) their might loosen (them i.e. the mountains).

Notes V. 85. 4

(a) For the distinction of *bhūmi* from *pṛthivī*, see notes on v. 1 above. (b) *dugdhám*: the rain shed by the Maruts is figuratively referred to as ' milk ' in I.116.3 ; 64.6 (*payas*) and the Maruts are described in (d) as co-operating with Varuṇa in shedding rain (c). This is one of the signs of approaching rain cf. V. 63.6 (d) That *Vīrāḥ* refers to the Maruts is clear from references to them in V.61.4 (*vīrāsaḥ*), VI.66.10 (*vīrāḥ*) I.85.1; X.77.3 etc. From VIII.7.4, it is clear that the Maruts coming on with the winds cause the mountains to quake (which is the same thing as the ' loosening ' of the mountains mentioned here). The moistening of heaven and earth and the

[2] *The Arctic Home in the Vedas*, 306-8.

firmament mentioned in this and the preceding verse is hinted at in IV.42.4 where Varuṇa says "I let the moistening waters swell;" the 'swelling' represents the overflowing of the waters on to heaven and earth; cf. also VII.87.1.

Translation V. 85.5.

(5) This great mysterious power of Varuṇa OF THE ASURA CLASS, the famous one, will I now (*ū*), proclaim —(of Varuṇa) who having stood in the firmament measured out the earth, with the sun as with a measure.

Notes V. 85.5.

(a) (*ū*) *u*: The anaphoric use of this enclitic (often written *ū* as here) particle appearing at the beginning of this and the next verse after the repeated word *imām* is to be noted. It means 'now' or 'also' (as in the next verse) according to context. It emphasizes the deictic pronoun, it is associated with. *āsurásya*: Many gods, markedly Varuṇa (or Mitrā-Varuṇā), Indra and Agni receive the epithet *ásura*. The fact that it is applied to Varuṇa, oftener than to Indra or Agni although each of the latter two gods is celebrated in a much larger number of hymns shows that it is specially applicable to Varuṇa. He is however, described here as *āsurá*, 'of the Asura brand or order.' In the *Avesta*, *ahura* (=*asura*) is a designation of the highest god and in the ṚV. the word *asura* is predominantly used of gods but in the *Atharva-veda* and later, the word means 'demon' or 'devil' only. An attempt to explain this semantic transition has been made by Macdonell.[3] For the view of the writer see note on *ṚV*. I.24.14 *ante*, where *ásura* is explained as "the Being who possesses the highest measure of *ásu*, regarded by the Primitives as a supernatural fluid investing the possessor with

[3] *Vedic Mythology*, pp. 156-7.

occult powers," (c) and (d). The act of measuring is frequently referred to, when the metaphor of building is employed in connection with the formation of the world. Whereas however, the measuring instrument (or instruments) is mentioned in a vague and general manner, elsewhere (III.38.3; II.15.3), it is here specified as the 'sun.'

Translation V.85.6.

(b) This great, mysterious power also (*u*) of the most sapient god, no one at all (*nú*) has dared (to call in question)—(the power) whereby the (many) shimmering (rivers), drenching with (their) water(s) (but) one ocean, do not (over—) fill it!

Notes V 85.6.

(c) *éniḥ*: feminine of *éta*, to be distinguished from *énī*, the Nom. P. of which is *enyàḥ*. Grassman would rather assign the meaning 'hastening, or darting forward' to this word, in our passage deriving it from the root *i* to go and thinks that the meaning 'speckled, dappled, striped or shimmering' is not well authenticated in the *ṚV.*; but PW. Geldner and W. Neisser do not think so and they are right. The rivers as they rush along burst with white foam on the surface of the swirling mass of dark waters and present the spectacle of a contrast in colours (black and white). The fact that though hundreds of rivers continually empty their waters into the ocean, there is no overflowing of the latter was looked upon as a miracle. For the metaphor of the filling of the ocean, compare I.52.4.

Translation V. 85.7.

(7) Whatsoever the sin we (might) have committed, O Varuṇa, anytime ever (*sádam it*), against an (esteemed) confrere (*aryáman*), an ally (*mitrá*), a friend, a brother, a neighbour or a stranger, loosen that (from us).

F. 27

Notes. V. 85. 7.

(a) *aryamyàm*: What precisely is the meaning here (from a syntactical point of view) of this adjective from *aryamán*, (with the parallel one: *mitryàm* from *mitrá*)? If it means '(something) relating to an *aryáman*' (*mitryam* = something relating to a mitra.) as Macdonell[4] takes it, then it will be syntactically connected with *āgaḥ*, the reference being to sin relating to or affecting an *aryáman* i.e. committed *against* him but there will be a break in the construction of the relative clause because the first two accusatives (*aryamyàm* and *mitryàm*) will qualify *āgaḥ* and the next four accusatives beginning with *sákhāyam* and ending with *áraṇam* will stand in apposition to *āgaḥ*, with the verb—form of *kṛ* and denote the person as a direct object beside the thing (*āgaḥ*). If, however, *aryamyàm* (or *mitrayàm*) denotes 'a person connected with i.e. *of the order* of an *aryamán* (or *mitra*)' or is taken as equivalent to *aryamán* (as *Sāyaṇa* takes it) then all the six accusatives will be *uniformly second accusatives* of the type described above. This point has not attracted the attention it deserves from scholars. *aryamán*: the word is distinguished from *sakhā* in X. 117.6 and from that word as well as *mitra*, here. The *original* meaning probably is 'a worthy or good friend'; 'a dear, beloved or intimate person, though it has a semantic evolution almost parallel to that of *arí* in several passages and means 'a nobleman giving freely' or 'someone worthy of respect.' The meaning 'a worthy comrade' glides sometimes into 'a wooer, suitor or fiancé, the young (male) consort.' (d) *Sīm*: Here is an illustration of this enclitic particle (restricted to the ṚV) giving sometimes the sense of 'ever' to the relative pronoun after which it is placed. For the pada, compare I.179.5. For the whole verse cf.

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[4] *Vedic Mythology*. p. 45.

II.28.10 and especially 1.185.8 where there is a similar use of the double accusative.

V.85.8.

For the translation of and notes on this stanza, see II.28.10 with which it is identical and which is already tanslated and annotated in the earlier Varuṇa hymn namely II.28. in a previous issue of the *Bhāratīya Vīdyā*.

SANSKRIT AS A MEDIUM OF CONVEYING THE CONCEPT OF ABSTRACTION

By SIDDHESHWAR VARMA

THE mental process called abstraction, usually consisting of selecting same part of a complex whole and neglecting others, is of great importance for all real knowledge. Even common nouns like " horse," "cow" etc. are really an abstratcion, as they represent only the general features of a horse etc., neglecting the specific qualities of individuals. This abstraction saves time, the mind being directed only to certain characteristics which have a bearing on the subject in hand.

In all abstract thinking language of a peculiar character is required. The higher the level of thinking, the lesser will be the number of words used. In fact some authorities even propose that in order to represent scientific thought accurately, human language should be discarded altogether, and symbology ordering on Mathematical technique should be substituted for it, in order to avoid any misunderstanding or unconscious misrepresentation. But no constructive plan for such a substitution has been arrived at so far, and human language still dominates all representation of human thought. Besides the number of words, the form of words in higher abstract thinking acquires a peculiarity, varying with the particular system of a language.

It should be clearly understood that though every concept is a unit, a single concept is often a composite unit, consisting of many ideas, and these in many, if not most languages, require a phrase to express it. Thus " man's conquest of nature " is a single concept but this concept is a composite unity, consisting of three ideas

and expressed, in English, by a phrase consisting of four words. But this linguistic form consisting of separate words has several disadvantages: (1) It does not vividly give the impression that the composite concept like "man's conquest of nature" is a single concept, in fact such a unity could be grasped only by an advanced student, not by the man of the street. (2) It consists of a superfluous number of words, which are an encumbrance on higher thinking. Now it is the glory of Sanskrit to have the capacity of expressing most of the single concepts in single words, however composite those concepts may be, so that the above concept will be rendered in Sanskrit into the following single compound word:—

manuṣyakṛtaprakṛtivijaya—man made nature conquest.

This abstractive brevity of Sanskrit is very helpful to scientific thinking; it stimulates clarity of thought, by the presentation of most of the composite concepts as units, it expedites scientific thought by the comparative elimination of unnecessary words and thus renders it easy for thought to produce another thought very quickly.

Sanskrit mechanism for the expression of abstraction is two-fold:—(1) Compound words. The number of compound words in scientific and philosophical Sanskrit is enormous. To many these compounds are a bugbear, but to deeper students they are a simplification, being an elimination of all grammar in the interior of a compound word. In fact a person who has studied languages comparatively is inclined to compare Sanskrit to some extent to the language of the Eskimos, in which every word, when isolated, keeps its grammatical form intact, but when this word is used in a sentence, it is entirely denuded of grammar. Being thus freed from grammar, the internal portions of Sanskrit compounds may also be compared to Chinese, which has no grammar in the common acceptance

of the term. The advantages of compounds in abstract thinking will be evident from the example given above—unity, brevity and speed. (2) Endings of words, technically called "suffixes." There are two remarkable features of Sanskrit suffixes, viz., comprehensiveness and boldness. Thus, corresponding to the English suffix (-ship), as in word "friendship", one of the Sanskrit suffixes is (-tva-), which however, has far wider, and bolder significance. For instance the word asva in Sanskrit means a horse, but when the suffix—*tva* is added to this word, *aśvatva*—literally meaning " horseship " has several meanings which vary with the context—(a) The characteristic features of a horse, (b) the fact of being a horse, (c) a horse as such, so, though aśva—itself is an abstract term, *aśvatva*—is the further abstraction of this abstract. This (tva-) could be added to any Sanskrit name in order to denote any of these meanings. This bold wideness of the Sanskrit suffix is certainly remarkable, if not unique, among the languages of the world. Thus when we have to describe the manner in which the horse as such differs from the cow as such, we cannot say in English that "horseness" differs in such and such a way from the "cowness." All abstract thinking however, does involve such concepts, for the expression of which Sanskrit does possess mechanisms. This suffixal mechanism here is a beautiful contrivance to avoid all, such cumbrous phrases as " the characteristic features—etc.," and has thus the advantages of brevity and speed, contributing to clearer thinking.

We shall now take up a few illustrative specimens of Sanskrit abstractive terminology as used in 4 branches of human knowlegde viz., (I) General Science, (II) Philosophy, (III) Psychology, and (IV) Linguistics.

(1) "The state of being established by science." This cumbrous phrase of seven words will be expressed in Sanskrit by one word :—

Śāstrasiddhatva.

Science state of being established.

(2) "Impossibility of being an instrument." This collection of 5 words will be rendered into the following single word in Sanskrit :—

Kāraṇatvāsambhava.

being an instrument impossibility.

(3) " The state of being an instrument " :—
kāraṇatva.

(4) " The state of being within the scope of science"—
śāstraviṣayatā.

Science state of being scope.

II. Philosophy:—

(1) "Relation between the states of one who favours and the favoured one—"	upakāryopakārakabhāvasambandha. favoured one who favours state relating.
(2) "The state of being one who favours "—	upakārakatva
(3) "Cognition of the relation between the states of the original and the modification "—	prakṛtivikṛtibhāvapratīti— original modification state cognition.
(4) "The fact of pertaining to the same class"—	sājātya.
(5) "The state of being a substance "—	dravyatva.
(6) "The fact of being an established matter of universal experience—"	sarvānubhavasiddhatva.

(7) "A subtle and primary element—"	tanmātra— that only.

III. Psychology.

(1) "Cognition of cognitive experience—"	anuvyavasāya.
(2) "Having nothing to do with consciousness—"	caitanyāsparśa— consciousness not touching.
(3) "The nature of making perceive—"	grāhakatva
(4) "Conveying the nature of an attribute—"	viśeṣaṇatva-bodhaka
(5) "The fact of being characterized by one quality—"	ekaviśeṣaṇavaiśiṣṭya— one quality characterization.
(6) "Cognition characterized by the pitcher as such—"	ghaṭatva viśiṣṭajñāna— plcher as such charactrised cognition.
(7) "Cognition of the object of cognition—"	bodhya-jnana— object of cognition.
(8) "The state of being imaginary—"	kalpanikatva.

IV. Linguistics.

(1) The nature of having two objects—	dvikarmakatā— two object state.
(2) The theory that the sentence has no part—	vākyākhaṇḍatva-vāda— sentence having no part
(3) The fact of being syntactically related—	anvitatva.
(4) The nature of vanishing as soon as pronounced—	uccārita-pradhvaṁsitva— pronounced vanished nature.

(5) The fact of being pronounced—	uccaritatva.
(6) "the expression tooth—"	dantatva.
(7) "the expression lip—"	Oṣṭhatva.
(8) "Illusion of being language."	'sabdatva-bhrama—being language illusion.
(9) "The nature of being a sentence—"	vakyatva.

From the above examples it will be definitely clear that Sanskrit terminology in sciences and arts has a remarkable abstractive expressiveness, and has a distinct advantage over many other widely-prevaling languages like English. Its elimination of accessory phrases renders it as a practicable substitute for algebraic symbology, possessing the latter's virtues, yet free from its unattractive features.

YOGA AND THE CREATIVE POWERS OF THE MIND

By H. L. Sharma

§1. *Inner dynamism of human nature*

According to Yoga, brain is the fine evolute of Nature, and is superimposed upon an underlying infinite ocean of spiritual energy (चितिशक्ति). The brain is in a state of flux, and is characterized by tendencies to manifestation, action and emotion. The relation of the mind to the brain is neither causal nor spatial, nor temporal. There is thus neither interaction nor parallelism between the two. The relation is that of mutual fitness(योग्यतालक्षणसम्बन्ध). The mind-energy (चितिशक्ति) has the power to illumine (चेतयिता) and energise the brain, without which the cerebral activity will remain an intricate molecular drama. But the brain has the fitness to individuate (अस्मिता) and canalize the soul-energy, without which it will have no power to contact with the environment.

Brain, in itself, has no centrality, but, under the influence of the tendency to individuation in Nature, it centralizes the bio-cerebral activity on the one hand and thus creates individual selfsense, and on the other, delimits and canalizes[2] the mind-energy. According to this view, the cerebral centralization is absolutely essential for even crude sensori-motor reaction. Thus the nervous system indicates a subjective orientation of the revolutionary process at a

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[1] The page references given in this article are from the *Yoga-Darśanam* with Patanjali's *Bhāṣya*, Vācaspati's Vyākhyā published by H. D. Gupta and Sons, Banaras, 1911, p. 157 and p. 211.

[2] p. 164. "मनोविज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यावस्थातोऽपनीय वर्तमानावस्थामापादयदुत्पत्तिकारणं विज्ञानस्य" *Cf.* Bergson—The brain reduces the nascent movements to actual movements.

very early stage. In fact, subjectivity[3] (व्यवसायात्मकता)[4] and objectivity (व्यवसेयात्मकता) are the earliest bifurcations of the evolutionary scheme. This view[5] leads us to distinguish what we may call the centripetal conception of psycho-dynamics and the other, centrofugal. According to the first, perception begins at the periphery, and stimulation travels inwards where mind comes to grips with it. The centrifugal theory regards mind as the creative energy, and perception as a form of spiritual creation. The mind-energy flows out and is captured and canalized by the nervous system. The object stimulates the manifestive organ, and the mind-energy saturating the entire receptive apparatus *creates* an experience—perception.

The entire bio-cerebral organism is fitted to become the vehicle of the creative mind-energy. Emotions, conations and cognitions are, physiologically seated in the visceral, glandular and cerebral activities. But they do not consist only in these organic concomitants. They are the acts of creation by the individuated soul, and, because their essence lies deep in the creating and illuminating energy, they remain unknown (अपरिदृष्टधर्म) to the conscious level of mind. Deep down the conscious mind is the surging sea of joy, knowledge and energy.

§2. *Yoga as the process of psycho-cerebral integration*

On a surface view of the matter, one may find that Yoga produces a negative state of the mind. Nothing can be further from the truth than this. For Yoga produces

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[3] P.147. "......एकादशं मनः, सर्वार्थम्-इत्येतान्यस्मितालक्षणस्या विशेषस्य विशेषः" १।१९

[4] P. 262.

[5] P. 21.

[6] Pp. 266-267. ' चित्तस्य द्वये धर्माः—परिदृष्टाश्चापरिदृष्टाश्च। .... वस्तुमात्रात्मका अपरिदृष्टाः। ....."निरोधधर्मसंस्काराः परिणामोऽथ जीवनम्। चेष्टाशक्तिश्च चित्तस्य धर्मा दर्शनवर्जिताः"॥

a positive state, in whose overflow of spiritual energy, the most revolutionary ideas and institutions were boring the noblest characters, took their form and life and great inventions made. Yoga is not prescribed only to the mystics and ascetics : It is equally meant for the common man whose workaday existence is hard, whose will and intellect are dulled by the tyranny of socio-economic order, and who, in a state of utter despair and constant repression, border on the neurosis. Yoga is prescribed for every one who wants to free his spiritual energies for growth and creation of a harmonious order within and without, and develop his capacities for science and art.

All conditions of creation and enjoyment are conditions of being 'free'. But freedom is not a negative state of the mind. Relaxation, if it is not a morbid index of escape-seeking, is a state of poise and balance (समत्व योग उच्यते—गीता), and can result from complete reconditioning of the mind. A new order has to be set in our emotional make-up by means of incessant effort, taking care always that peace is not confused with silent, unconscious frustration. Yoga lays down the conditions of balance leading to relaxation, and points out the process of re-conditioning the mind for creative career.

First we take Yoga as an integrative process.

Our ordinary state of the mind is sufficiently stormy and dissipated, in the sense that the instincts, seeking their natural ends and meeting opposition everywhere, become embittered, and charged as they are with elemental energy, they destroy the balance and rhythm of life. The primal restlessness with whose energy are they charged, and from which they flow out as incessant sparks, simply seeks their satisfaction. In that they are innocent[7], though insistent. They require delicate handling, for the ways of repression.

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[7] P. 39. "चित्तनदी नामोभयतो वाहिनी वहति कल्याणाय, वहति पापाय च."

indulgence or rationalization with them are not without their dangers. Even Religion, Art or Ethics are poor escapes, and are ways of surrogate satisfaction. To be blind to their reality, and to retract from them is death of the self. Yoga succeeds in giving us a positive approach to tackle these ' inner drives,' we call desires, and, tame them for our greatest advantage.

The way of Yoga is to cultivate an attitude which is, psychologically the healthiest inasmuch as it starts a process of progressive integration in the realm of ever-surging yearnings of our conative life. One has to slowly build up this attitude by outward regulation and inward organization. Outwordly, the aspirant to this creative state of the mind should practise abstinence, control breath, fasts, etc. This will bring about organic harmony and health. Yoga warns against the practice of austerity or severe asceticism which creats bodily disharmony (धातुवैषम्य)[8] The aim of outward regulation[9] is to create neuro-organic integration and health without medication. In the mental plane, Yoga makes a clear suggestion to the law of emotional ambivalence—all emotions spring from a common care, e.g., love and hate, anger and pity etc. are the divergent developments of common psychic energy. Their source of vitality being the same, one can be balanced by the other. A state of poise in our emotional make-up is possible to establish in this way.

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[8] P. 106. "“तावन्मात्रमेव तपश्चरणीयं, न यावता धातुवैषम्यमापद्येत”। On this is the interesting comment of Balarama: “तपःशब्देन चात्र कामानशनत्वं हितमितमेध्याशित्वं च गृह्यते....। अत एव श्रुतौ “तपसाऽनाशकेन” ” इत्याम्नातम्। अनेन योगिना चित्तप्रसादाऽविरोध्येव तपोऽनुष्ठेयमिति परमर्षिभिर्मन्यत इत्यर्थः ।।

[9] The *Gita* is emphatic on the issue of 'regulation' of desires and warns us against repression and indulgence: नात्यश्नतस्तु योगोस्ति न चैकान्तमनश्नतः। न चातिस्वप्नशीलस्य जाग्रतो नैव चार्जुन। युक्ताहारविहारस्य युक्तचेष्टस्य कर्मसु। युक्तस्वप्नावबोधस्य योगो भवति दुःखहा ।।६। १६,१७ ।।

There are other ways also to bring about inward harmony of instinctive energy. A person of religious turn of mind may gather round the divine idea his entire spiritual energy and his instinctive life may find its central meaning in the identification with the divine quality. A man of studious habits may teach all his instincts to obey the dictates of his scientific pursuit. Even an object of worldly love—the beautiful devoted wife—or anything for that matter, that can evoke the greatest emotional reactions of the soul, devotion to some cause or unconditional surrender to some noble thought or person; can help us creating a state of emotional poise which paves the way for Samadhi.

The process of bringing about mental poise is called citta-parikarma (चित्त-परिकर्म).[10] I translate it as 'integration', though this term is rich enough to convey much more meaning besides. Through citta-parikarma Samādhi; the highest state of spiritual creativity is attained. The first aspect of citta-parikarma is citta-prasādanaṁ (चित्तप्रसादनम्)[11] —a negative aspect which means cleansing the mind of its black-coverings (कालुष्य) like jealousy against the happy, aggressiveness against the weak and unhappy etc. But the mind cannot be cleaned of its blackness by ridding it of its emotions. Yoga's approach is pointedly positive here. It is through a culture of emotion (भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम्). Jealousy cannot be got rid of just by focussing our attention on it: Rather we should develop the attitude of love in place of it. This surge of positive emotions like love, sympathy and joy etc. cannot rise in the mind without regulation of the mind, says the *Gita* (न चायुक्तस्य भावना) and joy will be attainable not by drying up the fountain of

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[10] P. 79....सर्वं सुसूक्ष्मविषयमप्यापवर्गात् सुश्रद्धीयते—एतदर्थमेवेदं चित्तपरिकर्म निर्दिश्यते ।

[11] P. 77. मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् ।

परिकर्म = चित्तस्थैर्यहेतुचित्तप्रसादसाधनं मैत्र्यादिभावनाचतुष्टयम् ।

human emotions (न चाभावयतः शान्तिरशान्तस्य कुतः सुखम्), but by growing more intense emotions in it. Then citta-prasādanaṁ leads to perfect mental poise (चित्तस्थैर्यं) which, by its inherent virtue, dissolves all deep complexes[12] making us unfree. Thus citta-parikarma means building up a new emotional order by the process of integration and broadening the vision of the mind.

§3. *The release of creative powers*

Yoga, we have maintained, is psycho-organic integration or citta-parikarma. It is common[13] to all stages of mental integration. Leaving those whose minds are deranged or diseased, Yoga regards the first stage of those whose energies are scattered (क्षिप्त)[14] in 'getting and spending' and with whom the world is too much. These people have created nothing but chaos and confusion with their scatter-brains. But even when these creatures of the earth have to devise an adjustment to a situation, they practise cool concentration. They are otherwise always hurrying and worrying, and have 'no time to stand and stare' the delicate charms of the budding flowers and rosy fruits, have never felt into their souls the vastness of the oceans and mountains, and breath of the morning breeze and sigh of the rustling leaves. They carry commerce in the artist's studio.

The second stage of integration is of those who are infatuated (मूढ)[15] They are enomoured of something, some fetisch, religious or social dogma and the tike. They

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[12] The *Gita*: प्रसादे सर्वदुःखानां हानिरस्योपजायते । प्रसन्नचेतसो ह्याशु बुद्धिः पर्यवतिष्ठते ॥२।६५॥

[13] स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तस्य धर्मः p. 6. The word Samādhi has been used both as process and stage. As a process it means Yoga, though the first three stages have been judiciously precluded, there being little attempted integration.

[14] क्षिप्तं—सदैव रजसा तेषु तेषु विषयेषु क्षिप्यमाणमत्यन्तमस्थिरम्। p. 7.

[15] मूढं—तु तमःसमुद्रेकान्निद्रावृत्तिमतम्। p. 7.

are so much absorbed in love or hate that they reach more or less, a concentration of their energies. But they are said to be infatuated, because their fetisch absorbs them so much that it does not leave them free for further integration. They are generally the political enthusiasts and religious fanatics.

At the next higher stage are the common men whom we can meet at every turn of the lane. They are sober and considerate; they 'look before and after' and succeed in domesticating the insurgent animal appetites. They are docile and meekly submit to social and moral sanctions. They protest but humbly and mind their business. They are alive to their psyco-social surroundings, borrow the best ideas of others, and admire poetry and painting, and panorama of natural scenes with shadowy understanding. They create no institutions, planes or principles of life. They are known in the language of Yoga, as other-than-the scatter-brain (विक्षिप्त) [16]

None of the above three classes of people are capable of creation in any true sense of the term. Their waking experience consists of shadowy, fleeting snap-shots of the surroundings. The tremendous sense of reality, the overwhelming effect of colour, tone and touch, and the intense and magic thrill created by falls and fountains, rushing winds and sleeping seas,—these and the profound experience of pathos and ironies of human existence are known only to those glad hearts who have taught themselves ' to stand and stare' with unruffled calm. In such souls is art born and are born those profound feelings from which spring all great religions and revolutions

We have to discover the source of creative power. Yoga postulates that an infinite mind-energy (चितिशक्ति) underlies the individual mind. Heredity in the form of

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[16] विक्षिप्तं—क्षिप्ताद्विशिष्टम्। विशेषोऽस्थेमबहुलस्य कादाचित्कः स्थेमा p. 7.

bioplasm and psychoplasm (कर्माशय and वासनाप्रचय)[17] conditions mind's capacity to draw from its underlying source. But Yoga points out the practical method of thinning down the condition through the process of self-growth. Yoga is indeed the process of self-growth. It leads us to the state of Samādhi[18] through seven stages. The first is the stage of Yama.[19] It includes all principles of self-organization for spiritual and creative life, e.g., non-violence (अहिंसा)[20] is the principle or realising the common spiritual essence in men. Vyāsa regards it as the basic principle which is made brighter[21] by all that follows it. So are truth, non-stealthy and non-begging attitudes. Principles of self-regulation and temperance are called Niyama (नियम)[22]. Long and continued practice of Yama and Niyama creates stable mental balance and tones up the psycho-organic system. This naturally leads to calm posture (आसन)[23] and control of vital breath (प्राणायाम)[24], significant of bodily regeneration. Here we have travelled half-way towards Samādhi. Here also we leave behind the obsessive urges of animal life. There is in Prāṇāyāma the end of ugly and evil existence and the beginning of a highly vitalized and enriched life.

A good deal of psycho-organic energy is flowing along the peripheral channels. When this energy has learnt to

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[17] Pp. 125—127.

[18] यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि p. 171.

[19] अहिंसासत्यमस्तेयब्रह्मचर्याऽपरिग्रहा यमाः। p. 172.

[20] तत्राहिंसा––सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वभूतानामनभिद्रोहः.

[21] उत्तरे च यमनियमास्तन्मूलास्तत्सिद्धिपरतया तत्प्रतिपादनाय प्रतिपाद्यन्ते, तदवदातरूपकरणायैवोपादीयन्ते। p. 172.

[22] Pp. 182-183.

[23] स्थिरसुखमासनम्। p. 185.— ततो द्वन्द्वानभिघातः। p. 186.

[24] तस्मिन् सति श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः। p. 186. ततः क्षीयते प्रकाशाऽवरणम्। p. 190 "तपो न परं प्राणायामात्ततो विशुद्धिर्मलानां दीप्तिश्च ज्ञानस्य" "इति p. 190.

Tapas is an important term in Yoga Psychology, which means intense self-activity for growth of the self from one psycho-moral plane to another.

return and rest in its original matrix, we have Pratyāhāra (प्रत्याहार)[25]. It is a state of complete rest, and the entire body and sense-organs are refreshed and rejuvenated for heightened action. Up to this stage, however, we are only struggling to break the barriers to creation. It is an effort for recuperation to begin the creative life. We now come to last stages.

Our individual minds are rather feebly switched on to the central reservoir of creative energy. We, however always draw from it by the process of concentration of vital power at our disposal. Even when we are trying to discover a new relation by means of reasoning, we are collecting ourselves and focussing it to one point. As its result, the conclusion enters the conscious levels unawares. As a matter of fact, we never think on the conscious plane, but we have thoughts coming up to us from a depth within. So is the case with other highly creative states of the mind.

Energy flows to us, as it were in spurts or fountain-like gushes. The secret of genius is the capacity to concentrate on some focal point. Yoga regards concentration (धारणा) [26] as the first step towards creative sate. Dhāraṇa means holding the mind on to some point. Modern Psychology describes only the three stages of the (क्षिप्त, मूढ and विक्षिप्त) which it calls the waking experience of a normal man. Interest that has been evinced in dreams is very recent. The regions of deep sleep and a state of transcendence as the fourth stage of the mind remain totally ignored. When the state of focussed energy (एकाग्र)[27] emerges, the flow of life is continuous and in one direction. This has been called meditation (ध्यान)[28]. It is a highly charged state, and, burns with the clearest flame of consciousness.

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[25] स्वविषयाऽसम्प्रयोगे चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः । p. 191.

[26] देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा। p. 194.

[72] एकाग्र—एकतानं [वाच०तत्त्व०वै०। p. 7.]

[28] तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् p. 145. एकतानता—सदृशप्रवाहः । "एकतानता एकाग्रता"।

The process of Yoga is not merely emptying the mind of old hoards of thoughts and emotions, but re-filling it also by opening up untapped springs of life and its serene joys. So when the meditative state has set in and is stabilized, there is, first, unburdening of the mind of its complex fears ana loosening of the individuality-bonds. It is the state of liberation and relaxation, and the subjective limits being overthrown, the objects shine with steady bright blaze. There is complete absorption[29] of subjects' psycho-neural energy in the objects' quality. The object, surcharged with immense vitality, produces an intimate sense of its reality. Its flow and flicker being over, the mind sees the object from the nearest. This tremendous impression of reality produced by the object in this state has been called super-perception. (परप्रत्यक्ष)

In fact our ordinary perception is shadowy, photographic and not a real presentation of the object. When we behold green trees and flower-beds in bloom, the colour and form of things have a tendency to enter our soul and overwhelm us with their enchantment. But the commercial needs of life check this tendency from developing into a state of Samādhi, and cut short and thus dilute the real perceptual experience. But the tendency is there,—the tendency for self-absorption.[30] This tendency, rightly called Einfühlung, is at the root of all aesthetic experience, and even all joys and pathos of life.

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[29] तदेवार्थमात्रनिभासंस्वरूपशून्यमिवसमाधिः। p. 195. Samādhi, from the point of view of Psychology, is the tendency to self-merger, so essential for any intensified perception as in acsthetic enjoyment cr watching difficult games and sports. The subject is un-burdened so that the object may shine forth in full blaze in it: ध्यानमेव ध्येयाकारनिर्भासं प्रत्ययात्मकेन स्वरूपेव शून्यमिव या भवति ध्येयस्वभावावेशात्तदा समाधिरित्युच्यते। p. 196.

[30] Here a question is posed: अथ लब्धस्थितिकस्य चेतसः किं स्वरूपा किं वषया वा समापत्तिः? क्षीणवृत्तेरभिजातस्येव मणेर्गहीतृग्रहणग्राह्येषु तत्स्थतदञ्जनता समापत्तिः p. 85.

There are many roads leading to Samādhi. But psychologically these seven stages have to be gone through. There are many sub-stages in the Samādhi state. But in each of the succeeding one there is greater intellectual illumination (प्रज्ञालोक[30]–ज्ञानदीप्ति[31]–वैशारद्यम्).[32] It is not a state of introversion or infantilism or a state of matter resulting from the death-wish of Freud and his school, as may be supposed by an unwary reader, for in introversion etc. there is a lowering of the vitality and a morbid escapist tendency. On the other hand, Samādhi invigorates the will to face reality, and creates a healthy and integrated attitude towards life and its demands. Cognitively, Samādhi has been significantly called विशोका[33] ज्योतिष्मती.) That is, it is the state when perceptual presentations are accurate and intimate, imagination, vivid and unfaltering, and the unclouded intellection following the light of truth. We have then ऋतम्भरा[34] प्रज्ञा, or then the mind, which has outgrown the limits of individuality, eliminates all chances of illogicalities. Emotionally and aesthetically, Samādhi is the sweetest state मधुमती), for, as we have seen, aesthetic enjoyment is proportional to the capacity for self-absorption. Lastly, from the standpoint of ethical life, it is known as धर्ममेघ[15] —a term meaning the shower of virtue. It means that a person with capacity for Samādhi has organized his urges under the broadest purpose of life, and created such a dynamic and ever expanding vision of human existence that vice becomes impossible. Thus from whatever point

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[30] तज्जयात् प्रज्ञालोकः। p. 196.

[31] दीप्तिश्च ज्ञानस्य p. 190.

[32] बुद्धिसत्वं हि प्रकाशस्वभावं सर्वार्थदर्शनसमर्थमपि तमसावृतं यत्रैव रजसोद्घाट्यते तत्रैव गृह्णाति। यदा त्वभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यामपास्तरजस्तमोमलमनवद्य वैशारद्यम् उद्योतते....(वाचस्पति मिश्र) a. 99.

[33] विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती। p. 81.

[34] ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञा। p. 99.

[5] प्रसंख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्ममेघः समाधिः।

of view we consider, Yoga practice seems to be the self-directed effort to attain perfect experience. Yoga is the way of most creative and fruitful life.

§4. *Application of the Yoga Psycho-dynamics*

Yoga is nothing esoteric. It is a system of Psycho-dynamics, only true to India's soil and civilization in its outlook and postulates. Below we make an attempt to illustrate how Yoga explains creation in Art.

Yoga divides all mental states into waking, dream, sleep and Samadhi. Waking means wakefulness which means certain emotional tensions required for effort and adjustment. During dream we relax, which means we relax *into* a new order of tensions in the subterraneous regions of the mind. Thence we descend into sleep, where the psycho-neural tensions seem to be at rest. Western Psychology is not certain about the nature of dreamless sleep. According to Yoga, it is a *positive* state, where though the tensions of the upper regions have ceased to operate, new laws emerge and take hold of the mind. Its laws are as definite as those of dream state or wakefulness. Many of our art-creations evidence the operations of these sub-regional laws. Samādhi differs from these states in certain fundamental points: It is not a descent, but ascent from wakefulness. It is an intensification of life by the re-conditioning of our emotional energies. There is here a *complete release* from tensions of waking experience. It is an experience of *liberation*, where the only laws are the laws of free joy without the bondage of sense-titillation. Some of our art-workers, as we shall see later, testify to the operation of these laws.

We now take some examples of art-creation:

A work of art, it has been maintained, must have a material basis. The colour-effect and undulations of line are important in painting and sculpture. So are the im-

pressions of mass and volume in architecture. In music, sound-effect is perceptual in origin and enjoyment. All these qualities of art can neither be enjoyed nor produced without intensification of waking experience. They re-require a ' release ' of the mind much akin to that of Samādhi. Perhaps, this experience differs from Samādhi only in the point of sensory adjustment.

But some of the art-creations have dreamy character. Thorburn even says that all art bears close resemblance to dreams. ' The denizens of dreams' spring from Ego's unconscious energy; so are the characters of the dramatist in a drama. The experiences of the artist are surcharged with intense libidinal fire, and, in a concentrated creative gusto, rush out into live figures and symbols. In fact, the outward image is filled out with colour from without, but filled in with fire and life from within. An image, say a landscape painting of Bengali art, becomes a cluster of dreams. Such an image is the artistic symbol and a creation of profoundly concentrated mental state. It cannot be enjoyed at the level of *waking* mind. In fact, all imaginative art, formal beauty, symmetry etc. yield joys of a dream. They are but externalized dreamy states.

The chant of classic music, the moving rhythm of dance, the dynamic quality in a painting we call harmony, and the most pathetic situation in the first-rate tragedies, all tend to produce a state of deep sleep (सुषुप्ति). From this character of some important art-products the schools of Psycho-analysis have been led to suppose that all art-experience is infantile regression or introversion. Freud regards enjoyment in art-creations as a result of the wish-to-die, a desire to return to the primal state. Jung calls it incest-wish to return to the state of primeval matter (materia—meaning both mother and matter). No one denies that some art is of morbid nature and weakens the will. But in deep sleep, there is no general lowering of

life's tempo. It is a state of exhiliration without the wear and tear of waking mind's struggle for adjustment.

Then there is the sublime art of Vedic and Upaniṣadic songs, the religious painting and sculpture in mediaeval Europe and India. The religious artists, icon-makers and the architects of temples and churches sought, by means of cloud-kissing minerates, arches and lines etc. to give form to the formless, to present through suggestive symbols the supersensible realities in the medium of the sensible. Such an art can be created and appreciated in Samādhi state. In fact, the artists here are the seers and saints.

Waking is the stage set for execution. In the midst of tensions here, there is the freedom of movement and action. For conception and creation, these tensions must cease and action be stayed. We create in dream, sleep and Samādhi, where the laws of tension are conducive to creation. These states are really induced by the artist. They require some sort of psycho-physical integration. In Samadhi, the integration of the mind, its re-ordinary and re-conditioning, are perfect from the aesthetic, ethical and scientific standpoints.

SHORT NOTES

The significance of Candragupta II's title Cakravikrama

By Dasharatha Sharma

One of the Gupta coins from the hoard recently unearthed at Bayānā (Rajasthān) bears the legend, *Cakravikramaḥ*, and represents the king as receiving some divine gift from the god Viṣṇu.[1] The occurrence of the word *vikrama*, here has rightly led numismatists to assign the coin to Candragupta II who, as we know, bore also the titles, *Siṁhavikrama*, *Vikramāṅka* and *Vikramāditya*, all of them emphasising the *vikrama* or prowess of this Gupta Emperor. But while the meaning of these appellations is clear, *Cakravikrama* is still something of a riddle. It must, of course, have a meaning, and a meaning, too, that would suit the scene depicted on the coin. A good help in understanding its true significance would perhaps be the following verse from the *Śiva-Mahimnaḥ-Stotra*:—

Hariste sāhasraṁ kamalabalimādhāya padayor-
yadekone tasmin nijamudaharannetrakamalam !
gato bhaktyudrekaḥ pariṇatimasau cakravapuṣā
trayāṇāṁ rakṣāyai Tripurahara jāgarti jagatām

Here Śiva is the giver, and Viṣṇu, his devotee, the receiver of the gift of *Sudarśana-cakra*. And this *cakra* is no mere ornament. It is an ever-active weapon protecting the three worlds.[2] In the coin, we are discussing, Viṣṇu takes the place of Śiva. The devotee is Candragupta II who, in return for his great devotion, receives

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[1] The coin has been illustrated and described by Dr. A.S Altekar in the *Illustrated Weekly*, 22nd February, 1948.

[2] See lines 3 and 4 of the verse quoted above.

from Viṣṇu the Divine gift of *Vaiṣṇava* or *Sudarsana Cakra*, a gift most probably symbolising the idea that Lord Viṣṇu had been pleased to endow Candragupta II with a prowess (*vikrama*) and vigilance equal to that of his own *cakra*, so that he (Candragupta II) might efficiently discharge his duties as a *sārvabhauma* or *cakravartin*. Thus interpreted the coin obviously proclaims Candragupta II's *ekādhipatya* or universal sovereignty, but it proclaims equally well his profoundly devotional nature, sincere conviction that all that he had was a gift of God.[3]

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[3] Perhaps this is the idea conveyed by Candragupta II's title देवश्री.

ESSENTIALS OF HINDU CULTURE*

By BHAGAVAN DAS

WITH the advent of Sva-rāja there has been a very desirable revival of interest among Hindus, (even many, not all, by any means, of those who have been educated in modern western ways of thought), in the traditional Dharma and the language in which it is embodied and expounded viz., Sanskṛta, in the ancient Scriptures. (To some of these modern-educated the names of Manu and Vyāsa and Kṛṣṇa and *anathema maranatha*!). Hindi has been declared by the Bhārata Government to be the national language, Raṣṭra-bhāṣā, of India. But there has been a growing demand, from many quarters of India and many sections of the Hindu public, that Sanskṛta should be made Rāṣṭra-bhāṣā in place of Hindi. And at least one weekly and one monthly, within my knowledge, have been published in that language, in U.P., for some time now. In a way, no doubt, Sanskṛt would be more acceptable to all the provinces (or States according to the new Constitution) of India than Hindi; because, some centuries ago, it was the common language of all India, understood by all the well-educated and learned everywhere; even as English during the last hundred years and even now. But it is a very difficult language, not easily learnt, and quite unfit for use by the general public. For that very reason it began to be replaced, since before Buddha's birth, by Pālī, Prākṛta etc., which have become gradually transformed into the four most important mother-tongues of the northern two-thirds of India, and even the four most important mother-tongues of South India, viz., Telugu, Kannada, Tamil,

*** Address delivered on March, 19, 1950 in the Annual General Meeting of the Institute.**

Malayalam, are full of Sanskṛta words. Realising this, efforts are being made in several quarters to simplify it, by ignoring many of the rules of Pāṇini's grammar. Eg., a *Bharatīya-Vidyā-Pracāra-Samiti* has been established in Agra, a main object of which is such simplification.

But even if Sanskṛta were revived, even if it came into wide use in the course of some decades, even if the impossible tasks of creating skt. equivalents for thousands of technical words of western science—knowledge of which will always remain indispensable for Indian professors and students—even then the problem would remain unsolved as to what exactly is Hinduism or rather Sanātana Dharma and what are the *Essentials of that Hindu Culture* which all (self-styled, brāhmaṇa) Paṇḍits as well as many others of us are very rightly wishing to revive. It is very necessary that all of us who are interested in the matter should make our own minds clear first, and then that of the general public as far as possible, as to 'What exactly is the specifically differentiating characteristic of what we call Hinduism, Hindu Dharma, Sanātana Dharma, or Ārya Dharma?'

Ask any one who calls himself a Hindu, literate or illiterate, even a Paṇḍit most deeply versed in Vedas, Smṛtis, Itihāsa-Purāṇa, Śāstras; he will not be able to give you a satisfactory reply.

Is it *śikhā* and *sūtra*, top-tuft (like that of Amerindians) and sacred thread? But children of even highest-and-holiest feeling brāhmaṇa have no *sikhā* till *muṇḍana*, head-shaving sacrament, and no sacred thread till formal investiture with it, *upanayana*. *Sannyāsis* have neither. Also followers of the *Sāma-Veda* keep no top-tuft: *viśikhāḥ sāma-gāḥ*. And there are Smṛti-texts which say '*gotra-cihnam Śikhā-karma*, top-tuft is only a mark of the clan to which the wearer belongs: and, accordingly, it is worn in different ways, on different parts of the skull,

in different parts of India. Some Smṛtis say also that the sacred thread should be worn during performance of special rites and ceremonies, and need not be worn all day and night.

Is it belonging to one of the four castes? But there are no longer only four castes. Instead, there are some twenty-five hundred castes and sub-castes and sub-sub-castes, each exclusive of all others.

Is it knowledge of Sanskṛta? Not one in ten thousand or even twenty-five thousand has it.

Any particular form of dress? Every State, every caste, every profession has its own More, it has varied century after century in the same State and caste or sub-caste. The dress of the Banaras Pandit of today is very different from that of his grandfather a hundred years ago

Is it belief in Vedas? Buddhists, Jainas, Sikhs, Tāntrikas do not believe in them. The six *āstika* (believing) and six *nāstika* (non-believing) *darśanas*, views, philosophies, outlooks upon life and the universe, are well-known. But even among the *āstikas* (believers in a future life and world), Yoga, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, do not believe in a personal God (though Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are popularly and erroneously supposed to do so). Nor do any of these believe in Veda as word of God. Some of them believe in Veda but not in a personal God Others, the reverse. Aśva-, go-, nara-medha, ceremonial sacrifice of horse, cow, man, have completely disappeared. The last horse sacrifice definitely known to history was performed by Emperor Samudra Gupta in Banaras some fifteen centuries ago. It is not known whether he performed it with all its horrible filthy obscenities or had them omitted.

Is worship of any particular form of deity such specific mark? There are hundreds of sects, each having its own object of worship.

Any particular *mantra*. There are over a score of *gāyatrīs* and scores of other *mantras*:

Is it any particular custom or practice? There are hundreds upon hundreds of different customs and practices in different castes and sub-castes and parts of the country, as to what to eat and what to not eat, from whose hand to take food and drink, whether to eat off metal dishes and cups or off only leaves, whether to put salt on the bare ground besides the plate or leaf holding other viands or put it also on plate or leaf, with whom to interdine or intermarry, whether father-in-law and son-in-law should see each others' faces or not, whether mother-in-law and daughter-in-law should see each others' faces or not, etc. Laws of inheritance and succession are very different in the Strī-rājyas of Malabar where matriarchate prevails, *narāṇaṁ mātula-kramaḥ*, sisters' son inherits. And so on and so forth.

If a careful investigation were made of such variations by a group of workers and result published, it would probably make a large volume of a thousand pages. It is all well worth doing. The new *Hindu Code Bill*—if passed as it stands, without substantial modifications, which is not very likely, though possible—will no doubt cause some change in these customs and practices and reduce, as is very desirable, the bewildering variety; but even then some will continue for long yet.

What then, in these circumstances, should be regarded as specific characteristic of Sanātana Dharma? In one sentence, it is *Samāja-Vyavasthā*, Socio-Individual Organisation of the Progeny of Manu, Tanzim-i-Jama'at-i-Bani-Adam, of men, Mānavas, Humans, Children of Adam, Ādi-Manu, on the principles of *Varṇa-Dharma* and *Āśrama Dharma* viz., *Karmaṇā Varṇaḥ* and *Vayasā Āśramaḥ*, as founded in and arising out of *Adhyātma Vidyā*, *A-dvaita* Vedānta Philosophy and Psychology. In

other words, four main general professions and occupations, viz. learned, executive, commercial, industrial, according to congenital vocational aptitude and temperament, and four main orders, student, householder, honorary unremunerated public worker, and renunciant *sannyāsī*.

This Science of Human nature, i.e., Nature of the Individualised self, and of Divine Nature, i.e., Nature of the Infinite, Eternal, Universal Self, Science of Jīvātma and Param-Ātmā, is expounded in *Upaniṣads*, which are probably ten thousand years old or more and *Bhagavad-gītā* which is a systematic abridgment of them and is five thousand years old. *Gītā* is part of Vyāsa's great epic *Mahābhārata*; and the Great War described in it by Vyāsa as eye-witness, was fought 3100 B.C. in round figures, according to latest up-to-date Indian scholars. And the Scheme of Human Organisation, very briefly indicated in *Gītā*, is expounded in detail in *Manu-Smṛti*, latest edition of which, as found in the current version, is between twenty two and twenty-five hundred years old by practically unanimous agreement of Indian as well as European Indologists. But Manu is mentioned in *Vedas* with reverance—*Yad vai kiñcana Manuḥ avadat tad Bheṣajam*, whatever Manu has said is panacea, is elixir; and his verses—some not found in the current version—are repeatedly quoted in *Mahābhārata*. He is also referred to and quoted in Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*. And traditions are current of a *Bṛhan-Manu-Smṛti* and also of *Mānava-Dharma-sūtras*, as part of *Ved-āngas*. In fact, in some editions of *Manu-Smṛti*, diligent editors have collected in appendices, upwards of four hundred, not found in the current version, but found in *Bṛhan Manu* and other works, and quoted by post-Śaṅkara writers.

It has been the fashion among western orientalists to reduce the age of Indian Scriptures as much as possible. on the principle on which Bishop Ussher determined that

the World was created by God exactly 4004 B.C. Even such liberal-minded students of Indian Philosophy as Aldous Huxley, popular and versatile writer on many subjects, and as great an admirer of *Upaniṣads* as Schopenhauer, but far more apparatus for study of them than was available to Schopenhauer a hundred years ago, assigns to them no higher antiquity than 800 B.C. in his recent book, *Grey Eminence* (pub. 1949). But progress in astronomy, geology, physics, archaeology, evolutionary biology and other sciences has exploded good Bishop Ussher's view, and even devout Roman Catholics are ashamed of it. Buddha, twenty-five centuries ago, described the evils of the'caste system', as it was current in his time, condemned the principles of *Janmanā Varṇaḥ*, caste-by-birth and endeavoured to reform it by restoring it to its primal original scientific basis of *Karmaṇā Varṇaḥ*, vocational profession-by-worth and way of winning livelihood. His contemporary, *Mahāvīra* Jaina did exactly the same. In *Mahābhārata* also, the question is repeatedly discussed and decided definitely and emphatically in favour of *Karmaṇā*.

Incidentally, persons who are calling loudly for restoration of *Bhāratīya Sanskṛtī* should consider what it was in the times of Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas—polyandrous marriage of Draupadī with five Pāṇḍava brothers; any amount of polygymy culminating in Kṛṣṇa's 'lawful' marriages with eight women, supplemented by sixteen thousand and one hundred concubines; alcohol-guzzling to such an extent that it caused internecine destruction of all the Yādavas; gambling with stakes of not only property but liberty and even wives, so that Yudhiṣṭhira lost Draupadī to Duryodhana, whereupon the latter's brother Duśśāsana promptly dragged her by her hair into the *rāja-sabhā* and began pulling off her *sārī* to make her completely naked; while all the chivalrous knights, even Bhīṣma and Droṇa, were looking on without interfering. Even Sītā vows of

ferings of a thousand jars of alcohol each to Gangā and Yamunā if she returned safely with husband and brother-in-law to Ayodhyā. Polyandry prevails still in Jaunsar Bawar (Dehra Dun District); girls were being sold openly in the hills; wives were being exchanged or sold publicly during a fair held annually at Sipi near Simla. And so on. Steps have been and are being taken by the U.P. and East Punjab Governments to stop these doings now.

To return to the question of *Karmaṇā verses Janmanā*. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, and other ancient scriptures mention almost a dozen different *forms of government*, autocratic monarchy, constitutional monarchy, diarchy, republic, *gaṇa-rājya*, *sangha-rājya*, etc. But the *form of society* has remained the same throughout, under them all, i.e., four main professions in collective life and four stages in individual life.

The opening verses of *Manu-Smṛti* begin with a dramatic but very significant myth. They say that the pimeval Ṛṣis, sages and seers, reverently approached Manu, Primal Progenitor of those Ṛṣis and of the Human Race, and requested him to teach to them the *dharmas*, right-and-duties, of the four professions and four stages. They also stated the reason why they asked him and none else: 'Because thou alone knowest the meaning and Purpose of Life and the object of the supreme in periodically creating and destroying these countless worlds'. Response to the request is the Scheme of Organisation of the Human Race, without which human beings cannot achieve the Fourfold Purpose of Life, viz., Dharma, Artha, Kāma, and Mokṣa. The reason for requesting Manu and no other indicates the A-dvaita Vedānta Philosophy and Psychology on which the Scheme is firmly founded.

Later on *Manu Smṛti* states:

ध्यानिकं सर्वं एव एतद् यद् 'एतद्'—अभिशब्दितं;
नहि अनध्यात्मवित् कश्चित् क्रिया-फलं उपऽश्नुते ।

F. 31

'All this universe which is indicated by the word *This* is but Ideation of the Supreme Self. He who knoweth not the Nature of that Supreme Self, being ignorant of the Meaning and Purpose of life, cannot bring any action to fruitful issue; for he will not be able to guide his own and others' lives righteously, duteously, purposefully.' Such ignorance is the one sole cause of the aweful failure of the rulers, leaders, teachers of all the nations and countries of today, to establish 'peace on earth and goodwill among men'.

I see that Dr. Radhakrishnan, Ambassador of our Indian Republic to Russia, when presenting fresh credentials to the Vice-President of U.S.S.R , Comorade Mikhael Grechukha, on 5th March, said, : "We face our problems with the wisdom of the ages as the fervour of youth" I, for one, to my profound sorrow, see much "fervour of youth" and very alarming fervour too, but no sign at all of "the wisdom of ages", in dealing with our problems. Absence of that wisdom makes the fervour positively dangerous. In fact it has already resulted in deplorable manifestations of several sorts, communists' crimes, socialists' blunders, communal riots and murders etc.

The ignorance is by no means confined to India 'and Pakistan. It is widely prevalent in Russia, China, U.S.A., to mention only the bigger countries. If only a little of the Indian Ancient " Wisdom of the ages " were imported into their activities by Indian and Pakistani rulers, and also by those of the other three countries mentioned, principally Russia—for the fate of the two is now inextricably bound up with that of the three—then indeed *all* the problems that are agonising Mankind today would be solved satisfactorily, so far as is humanly possible. For, complete abolition of all pain and evil is impossible, is, in fact, against the Law of Polarity, of Duality, of Pairs of Opposites, *Dvam-Dvam*, which pervades and governs all

Nature; and only reduction of them, i.e., minimisation of misery and maximisation of happiness, in a given space for a given time is possible.

In this way may be established, for a few hundred years at least let us hope, the longed-for " peace on earth and good-will among men."*

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* More on this subject can obviously not be said in this paper. If any one happens to become interested in the subject, he may pursue it in my many books, small and large, Hindi, Sanskrit, and English, which I am ashamed to be compelled to mention, very imperfect as they are, in the lamentable absence of better ones.

Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting of the General Council of the Ganganatha Jha Research nstitute, Allahabad.

The Annual General Meeting of the General Council of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute was held in the Institute Building on Sunday, March 19, 1950 at 5 p.m. In the absence of the President—Dr. Bhagavan Das, the Vice-President Dr. Amaranatha Jha took the chair.

The following members were present: Dr. Amaranatha Jha (in the chair), Prof. A. C. Mukerji, Dr. B. R. Saksena, Shri R. C. Tandon, Dr. B. P. Saksena, Shri Shamsher Bahadur, Pandit Debi Prasad Shukla, Shri Vibhutinatha Jha, Shri B. N. Banerji, Rai Ram Charan Agarwal, Dr. P. K. Acharya, Dr. Ishwari Prasad, Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya, Shri M. K. Ghose and Dr. Umesh Mishra.

After the minutes of the last Annual Meeting were read and confirmed the meeting passed a condolence resolution at the sad death of Mr. Naim-ur-Rehman one of our Ordinary members. The Secretary then read out the Annual Report which is printed elsewhere in the journal. It was adopted.

Dr. B. P. Saksena made a suggestion that the Proceedings of the meeting and also the Annual Report should be written and published in Hindi. But it was pointed out by the Chairman that as these were published in the Institute Journal intended for the readers in India and abroad, the suggestion could not be accepted. In the unavoidable absence of the Treasurer, the Secretary presented the Statement of Accounts and the Estimated Budget for the year 1950-51, which were recorded and adopted respective-

ly after some discussion regarding the low salary paid to the Pandit of the Manuscript section.

After this the Chairman made the following remarks: The Budget Estimate may be approved with the direction to the Executive Committee that the expenditure should not exceed the income. The only source of income is from capital investment which is just enough for the publication of the Journal. There is no certain income out of which the establishment can be paid.

After this the meeting recorded a resolution expressing thanks to the Governments of Orissa and West Bengal for their grant of Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 2,500/- respectively. The meeting also expressed its thanks to the Government of U.P. and expressed the hope that the University Grants' Committee's recommendations for the grant to the Institute should be accepted.

As usual the Committee resolved to request the Accountant General, U.P. to depute an officer to audit the accounts of the Institute for the next year.

Dr. Bhagavan Das, the President of the Institute had kindly accepted to address the members of the Institute. But due to his old age it was not possible for him to attend the meeting and address it. So the address written out by him (which is published elsewhere) was read out by the Secretary.

There being no other business the meeting was declared closed with thanks to the chair and the members.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ALLAHABAD.

On behalf of the Executive Committee of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute I present the Annual Report for the year ending on March 31, 1949. During the year under review the most important work has been the construction of a wing of the Institute Building in which we have all gathered today. For full six years we enjoyed the hospitality of the authorities of the Hindu Boarding House for which we are most grateful. Since coming to our own building our responsibilities and needs have increased. Visitors come to gather information on various problems and topics and also to consult important books and manuscripts. This is one of the most important purpose of an Institute which should always be ready to supply such information as in the ordinary course one cannot get elsewhere. We do not lend books or manuscripts; scholars are eager to consult them in the Institute and also to get transcripts of manuscripts at their own cost. For all this we need an up to date equipment and also a highly competent research staff. It is a pity that there is no library where all the published books on Indology can be had. I have made representations to the Ministry of Education, Government of India to make such alterations in the law by which some institutions in the country should get all the publications free of cost. For a big country like India there should be at least *five* places, as for instance, Calcutta, Madras, Delhi, Allahabad and Poona, where an up to date library should exist. I do not know what effect my representation will have, but it would have been much more effective had some members of the Parliament taken up this question.

Since we came to this building we have been able to classify and catalogue our books. Proper cards have been prepared. We maintain a complete Accession Register. Card Cataloguing of Manuscripts is also in good progress. After it is complete we hope to take up a descriptive catalogue of Manuscripts. Even now one can easily see what a rich collection of Manuscripts we have, some of which are indeed rare. But the Collection of Manuscripts and their preservation are both costly and difficult. Every effort is being made to look after them with as great a care as possible.

As members will see we have constructed only one wing so far with two rooms on the ground floor and two on the first floor. This alone has cost us Rs. 35,342/8/-. Of this, the U.P. Government have donated Rs. 15,000/- only and the rest has been spent from our own funds. Besides, we have spent over one thousand on furniture and other equipment. We have also made arrangements for constructing other portions of the building and as soon as we get further grants we shall start it. Even as it is we need very badly closed shelves for keeping manuscripts.

All this needs money. It is discouraging that we have had practically no donations except the above mentioned grant from the U.P. Government and Rs. 1,000/- from the Government of Orissa for which we are thankful to both. Dr. Amaranatha Jha continued to give us a research scholarship. The U. P. University Grants' Committee visited our Institute in July last and was very much impressed with what we have done so far for the advancement of knowledge. It seems the Committee has made recommendations for both recurring and non-recurring grants to the Government. The Secretary approached the Minister of Education, U. P. Government and also the Secretary to the Ministry of Education, Government of India personally and has sent representations to them. We

hope the response will be satisfactory. The conditions in the country, however, have so deteriorated that in spite of our individual efforts no help has so far been received. It is needless for me to remind our Patrons and all those who are interested in the studies of Indology that without their help and encouragement the Institution cannot grow. It is they who can realise the importance of this Institute. History shows that it is their munificence which alone is responsible for the existence of big public institutions in the country. Who else can preserve the glorious heritage of our country of which every one of us is so proud? We need public sympathy and encouragement from those who realise the importance of our activities. We are sure when they will see that we have done so much work, they will never let this work suffer for want of funds.

Membership

The total number of Ordinary Members of the Institute on the 1st of January 1950 was 84 like the previous year. The number of Life Members was 85 as against 82 of last year, and that of Benefactors 20 as against 19 of the last year. The total number of all the members of the Institute at present is 209. Two ordinary members have dropped during the year.

Meetings

We had four meetings of the Executive Committee this year and most of the other business was transacted by correspondence.

Publications

During the year under review we have published Part IV of Vol. V and the first part of Vol. VI containing 403 pages of our Quarterly Research Journal. Due to the difficulties of the Press we have not been able to bring our

Journal up to date in spite of all our efforts. I am sorry to inform our members of the unusual delay in the publication of the *Sanskrit Documents*. The delay is due to the retirement of Dr. S. N. Sen from the Directorship of the National Archives of India; he was the General Editor. But now we are much more hopeful because the only portion which is in the Press is a short Index. We have made some selection of good and rare works for publication, but lack of funds stands in the way of our undertaking their publication.

Additions to the Library

More than fifty books have been presented during the year and some have been purchased also for the use of our Research Scholars. The manuscript section has been very much enriched. More than 200 manuscripts have been purchased this year, and I am glad to find that some of them are very important and rare.

Since our coming to this new building the Institute remains open from 12 Noon to 6 p.m. A Curator has been temporarily appointed. We have ordered for Steel shelves for keeping printed books and as soon as we get them, it will be possible for us to make better arrangements of our books which are still scattered in so many places at present. But for want of funds we have not been able to purchase closed shelves for keeping manuscripts. This again is one of our pressing needs. Manuscripts require more space and greater care.

Research Scholarship

We had, as members already know, three research scholars. Their term is now over. Shri A. S. Nataraja Ayyar, M.A., L.M., of Madras was working on '*Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation.*' I am glad to inform the members that the work is now complete. It covers some

800 pages of Foolscap size in manuscript. He has worked under the guidance of Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra, the Secretary of the Institute. The Executive Committee on the proposal of the Secretary requested Dr. Sir S. Varadachari. Retired Judge, Federal Court, to scrutinise the work of Shri Nataraja Ayyar, Dr. Varadachari was kind enough to take the trouble of going through it and has given a good report on the work. The term of Shri Ayyar expired on December 31, 1949 but he has been appointed temporarily to look after the Library. The period of the other two scholars, namely, Shri Daksinamurti Shastri and Virendra Acharya is also now over and the work they did, is preserved in the Institute. All this has to be now published for which we need funds.

The Executive Committee proposes to award the next scholarship for research in Buddhist Philosophy based on original texts, and we shall take necessary steps to appoint a really qualified scholar before long.

This is in brief a survey of the activities of the Institute during the year under report. Now, it is my pleasant duty to express my gratitude to all those who have helped the Institute in different capacities—contributing articles, presenting books, giving donations and so on. I hope they will continue their cooperation in future.

List of Journals received in Exchange

1. Journal U. P. Historical Society, Lucknow.
2. Journal Adyar Library, Madras.
3. Journal of Indian History, Madras.
4. Bulletin of the Deccan College, Post-Graduate Research Institute, Poona.
5. Main Current of Modern Thought, U.S.A.
6. Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, Tirupati.
7. Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona.

8. Journal of the Greater India Society, Calcutta.
9. Journal of the Bihar Research Society, Patna.
10. Vishva Bharati Quarterly, Shantiniketan.
11. Jain Gazette, Lucknow.
12. Prabuddha Bharata, Calcutta.
13. Journal of the Andhra History and Culture Guntur.
14. Bharati Bharatiya Sanskritic Vidyapitha Journal, Nagpur.
15. Journal of the Oriental Research, Kuppuswami Shastri Research Institute, Madras.
16. Astrological Magazine, Bangalore.
17. Journal of the Rama Varma Research Institute, Trichur.
18. Journal Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay.
19. Journal of the Kamarupa Anusandhana Samiti, Gauhati.
20. Journal of the Venkateshwara Oriental Research Institute, Tirupati.
21. Journal of the Bengal Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta.
22. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, London.
23. Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, London.
24. Journal of the American Oriental Society, America.
25. Journal of the Andhra Historical Society, Rajmundry.
26. Journal of the Mythic Society, Banglore.
27. Journal of the Gujarat Research Society, Ahmedabad.
28. Jain Antiquery, Arrah.
29. Journal of the Music Academy, Madras.

30. Journal of the Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala, Poona.
31. Journal of the Oriental Mss. Library, Trivandrum.
32. Indian Culture, Calcutta.
33. Aryan Path, Bombay.
34. Journal of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavana, Bombay.
35. Archaeology in India, Delhi.
36. The Suddha Dharma, Madras.
37. Bulletin of the New York Public Library, New York.
38. Maharaja's Sanskrit College Patrika, Mysore.
39. Indian P. E. N., Bombay.
40. Journal of the Sardul Rajsthana Research Institute, Bikaner.
41. The Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions, Washington.
42. University of Ceylon Review, Ceylon.
43. Journal of the Kaling Historical Research Society, Orissa.
44. Silpi, Madras.
45. The Poona Orientalist, Poona.
46. Maruf.

BALANCE SHEET FOR 1948-49

INCOME	Rs.	a.	p.	EXPENDITURE	Rs.	a.	p
Life Membership	30	6	0	Research Scholarship	21,55	0	0
Annual Membership	640	0	0	Book Binding	153	2	0
Donations	13,063	0	0	Cataloguing	60	0	0
Sales account	339	4	0	Building Expenditure	1,872	1	0
Interest account	2,163	0	0	General Postage	40	14	0
				Journal account	2,817	12	0
				General Expenditure	1,324	4	10
				Surplus income over Expenditure ...	7,812	11	8
Total ...	16,235	14	0	Total ...	16,235	14	0
LIABILITIES				**ASSETS**			
Due Expenditure	265	0	0	Almirah	284	0	0
Surplus income over Expenditure on 1st April 1948	1,45,194	14	7	Mss. and Books	581	0	0
Sarplus income over Expenditure on 31st March 1949	7,812	11	8	Advance account	4,200	0	0
				Securties account	1,37,529	13	1
				National Certificates	1,500	0	0
				Cash at Bank	9,162	7	2
				Cash in hand	15	6	0
Total ...	1,53,272	10	3	Total ...	1,53,272	10	3

Sd. GOPI NATH,
Auditor.

Sd. A. SIDDIQI,
Treasurer.

UMESHA MISHRA,
Secretary.

FINANCIAL ESTIMATE FOR 1949—50.

Income

	Item		Rs.
1.	Donations		20,000
2.	Govt. grant		10,000
	Bihar Govt. ...	5000	
	U. P. Govt. ...	5000	
3.	Life Membership		600
4.	Annual Membership		1,000
5.	Nonrecurring grant for Building from U.P. Govt.		75,000
6.	Interest on Securities		3.500
7.	Sales of Journal etc.		300
8.	Donations for Research Scholarship from Dr. Amaranatha Jha		780
			1,11,180
	Interest on the Reserve fund invested ...		4,000
	Total ...		1,14,580

Expenditure

	Item	Rs.
1.	Pandit ... 45/-/- P. M.	540
2.	Clerk ... 30/-/- „ „	360
3.	Peon ... 30/-/- „ „	360
4.	Chaukidar 15/-/-+15 D. A. from July 1949	270
5.	Publication of the Journal	4,000
6.	Scholarship	2,400
7.	Purchase of books	1,500
8.	Purchase of MSS.	1,000
9	Postage	100
10.	Binding of books and Journals ...	300
11.	Cloth for binding MSS.	100
12.	Publication of books	5,000
13.	Furniture	1,000
14.	Contingencies	100
15.	Auditor's fee	50
16.	Building with equipment	95,000
17.	Special grant to purchase Tibetan Tanjur ...	2,500
		1,14,580

UMESHA MISHRA
Secretary

Sd. A. SIDDIQI
Treasurer

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

STUDIES IN THE PURĀṆIC RECORDS ON HINDU RITES AND CUSTOMS by Dr. R. C. Hazra, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in Sanskrit, University of Dacca. Published by the University of Dacca; p. 367, 1940.

The book under review is a thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Dacca. It consists of two parts. The first part deals with the Major and the Minor Purāṇas and the chronology of the Purāṇic chapters on Hindu Rites and Customs while the Second Part is divided into five sections: (1) The Hindu Society before 200 A.D. and the Puraṇic Rites and Customs in the First Stage of their developement; (2) The Hindu Society from the 3rd to the 6th cen. A.D.; (3) Brāhmanical Elements in the Puraṇic Teachings; (4) The Purāṇic Rites and Customs as influenced by the Economic and Social Needs of the Sacerdotal Class; and (5) Absorption of Tantricism by the Purāṇic Rites and Customs. Besides, there are two Appendices, Bibliography and Index.

Dr. Hazra has done very useful work on the studies of Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas. His critical outlook and investigations have been always a matter of great satisfaction. The present work is also the result of his hard labour and fruitful researches. He has clearly brought out the immense importance of the study of the Purāṇas in various aspects, particularly the Rites and Customs. It is a matter of great satisfaction that Dr. Hazra has based all his conclusions on the study of original sources.

The subject is so vast, the resources are so extensive and difficulties in getting the correct version of the texts are so innumerable that a single volume like this is not at

all sufficient to present all the aspects of the topics easily. But in spite of this, the achievements of Dr. Hazra are very praise-worthy. He has handled the topics very carefully. His method of expressing the results of his researches is quite interesting and convincing. I am sure this volume will create an interest in the minds of its readers for a more extensive study of the Purāṇas.

WRITERS IN FREE INDIA: published by the P. E. N. India Centre; 22, Narayan Dhabolkar Road, Malabar Hills, Bombay 6; pp. 256; Rs. 5/-.

The volume under review while recording the proceedings of the 2nd. All-India Writers' Conference held at Benares in 1947, gives a critical analysis of some of the problems whch face some of the authors in India today as well as a survey of the various Indian literatures between 1945 and 1947. The ideals of the P.E.N. being what they are, it was natural that, among others, it should discuss such problems as "The Cultural Unity of India", "Applied Culture", "The Attitude of Classical and Modern Writers towards fundamental values of Life," "Freedom of Expression" and "Writers Responsibilities in Modern India". These are indeed the issues which face every author in India today—the more so because the partition and subsequent cultural crisis have raised grave doubts in the minds of the writer about the use of writing and the themes on which he should write. Shri Atulananda Chakravarty's paper on "Applied Culture" is especially enlightening in this regard as his emphasis is on the creation of "a mental atmosphere that may engender a better human behaviour and render the mosaic of human society more beautiful, more cohesive, more co-operative, more communicative". Herein would lie the ultimate salvation of the bewildered writer: in the extent to which he can

extend the borders of culture and infuse it in common life. This in truth is also the ideal of the P.E.N. and it is a pity that the other discussions have now and then forgotten this fact. Otherwise, the debate on the problem of value would not have ended merely with an emphasis on the creation of emotion or of beauty or the one on 'writers' responsibility should not have concluded on an entirely subjective level.

The second part of the volume is also a work of unequal merit and emphasis, and while there are some surveys which seek to outline the tendencies with a bare sprinkling of names, others simply give a catalogue of books and their authors. The result is that while Bengali appears, from the survey, not to be a virile literature, Sanskrit seems to be a language that is being written all round. Again, some of the surveys betray an attempt at over-rating contemporary authors, the most glaring of which is Dr. Iyengar's review of Indo-Anglian literature which gives a rather exaggerated account of our success in English writing. It would be surely better if, while getting such surveys prepared for future conferences, a board of editors sit together and outline the scope and manner of every record so that emphasis and description are equally distributed between the various accounts. It would be also better if the editor would print the other papers published elsewhere to make the proceedings really complete.

Even then, "Writers in Free India" will be an attractive volume for all authors and those interested in the literary work done in India. The Indian P.E.N. must be thanked for publishing such a volume.

AMAR MUKERJI.

Evolution of Songs: Shripada Bandopadhaya; Vani Mandir, Bharatıya Sangit Sahitya Prakashak, Premnangar, Sabzimandi, Delhi; pp. 120; Rs.3/6/-.

While written with the laudable intention of publicising the art of Indian music, the volume unfortunately is full of so many mistakes of fact and theory that the space at our disposal prevents us from pointing out in great details. Moreover, Shri Banerji seems to be over-charmed by a set of adjectives which he throws about so indiscriminately that they lose all their sharpness and prevent us from forming a real estimate of the musicians he has spoken about. The arrangement is also faulty and creates a lot of confusion as when the author while narrating the life of Dilipchandra Dwivedi suddenly starts narrating the affairs of the College of Indian Music Baroda.

All such inaccuracies of method and detail make "Evolution of Songs" a bad book, in spite of the material that it contains. Some of the inaccuracies are indeed misleading and one is really exasperated to look into the appendix which tries to list all the names of the artists and the art-critics. Such books, instead of doing any service to the cause of music, do it harm and the author is strongly advised to revise the entire material and write it out with a more strictly scientific attitude. Otherwise, the book would definitely fail in the purpose with which it has been written.

AMAR MUKERJI

Some aspects of Education in Ancient India.—Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures in the University of Madras by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, Adyar Library, Madras. 1950. Pages ix and III. Price Rs. 2-8-0.

Dr. C. Kunhan Raja delivered two lectures at the

above foundation of the Madras University and are now published as No. 73 of the Adyar Library Series.

The Professor has laid emphasis upon the continuity and unity of tradition relating to education from the early Vedic times to even recent times through the period of the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, the Upaniṣads, the Sutras and Smṛtis. The Vedic culture could be summarised in two words *Dharma* and *Brahman*; and these have developed as the philosophical systems of India. The theory of the three natal debts and the Brahmacarya āśrama were specially prescribed for the preservation and continuance of the cultural traditions of India. The convocation address at the end of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and the advice of the king to the would-be annointed prince in *Baṇa's Kadambari* are valuable even today. The book is very useful and gives a pleasant reading and instruction to young graduates of the present day.

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar.

EDICTS OF ASOKA (Priyadarsin), with English translation by G. Srinivasamurti and A. N. Kriṣhna Aiyangar and an introduction by K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar. Adyar Library, Madras, 1950; pages xliii and 147. Price, boards Rs. 2; cloth Rs. 3.

The Adyar Library should be congratulated for this handy and handsome edition of the Edicts of Aśoka in the original Prākṛt with a Sanskrit *chaya*, transliteration and translation into English with an elaborate introduction from the pen of the great historian Srī K. V. Rangaswami Iyangar.

Aśoka ruled an empire bigger than the British Empire in India and was the most remarkable and imposing of the rulers of the country. His edicts serve for the instruction of the future generation in Dharma till the end of

the aeon (Kalpa). Asoka organised a system of foreign missions which permanently determined the religious history of a large portion of the world. The substance of his edicts emphasises the respect for the absolute unconditional right of the meanest animal to retain the breath of life until the last moment permitted by nature; and along with reverence to elders and superiors and truth, the toleration and sympathy for the belief and practices of others was laid down as a fundamental duty. He considered the welfare of the world as the highest duty and all his subjects were his children. —A. S. Nataraja Ayyar.

NEHRU ABHINANDAN GRANTH: A Birthday Book. Presented to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India on completion of his sixtieth year, Nov. 14, 1949. Published by Vishwanath More of the Aryavarta Prakashan Griha, 47, Muktarambabu Street, Calcutta 7. Price Rs. 30.

Unlike the usual birthday-books presented to political leaders, the one under review contains much that may interest the scholarly world too. There are thoughtful articles on History, Art, Politics, Literature, Modern Indian Languages, etc. and a translation of a selection of original writings in different languages of India written for this volume. The volume is worthy of an honourable place on the shelves of an art-lover (there are some 76 plates independently given of distinctive Indian paintings, some of which had not seen the light of day so far indicating of cultural heritage of the people of our country) as well as a Nehru-enthusiast. There is a valuable bibliography of books and articles by and on Pandit Nehru in English and in the principal Indian languages.

DARBHANGA : By Dr. Jayakanta Mishra, Published by the Local Secretary, XIV Oriental Conference, University of Allahabad, Allahabad. Price Rs. 1/8/-. 1948. (Along with a SOUVENIR containing illustrations from social and cultural life of Mithila. Rs. 1/8/-. 1948).

" Mithilā is perhaps the only part of India which has been able to preserve a continuity in the evolution of Bharatīya Saṇskṛti from the days of the *Ṛgveda Saṁhita* " The present booklet is a small introduction to its chief city, viz., Darbhanga. It contains a brief account of Mithilā and her culture, and a select list of historical and cultural sites in Mithilā. While we recommend this to interested readers, we cannot but express our disappointment at the non-publication of a more comprehensive historical account of Mithilā and her life prepared by the *XIV All-India Oriental Conference* which we hope will now be " published in due course."

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ORIENTAL CONFERENCE VOL. I. Published by Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra, M.A., D.Litt., University of Allahabad, Allahabad. 1949. Price Rs. Five. Pages 300+iv.

The Darbhanga session of the *All-India Oriental Conference* was unique in the annals of scholarly gatherings in recent times on account of the systematic and fullfledged participation of traditional Indian scholars in academic discussions of Sanskrit learning. As Mithilā (of which Darbhanga is the modern capital) has been for centuries the home of traditional Sanskrit scholarship, these attracted a large share of attention. If the organisers of the conference had taken the cue from this session and had encouraged more and more active association of the tradi-

tional with modern scholarship it would have done a lot of good to both. While we must respect and learn the depth, the thoroughness and the singleminded selfless devotion to the cause of scholarly pursuit (even in its decadent aspect) among the traditional Pandits, we cannot help thinking that they have to be awakened out of their listless stupor, their almost self-effacing complacency, their "stay-where-you-are" attitude and their lack of confidence and even enthusiasm in pursuing their studies beyond the trodden and easily accessible limits. They must needs be reformed. They have to learn by contact with modern scholars, the critical and historical approach, the efforts to understand and go beyond the easily accessible limits and a more organised sense of research. The type of essays written for some of the Paṇḍita Pariṣad sections reveal this, whereas quite a few of them deserve serious notice of the highest and most academic brains of the world of Oriental Scholarship.

For the rest, these proceedings contain the usual kind of stuff, except if it be the most valuable appendix on *XXI International Oriental Conference* by Dr. R. N. Dandekar who had attended it along with Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, Mm. P. V. Kane and Dr. S. Radhakrishanan—which may be recommended to all interested in knowing what Oriental Scholarship is doing now in Europe.

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar.

BOMBAY: Story of the Island City. By A. D. Pusalker and V. G. Dighe. Published by the Local Secretary XV All-India Oriental Conference, Town Hall, Bombay 1., 1949. Price Rs. 3. Pages 125.

While this booklet was prepared for members and delegates to the *XV All-India Oriental Conference*, it may well serve as handy historical introduction to the general

reader. It is based on standard works on the subject and has an added value in that it has devoted a whole chapter to a select list of books on Bombay. An item of interest to Oriental scholars is the section on Research Institutes in Bombay.

CANDRALEKHA by Rudradasa (A drama in Prakṛt). Edited along with Sanskrit chaya, Critical Introduction, Notes, Appendix, Glossory etc. by Dr. A. N. Upadhye. Published in the Bharatiya Vidya Series, Bombay. Pages 66+96. Price Rs. 6. 1945.

This is a " welcome addition to the published Prākṛt literature, especially when there has been such a deplorable lack of Prakṛt plays belonging to the Saṭṭaka type which has been all along illustrated only by the *Karpūramañjarī*." The author of this play flourished in about 1660 A.D. The learned editor has given an elaborate critical introduction, in which as well as in the appendix he also discusses the saṭṭaka as a type of drama in the background of the evolution of Indian drama. With the growing importance of modern Indian languages, it is but meet that more intensive study and extensive publication of Prākṛt works should be undertaken. The editor deserves every thanks for his pains, but needs to be emulated except in the rather unnecessary repetition of known facts.

COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS—INDIAN ÆSTHETICS, VOL. 1. By Dr. Kanti Chandra Pandey, M.A., Ph.D. D.Litt., M.O.L., Shastri; Sessendi Raj Reader, Lucknow University. Published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Banaras, 1950. pp. xxii+486. Price Rs. 16/-.

The book under review is published in the *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series* Ṣtudies Vol. II. It is a portion of the

Thesis approved for the degree of D.Litt. in Philosophy by the University of Lucknow. Dr. Pandey is already known to the scholarly world for his work on *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study*. The present Volume also is mainly concerned with the presentation of 'Abhinavagupta's Theory of Aesthetics against the background of the History of Aesthetic thought in India and in proper setting of the system of the monistic Śaiva Philosophy of Kashmir, as propounded by him in his *Īśvarapratyabhijna-vimarśinī and Isvarapratyabhijna-vivṛti-Vimarsinī*.' Though the study of Aesthetics in India has been so important, yet it has not much attracted the attention of modern scholars. This may be due to the somewhat difficult nature of the subject. The scope of Aesthetics is vast and variegated. A comprehensive study of the subject has been a great desideratum. I am glad that Dr. Pandey has taken up this subject and has planned a comprehensive history of it.

The work under review is its first volume. It contains seven chapters dealing with (1) History of Indian Aesthetics, (2) The Śaiva Basis of Abhinava's Aesthetics, (4) Abhinavagupta's Theory of Meaning, (5) Mahima Bhaṭṭa's criticism of Dhvani and a reply, (6) The technique of Sanskrit Drama, and (7) Aesthetic currents in poetics.

All the topics have been critically and chronologically dealt with. The author has explained the facts in a lucid and interesting manner. His exposition is quite good. I am told that the next volume of this book is also ready. I congratulate Dr. Kanti Chandra Pandey for this very useful and scholarly work.

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WRITERS IN FREE INDIA : Published by the P. E. N. India Centre.

EVOLUTION OF SONGS, by Shripada Bandopadhyaya.

SOME ASPECTS OF EDUCATION IN ANCIENT INDIA, by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., Ph.D.

EDICTS OF AŚOKA WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION by G. Srinivasa Murti, M.A. and A. N. Krishna Aiyangar.

NEHRU ABHINANDAN GRANTH. Published by Vishwanath more of the Aryavarta Prakashan Griha, Calcutta.

DARBHANGA, by Dr. Jayakanta Mishra, M.A., D.Phil.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ORIENTAL CONFERENCE, Vol. I. Published by Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra.

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CANDRALEKHĀ by Rudradāsa (a drāma in Prākṛta) Edited by Dr. A. N. Upadhye.

COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS--INDIAN ÆSTHETICS, Vol. I. By Dr. Kanti Chandra Pandey, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., M.O.L., Shastri.